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Abstract: 
 
My dissertation employed intellectual historian Michel Foucault’s notion of biopolitics—
which can be most broadly parsed as the political organization of life—to examine the 
way the lives of Aboriginal people were regulated and surveilled in relation to settler 
European norms. The study is a focused investigation into a topic with global 
ramifications: the governance of race and sexuality and the effect of such governance on 
the production of apparently inclusive cultural productions within the public spheres. I 
argue that the way in which subaltern peoples have been governed in the past and the way 
their cultures have been appropriated continue to be in the present is not extraneous to but 
rather formative of what is often misleadingly called “the” public sphere of dominant 
societies. In the second part, I analyze the legacies of this biopolitical moment and 
emphasize, particularly, the cultural politics of affect and trauma in relation to this (not 
quite) past. Authors addressed include: Xavier Herbert, P. R. Stephensen, Rex Ingamells, 
Kim Scott, Alexis Wright, and others. I also examine Australian Aboriginal policy texts 
througout the twentieth century up to the "Bringing Them Home" Report (1997). 
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Introduction 
Artifacts of Settler Colonialism 
Biopolitics in the Bank Vault 
In the files of the Western Australian Aborigines Department, census data on 
Aboriginal people from 1928-1944 is held in a single microfiche. There, “half-caste” is 
divided from “full blood”—a symbolics of blood enmeshed with an analytics of 
sexuality.1 Similarly, this analytic is cross-referenced to the socioeconomic mode 
inhabited by these indigenous subjects: nomadism, habitation in “supervised camps,” 
employment in the settler community.2 Slipped in with this folder, alongside this 
racialized calculus of demography and modus vivendi, is a government circular generated 
by the Bank of New South Wales titled “The Australian Population: Growth or 
Decline?”3 In handwritten ink at the top of the circular is an instruction that it be filed 
with population statistics; an instruction signed by A. O. Neville, Chief Protector of 
Aborigines in the state from 1915-1940. The signature of the Native Protector embeds the 
regulation of the lives of “Natives” within broad demographic aggregates, their 
correlation to the makeup of the nation, and the vital and capital wealth which resided 
within its territory.  
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The circular does not mention Australia’s indigenous population. Rather, it is 
primarily concerned with a decline in the Australian national birth rate, as well as the 
decline (since the mid-nineteenth century) of death rates, the commensurability of either 
with equivalent trends in other nations, the resultant distribution of age, and the abiding 
implications of all these factors for economic growth and vital prosperity at the national 
level. Neutralized of specific designators around race, the circular nonetheless begins 
with a question, marked by that trope’s unwieldy deployment: “The question of ‘racial 
decay’ cannot be settled by mere reference to the birth rate.”4 Here race is subject to a 
certain slippage. “[R]acial decay” seems to refer less to racial “others” than  it does to a 
conception of the human race or species as a whole, even as this conception hides an  
insistence on white dominance in the making of the settler nation. The population subject 
to potential decay is, then, the settler population at the antipodean margin. Where explicit 
reference to indigenous peoples and non-European migrants is absent from the document, 
blindness to “race” throughout the remainder of the circular marks the neutralization of 
this category of demography—a category with which it was nonetheless correlated and 
filed alongside. 
The Native Affairs file in which this bank circular has been slipped (by order of 
the Chief Protector) is precisely the antithesis of this ambiguous marking of race. 
Aboriginal people were not counted in the Commonwealth Census until a referendum in 
1967 overturned this symbolic segregation. Yet attempts to survey, enumerate, and 
classify “Natives” across the entire Commonwealth territoriality had been underway 
since as early as 1924. As a technology of surveillance, the census precedes its function 
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of including “others” in the accounting of the national polity. The Western Australian 
Aborigines Department supplied its data to this national process of aggregation, 
enumeration, and classification, which implicitly divided the Aboriginal population both 
from the wider population (through their exclusion from the Commonwealth census) and 
internally, through a system of book-keeping, grounded in an analytics of blood and 
territory.  
I open with this microscopic description of a single folder in a postcolonial 
archive since it foregrounds a central tension in settler colonial governance. In the 
process of producing itself as a nation, the settler colony both absents indigeneity and 
aims to ingest it—excluding, segregating, and subjecting the indigenous body and 
population, while simultaneously aiming at its assimilation. Such a settler nation as that 
which emerges in twentieth century Australia is—all at once—an instance of a newly 
formed postcolonial liberal democracy, a culture in search of a nationalist narrative, and a 
state predicated on ongoing colonial dispossession. With liberalism lies so pre-eminently 
at the center of this tripartite narrative, it is also emblematic of a tension at the heart of 
the form of governmentality which Michel Foucault named “biopolitics.” Indeed, the 
parable about the postcolonial archive with which I opened indexes Foucault’s logic: the 
analysis of demography (biopolitics) emergent in the early nineteenth century was 
paralleled by the emergence of a concomitant diminution of government intervention in 
the private sphere (liberalism). Just as the market was emerging as an autonomous realm 
beyond the reach of government intervention, technologies for measuring laboring lives 
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and exchangeable things developed alongside this doctrine of non-intervention. These 
technologies allowed the maintenance of a less perceptible governmentality. 
In his 1975-6 Lectures at the College De France, Foucault theorized biopolitics by 
describing a shift in the logic of sovereignty that had emerged in early modern European 
thought. Foucault had previously spent his career investigating the way in which human 
beings are made subjects. In his histories of such institutions as the prison and the 
madhouse, he identified a model of disciplinary power which worked through 
surveillance, with its production of docile bodies. With biopolitics, Foucault would come 
to be concerned with the production of aggregates to which a form of power resembling 
(but not coincident with) disciplinary force directed itself: “[u]nlike discipline, which is 
addressed to bodies, the new nondisciplinary power is not applied to man-as-body but to 
living man, to man-as-living-being,” and ultimately, to “man as species.”5 This “new 
technology that is established is addressed to a multiplicity of men, not to the extent that 
they are nothing more than individual bodies, but to the extent that they form, on the 
contrary, a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, 
production, illness.”6 As such, Foucault suggests, by the end of the eighteenth century, 
there arises “the emergence of something that is no longer an anatomo-politics of the 
human body, but what I would call a ‘biopolitics’ of the human race.”7 Here we find a 
clue to the muted articulation of race encountered in that strange moment of filing I just 
described: a Bank of New South Wales circular, slipped in alongside the enumeration of 
Aboriginal subjects. Under biopolitics, race is at first a totality, interchangeable with the 
notion of species. Yet this biopolitics of the human species, emergent alongside 
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nineteenth century ideas about internal human difference, is immediately attended by the 
concept of “race” in the other sense. The vital calculation of the species nonetheless 
presents non-white, non-Western “others” as simultaneously of the “human species” and 
temporally, developmentally, or environmentally other—difference in degree extended to 
a point verging on a difference of kind. The human species, conceived in its nineteenth 
century form as one made up of many divergent races, is immediately evacuated from the 
calculus of the vitality of the whole: the vitality of the whole becomes that of the 
privileged, the white, the European. Within the broad biopolitical calculus of aggregates 
which takes the “human race” or “human species” as its object, the outcome of both 
anatomo-physical power and its aggregation across bodies becomes: “control over 
relations between the human race, or human beings insofar as they are a species, insofar 
as they are living beings.”8 This idea of the human race as human species is concerned 
with “the birth rate, the mortality rate, longevity, and so on—together with a whole series 
of related economic and political problems.”9 Further, what emerges at the level of the 
application of power to individual bodies is an attempt to normalize in commensurability 
with the biopolitical aggregate—a power which Foucault names biopower. Biopower 
emerges as a concern with normalization; one within which “the norm is something that 
can be applied to both a body one wishes to discipline and a population one wishes to 
regularize.”10 Biopower is applied to individuals whose vital normativity will ensure the 
regularities toward which biopolitical thought attains. Insofar as the settler colony 
perceives itself as a nation of settlers, it is against the backdrop of biopolitics that it 
generates the calculus of norms in relation to the population as a whole that will be its 
projected telos.  
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According to a European genealogy of power that is exported with colonialism, 
“[s]overeign power’s effect on life is exercised only when the sovereign can kill. The 
very essence of the right of life and death is actually the right to kill: it is at the moment 
when the sovereign can kill that he exercises his right over life.”11 Prior to the nineteenth 
century, when raison d’État circulated around a centrifuge of sovereign power, the state 
retained this right to kill. Indeed, the state never does away with this deathly power, but 
rather, with the emergence of fields such as population, the apparent minimalization of 
government manifest in liberalism, and the proliferation of biologistic modes of thinking, 
it comes to be inverted. As Foucault notes, in the nineteenth century, sovereignty 
undergoes a shift: 
sovereignty’s old right—to take life or let live— . . . came to be complemented by 
a new right which does not erase the old right but which does penetrate it, 
permeate it. This is the right, or rather, precisely the opposite right. It is the power 
to ‘make’ live and ‘let’ die.12  
Biopolitics is implicated in this reversal and produces a distribution of life in which life 
and death are both imbricated, symbolically and diachronically arranged in mutual 
protection and negation. The power to make live is, for Foucault, the essence of 
biopolitics, the aim—through the disciplinary normalization of the body—to regularize a 
population as a whole, while affecting the human species at this population’s horizon. 
Foucault, will repeat his formulation later in the lecture, in order to make clear its relation 
with biopower and biopolitics: 
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sovereignty . . . consisted in the power to take life, we now have the 
emergence, with this technology of biopower, of this technology of power 
over ‘the’ population as such, over men insofar as they are living beings. It 
is continuous, scientific, and it is the power to make live. Sovereignty took 
life and let live. And now we have the emergence of a power that I would 
call the power of regularization, and it, in contrast, consists in making live 
and letting die.”13  
For Foucault, this thinking is directly linked to race and to racism. In the settler colonial 
bank vault, the statisticians of the population and the market make a single mark around 
“racial decay” only to occlude discussion of “other” races. Today’s advocates of 
liberalism see it as a “complex of evolving discourses, beliefs, and ideals,” and identify 
this evolving complex by reference to a mobile tradition committed to minimal 
government intervention, a commitment in turn formed around ideals of neutrality of 
state intervention, norms of fairness, non-coercive political power, and even a 
commitment to relative toleration of differing conceptions of individual good.14 
Foucault’s account is, instead, rooted in the operations of governance around the twin 
spheres of market and population, which liberalism is in fact grounded on, despite its co-
emergent political philosophy. For Foucault, liberalism as a mode of governing seeks to 
concern itself with the vitality (and, indeed, wealth) of the “human race,” but, in so doing, 
it conceals its constitutive relation with non-European “races.” The fact that this 
universality is filed away with an analytics of blood and of sexuality needs to be 
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emphasized. But let me first carry to its conclusion, Foucault’s principle contention on 
the relation between race and sovereign power after the turn to biopolitics. 
As Ann Laura Stoler has noted, even as he explicitly connects the retention of 
race within the logic of sovereignty and death to nineteenth century racial biologism and 
to colonialism, Foucault’s genealogy remains largely Eurocentric.15 Regardless, in 
principle at least, for Foucault, the relation between race and population vitality allows us 
to  
understand why racism should have developed in modern societies that 
function in the biopower mode; we can understand why racism broke out 
at a number of privileged moments, and why they were precisely the 
moments when the right to take life was imperative. Racism first develops 
with colonization, or in other words, with colonizing genocide. If you are 
functioning in the biopower mode, how can you justify the need to kill 
people, to kill populations, and to kill civilizations? By using the themes 
of evolutionism, by appealing to racism.16  
And, while he hardly elaborated the concrete instantiation of these themes in  
“colonizing genocide” one nonetheless detects that they were, for Foucault, 
essentially bound up in a nineteenth century discourse of peoples and their 
relations as races and within the human race, an evolutionism, a physical 
anthropology. He makes this explicit in the lectures: 
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Evolutionism, understood in its broad sense---or in other words, not so 
much Darwin’s theory itself as a set, a bundle of notions (such as: the 
hierarchy of species that grow from a common evolutionary tree, the 
struggle for existence among species, the selection that eliminates the less 
fit)---naturally became within a few years during the nineteenth century 
not simply a way of transcribing a political discourse into biological terms, 
and not simply a way of dressing up a political discourse in scientific 
clothing but a real way of thinking about . . . colonization.17  
Foucault wasn’t all that explicit about what constituted killing in this analysis. Does 
putting a population to death only refer to the literal physical killing of its members, or 
should we also take seriously the way other organized schemas for disappearing racial 
others which take in eugenic praxis? Further, what is meant by Foucault’s reference to 
“kill[ing] civilizations” in his characterization of “colonizing genocide.” Much 
subsequent work has elaborated the connection between the civilizing mission and the 
broader imbrications of colonization in biopolitics and, at times, its genocidal reversal. 
Stoler, for instance, has indispensibly given an account of practices of colonial 
governmentality and race in the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina. Her theoretical 
framework proposes a useful emphasis on the way Foucault’s arguments can be taken to 
entail not only a thanatopolitical practice of death, but the more capillary, regular, and 
insidious means by which “biopower inscribed modern racism in the mechanisms of the 
normalizing state.”18 The further problematic for a biopolitical analysis of colonialism is 
the identification, disentangling, and specification of the concatenation of this politics of 
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death and the normalizing state which gradually supplants it: replacing the literal 
genocide of killing with the killing of civilizations—the microphysical operations of 
discipline, dressed up in the rhetoric of kindness, uplift, and the civilizing mission. Such 
projects seem to imagine indigenous survival, even as the integrity of such communities 
is often something to be entirely absented. 
In Australia, the idea that the Aboriginal population was subject to inevitable 
extinction subsisted well into the twentieth century. As a number of historians have 
shown, and as I lay out in more detail in Chapter 1, the demographic recognition of a 
rising population of people of mixed descent led to an intensive effort to regulate this 
population by eugenic means. Where people of mixed descent would survive the 
presupposed extinction of their “full blood” relatives, now techniques of biopower and 
discipline would be put at the service of ensuring that this new population could be 
absorbed through breeding into the settler European population. Where, in the nineteenth 
century settler colonialism painted a narrative of extinction for indigenous peoples, in the 
twentieth century the decreasing tenability of this myth led to varying strategies to either 
eugenically “absorb,” or socio-cultural assimilate indigenous people.  
For either the narrative of the doomed race or the eugenic intensity of absorption, 
the indigenous subject was imagined to be subject to a logic of disappearance. This 
notion of Aboriginal disappearance culminated in a 1937 Commonwealth Conference on 
Aboriginal Affairs, at which Neville put forward the rhetorical phrase which summarizes 
absorption: 
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“[a]re we going to have a population of 100 0000 blacks in the Commonwealth, 
or are we going to merge them into our white community and eventually forget 
that there ever were any Aborigines in Australia? . . . Our own population is not 
increasing at such a rapid rate as to lead us to expect that there will be a great 
many more white people in [remote] area[s] 25 years hence . . . I see no objection 
to the ultimate absorption into our own race of the whole of the existing 
Australian native race. In order to do this we must guard the health of the 
natives””19  
In Australia, clearly biopolitics over Aboriginal subjects retained an insistence upon 
death, albeit in a binary form. Where differing decisions applied to Aboriginal subjects 
depending on their blood quantum and social mode of life (savage/civilized, 
nomadic/sedentary), one must also identify the varying modes of death and disappearance 
to which this logic was given. But many historians also note that this logic of death and 
disappearance did not last. As the specter of Nazi eugenics was laid bare after the Second 
World War and Raphael Lemkin was drafting the international law prohibiting its 
repetition, perpetrators of colonizing genocide could hardly speak openly about projects 
of “forget[ting] that there were ever any Aborigines in Australia” through eugenic means. 
Many Australian historians emphasize and, to various degrees, valorize the post-war shift 
to assimilation, the socio-cultural project of producing from within mixed descent and 
“full blood” Aboriginal people the capacity to socially adapt to the norms of settler 
society and find acceptance not only as political but also as socially accepted citizens. 
From a thanatopolitics, to a natal-thanatopolitics to this biopolitical emphasis on 
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normativization, certain shifts of rhetorical emphasis emerged even as many 
governmental powers of subjection continued throughout the period—exemption from 
native status, the regulation of who could marry whom among natives, and the removal of 
Aboriginal children, particularly those of mixed descent. Debates about this practice in 
the public sphere today aim to draw neat periodizing lines at the moment when the nation 
was a eugenic apparatus worthy of revulsion, separating out the break moment when its 
policies came to envisage Aboriginal survival and relative equality. Drawing these lines 
emphasizes what should be remembered with caution and what was misguided and 
paternalistic, but perhaps defensible, continuous with contemporary ideas about how 
Aboriginal people can attain material equality if they are willing to abandon those aspects 
of their culture, praxis, and identity, considered to be incompatible with “civilization.” 
Throughout this study, I am skeptical of such neat and easy lines. For this reason, I don’t 
aim to exhaustively account for twentieth century Australian Aboriginal policy, but rather 
to point to marginal (and some central) limit moments, which worry the neatness of such 
neat historiographical transitions. I do so in order to reveal continuities that subsist into 
the present---a moment always assumed as given to the full plenitude of modernity. 
These continuities are often marked by practices of counting, classifying, and applying 
exceptional measures to subaltern and minority peoples. They are, in other words, 
biopolitical. Much can be said about when members of a dominant population tend to 
sanction moments when “others” are rendered subject to exceptional, particular 
applications of power and much of how we say it depends on our attitude to the tradition 
of liberalism. 
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Two years after the lectures where Foucault first aired this analysis of sovereign 
power and biopower, he aimed to return to the question of biopolitics. He had already 
surged through a long consideration of the emergence of war as a social locution and its 
concomitant implications for sovereignty and territoriality—not only between, but within 
societies.20 Having entitled his 1978-9 lectures “The Birth of Biopolitics,” it turned out 
that biopolitics was less the topic of this series than its birth and immanent remainder in 
liberalism—cast between the emergent practice of demography alongside an ethos of 
non-intervention in the market. He had spent much time developing a critique of the 
subsistence of raison d’État and its protection of sovereign power, but now he found that 
many of the mechanisms of government he identified continued as the state’s neutrality 
also emerged as a dominant tradition in political philosophy. How was it that the 
microphysics of power given in specific medicalized and disciplinary interventions into 
the body continued—indeed, increased—as the liberal doctrine of the neutrality of the 
state and the diminution of government power emerged and increasingly predominated. 
Informing his audience that while he had “thought he would do a course on biopolitics” 
he emphasized that biopolitics could only be conceived through the coemergence of 
“what is called population” alongside the emergence of liberalism.21  
it is only when we understand what is at stake in this regime of liberalism 
opposed to raison d'État-or rather, fundamentally modifying [it] without, perhaps, 
questioning its bases—only when we know what this governmental regime called 
liberalism was, will we be able to grasp what biopolitics is.22  
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For Foucault, liberalism became the framing political theory which accompanied the 
emergence of technologies of intervention in population. Where liberalism presupposed 
diminished government, the intervention of power in the sphere of the private became 
more microphysical, occasional, and minute. It also justified its analysis through the 
vitalization of life, the proper provision of medical care, the indirect economic support 
for private charitable, sanitary, and medical projects which would nonetheless return 
statistical aggregates in census data of increased birth rates, diminished death rates, and 
by extension, a healthier laboring population. 
The point here is that biopolitics organizes a whole arsenal of more particular 
forms of discipline and surveillance, directed against minor elements of the population: 
those considered abnormal, mentally or physically sick, and—increasingly after the 
nineteenth century—racially other. In its attempt to extend the increasing vitality in the 
population and a resultant expansion of value and utility, the New South Wales Bank 
circular nonetheless does not mention particular racially “other” individuals and 
populations to target, or strategies to practice normativization. Despite this elision of 
race, it seemed imperative that this document be circulated to the Aborigines Department, 
and its organizing outcome implied to Neville that it be filed alongside the sporadic 
censuses that his government was conducting. Counting Aborigines and tabulating 
precisely how the state was reforming them was understood to be a measure with 
immediate value for the nation as a whole. Settlements and supervised employment for 
“half-castes” proffered the potential that they might be incorporated into the vital and 
laboring force of the nation, segregation for “full bloods” on reserves meant Aborigines 
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living a more traditional life could be cared for and studied before (many thought) they 
fell into extinction.  
The outcome of the discipline and surveillance of racial “others,” then, is 
refracted more against the aggregated outcomes for the dominant population than for the 
microscopic interventions themselves. As we have seen, Foucault’s reticence to speak on 
race makes this point difficult to tease out in biopolitical terms. Foucault focused his 
inquiries on race implicitly on the most genocidal practices of twentieth Century 
European totalitarianism. Yet, the gradual camouflage of thanatopolitical projects in 
colonial contexts within rhetorics of civilization and care implicates settler colonial 
biopolitics more particularly in a logic of (post)colonial liberalism. If this liberalism, 
transplanted to the colonial margins, evacuated the deathly and genocidal pretensions of 
colonial occupation, it nonetheless retained the more or less concealed aim to “kill 
civilizations.”  
 Nonetheless, Foucault’s most explicit concatenation of race and biopolitics was 
traced from nineteenth century European conceptions of race purity to their deathly 
eruption in twentieth century European totalitarianisms. With the Nazi holocaust hardly 
muted as his backdrop, he writes: “the fact that the other dies does not mean simply that I 
live in the sense that his death guarantees my safety: the death of the other, the death of 
the bad race, of the inferior race . . . is something that will make life in general healthier 
and purer.”23 Biopolitics, for Foucault, and its relation to race was theorized first vis a vis 
the politics of death: thanatopolitics. Yet, without overtly connecting this inquiry to 
questions of race, Foucault soon turned back to the relation between biopolitics and 
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liberalism. Taking liberalism as a cultural and philosophical logic grounded in an account 
of the relation between the body, the subject, its properties, and its immunitary 
autonomization and extricating this nexus from the emergence of a political philosophy 
connected to democracy, Roberto Esposito usefully disarticulates totalitarian and liberal 
biopolitics: 
if we reject the idea of a chronological succession between liberal-democratic and 
totalitarian regimes in favor of a different genealogical or topological 
representation, we see that the correct and conceptually important distinction isn’t 
the vertical one between totalitarianism and liberal democracy . . . Biopolitics in 
turn breaks off into two antithetical but not unrelated forms: Nazism, the 
biopolitics of the state, and liberalism, the biopolitics of the individual.24  
I turn momentarily to elaborate this further, but for not I want simply to note, along with 
Esposito that, “it is precisely the biopolitical characterization of liberalism that separates 
it from democracy.”25 The political philosophical tradition of liberalism aims to establish 
norms within which rights, obligations, value, and utility can be located. As Esposito and 
Foucault note, the emergence of these norms cannot be evacuated from the co-emergence 
of ways of the normativization of bodies and of modes of living. Finally, in the settler 
colonial context, as biopolitics turns to a new liberalism, as Aboriginal survival becomes 
a demographic reality, and as this project thus ceases to explicitly refer to genocide and 
its eugenic correlates, the settler state nonetheless retains the power of regularization and 
the aim of normalization, which functions to, as Foucault put it (however briefly) “kill 
civilizations.” 
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Where Foucault, à la lettre provides a genealogy of liberalism and an articulation 
of genocide as the thanatopolitical inversion of biopower, Foucault’s lectures provide no 
pre-given means to delineate the way operations of discipline and biopower produce 
mechanisms of normativization even when practices of explicit state killing are absent. 
While Foucault never made explicit how precisely the tense enmeshing of biopolitics and 
liberalism could be thought in relation to race or in the colonial context, scholars of 
colonialism have usefully connected Foucault’s analysis of governmentality and 
biopower to practices of norming and disciplining colonized bodies at the periphery of 
empire.26  
My focus in the present study has been less on the way dispatches from 
metropolitan colonial offices determined the government of subaltern peoples in colonial 
society. Rather, I have emphasized the practices of internal colonization within an 
autonomous settler nation after a certain postcolonial turn—the federation of the 
Australian colonies in 1901 leading to relative autonomy from Britain. What emerges 
from this is not only that after 1901, Australia, as a former colonies that remains a part of 
the Commonwealth, produces multiple asynchronicities in the application of power. One 
central point one can discern from this asynchronicity between the settler center at the 
colonial periphery and its treatment of the most peripheral colonized bodies —indigenous 
peoples—is that disciplinary power is enforced over the colonized long after its force has 
been blunted and diminished in relation to settler subjects. While among the settler 
population biopolitical aggregation entailed the application of a seemingly benevolent 
(though rather insidious) biopower, for indigenous peoples, the goal of a vital and 
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normalized settler population entailed ongoing discipline. Where, for settlers, biopolitics 
leads to biopower, for indigenous peoples, the same emphasis on settler biopolitics leads 
not only to biopower’s application to the indigenous body but also a subsistence of 
disciplinary power vastly asynchronous with the diminution of violence at the Imperial 
center, or indeed, at the marginal center of the settler colonial metropolis. While 
metropolitan settler subjects in Sydney might have been unaware of the persistence of 
biopower in their lives, Koori people in rural New South Wales, and Noongar people in 
the South West of Western Australia continued to be rounded into camps for rigorous and 
sustained disciplinary operations. Employment required a permit, any sexual or marital 
relations were supervised by the state, children were removed, and many of the avenues 
to provisional citizenship (exemption) involved giving up identification with indigenous 
heritage and relations with extended family. Indigenous peoples have been some of the 
most governed people in global history and Indigenous Australians are no exception. 
I have begun to suggest that just as the New South Wales Bank formulated its 
strategies for economic growth around population, so settler colonial biopolitics as a field 
formed around the racially other body and its relation to the vitality of the human species, 
was in fact correlated within the governmental regime alongside which it developed: 
liberalism. It is crucial, then, to place biopolitics in the colonial context within which 
liberalism took shape.  
In Chapter 1, I expand more fully on the theoretical dimensions of biopolitics, its 
relation to liberalism, and its spatiality. There, I also delineate key tensions between 
forms that settler colonial biopolitics has taken as it moves from a deathly logic of 
20	  
	  
indigenous extinction to a eugenic program to concerns of care and protection. In Chapter 
2, I move to concretely relate this observations to the historiography of Aborigines 
Department administrations in Australia in the twentieth century In doing so, I critique 
historiographic attempts to strictly periodize the operations of either eugenic absorption 
(natal-thanatopolitics) and sociocultural assimilation). In doing so, I emphasize the way 
settler colonial biopolitics is an apparatus in which differing forms of power emerge, 
rather than a place-holder for distinct and demarcated kinds of governmentality. In 
Chapter 3, I build on and extend this argument to show how even the most socio-cultural 
minded framers of Native Administration in Australia retained much biologism and 
essentialism in their thought. In so doing, I amplify my critique of historiography to 
implicate it in wider practices of cultural memory. These latter are framed through the 
idea of intentionality. Intentionality simultaneously acts to exonerate the state crimes 
perpetrated against indigenous peoples in the past and to shape the way these acts are 
remembered in the present not only in the writing of history, but also in large public acts 
of memorialization. In Chapter 4, I return to the mid-twentieth century focus to position 
the relation between settler colonial biopolitics and cultural nationalism. Just as a colonial 
governmentality was focusing itself on the normativization of the settler colony, this new 
normalized indigeneity was being appropriated and promoted in the public sphere by 
settler literary nationalists. In Chapters 5 and 6, I turn to the present by investigating the 
way indigenous writers and artists respond to the legacy of settler colonial biopolitics as 
well as to the way the settler colonial public sphere retains artifacts of the kind of 
thinking derived from that form of governmentality that the earlier chapters trace. As 
such, my methodology and mode of presentation is decidedly nonlinear, shuttling back 
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and forth between the middle of the twentieth centuryand the present. Before proceeding 
to the study proper, it would do to briefly theorize this move. 
	  
 
Artifactuality: Notes on a Nonlinear Methodology 
Despite my insistence on extending the thought of biopolitics beyond a ubiquitous 
reading of the globe as a nomos produced by the insistent threat of the camp and on 
moving toward a recognition through terrapolitics of the endurance of indigenous 
ontologies, the greater part of this dissertation is nonetheless concerned with accounting 
for the biopolitical subjection of indigenous peoples in Australia. It is concerned not only 
with the emergence of insistent forms of this subjection in twentieth century Australia, 
but also with the return of such modes of subjection even after the turn to self-
determination as a government policy in the 1970s and the eventfulness of moments such 
as Mabo, which have established a new politics of recognition. Thinking this repetition 
requires a guiding theoretical understanding of the conditions of time and repetition 
within which ways of making people into subjects repeat and return. 
As we saw in the observations of Fraser and Povinelli, public reason is separate 
from rational critical discourse and, as it manifests in the public sphere, it is also 
affectively charged. I suggest in this study that in (post)settler colonies, a considerable 
source for such imperceptible affective charge to the norms that settlers take for granted 
in their dealings with and attitudes about indigenous peoples emerges unconsciouslyfrom 
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a genealogy stretching back at least to the twentieth century policies of absorption and 
assimilation. These policies operated with thanatopolitical, necropolitical, and 
biopolitical ends. Yet between these ends, concrete outcomes were forged for the ideal 
indigenous subject, as it was made amenable to the narcissistic imaginary of settler 
nationalist independence I aim to suggest particular instances of the way this genealogy 
has constrained cultural memory in the public sphere, even as this constraint is presented 
as merely the conditions for rational political discourse. While there remain many parallel 
genealogies to be undertaken, my focus has been on biopolitical forms of normativization 
in the Australia context because I feel that their influence in this site has been pervasive 
and insistent, returning even in the present after the turn to self-determination. 
Povinelli has suggested that a key aspect of the genealogy of Australian 
multiculturalism and its sustained practices of normativization emerges from an 
“impossible demand” placed on indigenous people, “that they desire and identify in a 
way that just so happens, in an uncanny convergence of interests to fit the national and 
legal imaginary of multiculturalism” and in doing so, “ghost this being for the nation.”27 
In the first three chapters of this dissertation I focus on an archeology of the production of 
the form of normativity by which many indigenous people—particularly those of mixed 
descent—were compelled to transform themselves to fit the desire of the settler nation. 
Methodologically, I have not taken the path of a linear historical materialism. I shuttle 
between twenty-first century texts and artifacts to the twenty-first century archive from 
which they emerge in order to make certain provocative claims about the maintenance of 
biopolitical modes of seeing and describing indigenous peoples and the deconstruction of 
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these modes by indigenous writers and public figures. In doing so, I have had to think 
long and hard about the way in which biopolitical technologies of looking and 
classifying, harden into artifacts which return in the public sphere long after they have 
ceased to dominate in governmental practice. Such a logic of artifact, virtuality and 
revenant requires explanation. 
One term by which to describe the “national and legal imaginary” described by 
Povinelli is the notion of “Aboriginality” coined by Marcia Langton. As Chris Healy has 
recently deployed and delineated Langton’s useful conception, “Aboriginality,” is “a 
construction of things ‘Aboriginal,’ which is animated by ideas and images from the 
colonial archive of indigenous people as primitives, entirely disconnected from 
indigenous life in [for instance] the 1940s.”28 Indeed, this archive could be said to include 
not only the most stereotypical ideas about “indigenous people as primitives” but also the 
various other stereotypes and categories of “detribalized” Aborigines produced as kinds 
of subject to be governed in particular ways. As we saw, the Aboriginal census divided 
indigenous people into three kinds of supervised spatial habitation and cross-referenced 
this against a rubric of blood. This is only one of a large number of inter-related rubrics 
for classifying and dividing indigenous peoples for the purposes of governance that 
emerged in the twentieth century. As at 1986, there were noted to be at least 67 extant 
legal definitions of “Aboriginal” in Australia across over 600 pieces of legislation.29 As 
Langton puts it, “[t]he most dense relation between actual people, but between white 
Australians and the symbols created by their predecessors.”30 Bob Hodge and Vijay 
Mishra have similarly named what they called “Aboriginalism,” which names the same 
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phenomenon of white Australians, relating to their symbols of indigenous people.31 For 
Hodge and Mishra, this cultural nexus is analogous to the wider phenomenon, which Said 
named Orientalism. However we name “Aboriginality” or Aboriginalism, the idea is 
similar: settler subjects have produced a semiotic field in which ideas about indigenous 
people are produced. Further, this field is often more pervasive and influential than the 
reality of indigenous people’s lives, which is often obscured by such imaginaries. 
Further, the degree to which traditional indigenous society and selfhood is 
produced in the Aboriginalist nexus, it often constrains the agency and identity of the real 
lives of people who happen to trace their decent to the first peoples of Australia and 
maintain their own autological sense of the kin and country connections that this personal 
history of belonging and being entails. Povinelli has argued that colonial texts function as 
artifacts which remain and return in the social imaginaries that produce them, often long 
after the static conception of the other that they conjure has reformed in a process of 
continuity and change.32 As she suggests, such classic ethnographic texts as those of 
Spencer and Gillen (her specificed exemplum), A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, or A. P. Elkin, 
possess juridical authority as texts rendered crucial in the veridiction of descent, 
identification, and communal recognition required by the juridical apparatus of Native 
Title. Classic ethnographies have “an artifactuality” in Native Title discourse, such that: 
“land commissioners, native title commissioners, anthropologists, writers, and 
filmmakers, read, refer to and defer to such texts as that which captured ‘unspoilt Arunta 
men.’”33 The active presence of a reconstituted indigenous subjectivity endures both 
settler colonialism’s governmentality and even late liberalism’s normativizing strategies, 
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but this durative form is neither fully the traditional subject produced within the 
artifactual, nor (most importantly for my purposes) the whitened subject envisioned by 
the apparatus of assimilation. This has several consequences: the image of the Aboriginal 
produced within Aboriginalism has less to do with the reality of Aboriginal people’s lives 
than it has to do with the way Aboriginal people are compelled to comport themselves by 
state and public sphere imaginaries. A further consequence, which this study takes up is 
that the artifactuality of this image is produced between anthropology and native 
administration, literature and film, the mass media and the idle talk it disseminates. 
Artifactuality doesn’t only relate to the imaginary of Aboriginal tradition and “unspoiled” 
individuations of it, rather, the artifactual inheritance of the colonial archive produces 
ideas about the “mixed blood,” their assimilation, and not only their place in the nation, 
but also among “traditional” Aboriginal people. 
The Australian state has indeed moved beyond the biologism of absorption and 
the disciplinary power of assimilation—at least in its most genocidal forms. Instead, from 
the era of self-determination, the juridical logic of descent, countenanced by the 
recognition of the significant role of identification and communal recognition in 
Aboriginal identity, has developed a complexity that structurally couples with indigenous 
modes of collectivity and often allows a mode of recognition that facilitates reparative 
legislation, most notably land rights within the discourse of Native Title, but also access 
to subsidized education and health schemes.34 The process by which individuals are 
recognized as Aboriginal often remains an adjudication by the state and one which 
always indicates a retention of colonial sovereignty (whether the Commonwealth decides 
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for or against the interests of indigenous people). It is incumbent to add that this 
artifactual dimension to juridical adjudication of indigeneity is compounded as such 
principles of adjudication are apprehended and misconceived in the public sphere, re-
emerging as popular settler evaluations.  
Most centrally here, I focus on instances when not only images and imaginaries of 
“Aboriginality,” but also the apparatuses of governmentality that frame them retain an 
artifactuality. The perceived “unspoilt” representative of indigenous traditional life 
returns as the gestalt against which indigenous people are compelled to refract their 
identification. Concomitantly not only do such artifactual frames of identification recur, 
but so too do the apparatuses of subjectification that produce them. In other words, it is 
worthwhile tracing not only the artifacts themselves but the apparatuses that produced 
them and the revenants in which they recur. As we known, state logics of adjudication 
were employed in the twentieth century to inform the thanatopolitical absorption of 
Aboriginal bodies and the cultural assimilation of Aboriginal social life themselves 
produce artifacts which recur and resound in the present. Where the ossified colonial 
artifact imagines the static logic of indigenous tradition and the static image of the 
indigenous body as a basis for adjudication, today, public sphere evaluations often insist 
that indigenous people either conform to these logics and images, or (and this is my 
primary concern here) eschew indigenous identification in favor of an entirely 
assimilated collective and identificatory mode. 
Artifactuality is a late liberal citation practiced acutely in settler (post)colonies 
and recalls the biopolitical legacy of colonizing liberalism. Artifactuality adjudicates, 
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evaluates, and captures subjects, deciding on their identities through evidential 
processes.35 Pertinent to our understanding of the mass mediation of evaluations of 
alternative social worlds is Jacques Derrida’s identification of “artifactuality” in relation 
to the mass media. For Derrida, thinking through artifactuality is crucial to the question 
of “how best to approach [the] theme of presence and of the present” after the 
hypermediation of everyday life.36 Media events are: “factititous or artificial, 
hierarchizing and selective, always in the service of forces and interests to which 
‘subjects’ and agents . . . are never sensitive enough.”37 Derrida distinguishes between 
two modes in the mass media. In the resurgence of any artifactuality, images take shape 
as actuvirtuality (a word which puns on the French word actualité, denotating both 
“news” and the now, connoting presence and the present). Actuvirtuality describes the 
return of the framing of the mass media in reference to artifactuality—across television, 
new media, and printed forms.38  
Assimilationist texts (and the archival traces of the biopolitical apparatus in which 
they are enmeshed) carry with them an artifactuality: an artifactuality whose technologies 
are often redeployed virtually in the mass media. It is in the mass media system indexed 
by Bolt that the specters of such artifacts of assimilation as a physiognomic gaze and a 
genealogical imaginary remain, influencing and enabling the governmental belonging of 
settler subjects. The adjudicative modes of governmental belonging have spread in no 
small part from a central function in state policing to a diffuse presence in the public 
sphere, revealed in media events. Such events reflect a wider evaluative pretension in the 
settler public sphere. As the specters of settler colonial governmentality continue to haunt 
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and unsettle the lives of real indigenous people, critique of their return and 
memorialization becomes an essential task. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Theorizing Biopolitics and (Post)Colonial Liberalism 
	  
Between Colonial and (Post)colonial Liberalism 
As an Australian of settler and migrant descent, I first became interested in 
returning to consider the internal colonialism of the space in which I grew up after Kevin 
Rudd’s 2008 Apology to the Stolen Generations. Where the years under John Howard 
had been stifling and denialist, the apology seemed to gesture to a shift in attitudes.  Yet 
the Rudd government continued the Howard Government’s Northern Territory 
Emergency Response Act (NTERA), simultaneously precipitating and reorienting the 
Governmental discourse of practical reconciliation—a doctrine which implied the 
eschewal of symbolic acts of cultural memory in favor of practical measures to 
ameliorate adverse conditions in indigenous communities.  Framed by the Howard 
Government’s last Indigenous Affairs Minister, Mal Brough, the NTERA, known as “the 
Intervention,” aimed to tackle structural social problems through such measures as 
welfare quarantine, modifications to the permit system designed to keep alcohol out of 
dry remote communities, and other such immediate biopolitical measures targeting the 
care and welfare of population. The Intervention was also installed under the rubric of a 
state of exception from law, it suspended the Racial Discrimination Act and compulsorily 
acquired Aboriginal lands which were then released to communities.  The Gillard 
government which followed Rudd’s (and remains in power as I write) has continue its 
commitment to the NT Intervention, though since the initial Act has lapsed, they have 
modified its provisions in slight ways (such as to target and encourage Indigenous school 
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attendance), and shifted the leasing of land from a compulsory to a voluntary model. I am 
no expert on Indigenous policy. As such, I will not pretend to having a concrete criticism 
of the “effectiveness” of these practices within their own bounds. Instead, to the degree 
that this project has implications for the present, I want to draw out their genealogical 
link to the broad biopolitical contours of the emphasis on care, and to remark the framing 
of such welfarist legislation in terms of the suspension of law and the rendering of 
indigenous lands as zones for governmental protection and preservation. With such a 
return to biopolitical practices of governance and their correlation to a sovereign 
exception, a concrete utilitarian calculus of care and vitality is always possible, it may 
even be defensible. But, when influential voices are crying that “considerations of care 
should be put before considerations of strict justice as a matter of principle,” the issue 
should not be closed but opened and at the least certain caveats and some historical 
awareness must be foregrounded.1 Rather than the too ready eschewal of justice in favor 
of care—one which seems to emphasize the connection between biopolitics and 
postcolonial liberalism—or, on the other hand, a too ready description of the entirety of 
settler colonial past as a homogeneous genocidal violence, a genealogy of such 
“considerations of care” seems vital. Instead, perhaps what is needed is a genealogy that 
takes account of the kernel of thanatopolitics and of essentialism that are respectively 
retained after the turn to (post)colonial liberalism and its emphasis on biopolitics: care 
and welfare under conditions of vitalist sovereignty. Further, where (post)colonial 
liberalism insists on its capacity to normalize indigenous cultural practices, we may find 
settler subjects increasingly willing to arrogate the right to define the norms whose 
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outcome is, amidst all else, the killing of indigenous civilizations. Such cultural genocide 
begs at least a genealogy while it remains disturbingly unquestioned. 
If we are to critically locate the particular forms of governmentality which 
subsisted, shifted, and reformed through colonial and (post)colonial moments as 
applications of genocide, thanatopolitics, necropolitics, disciplinary power, and 
biopower, then it is essential to take seriously the discursive formations that surround 
these governing practices. Throughout this study, I use the term settler colonial to 
describe spaces such as Canada, New Zealand, and my primary exemplum, Australia. I 
do so out of recognition of the fact that “dispossession is not a historical event but an 
ongoing process” and that there persisted “a logic of elimination through post-frontier 
Australian society.”2 I also parenthesize the (post) in (post)colonial as well as correlative 
terms such as (post)settler nation and (post)settler colonialism. In an essay written in 
2009 and published in 2010---which forms the kernel of the fourth chapter of this 
dissertation---I moved to employ the parenthesization of the (post) in (post)colonial when 
describing settler spaces.3 I did so out of a specific concern with the imperative that 
sovereign gestures such as the 2008 Apology not be seen as closures of  reconciliation 
but merely iterable conditions of a processual account of reconciliation as a process that 
remains unfinalizable so long as (post)settler sovereignty maintains its continued process 
of dispossession (as it is likely to do).  I join this more specific insight to Chadwick 
Allen’s broader and more salient reason for parenthesizing the “post” in the settler 
colony. As Allen remarks: 
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There has been increasing debate over whether the circumstances under which 
indigenous minorities live in the First World settler nations . . . are best described 
as ‘colonialism,’ ‘postcolonialism,’ internal colonialism,’ ‘paracolonialism,’ 
‘domestic imperialism,’ or something else . . . [T]he term (post)colonial. . . 
employs parentheses to emphasize the irony of an often-asserted post-colonial 
situation (where the hyphenated ‘post-’ implies ‘beyond’) that is never quite one 
for indigenous minorities.4 
Parenthesizing the “post” therefore emphasizes what I have already marked as the 
continued project of dispossession. As an orthographic gesture, the (post) in 
(post)colonialism does as much diacritic work as a textual exercise can accomplish. Here, 
I want to remain also with the degree to which this ongoing dispossession can be 
genealogically traced from ideas about assimilation to liberal practices of multicultural 
recognition, from biopolitical liberalism in the twentieth century (post)settler colony to 
the late liberal remainders of governmental adjudication and evaluation of alterity and 
authenticity (by state and settler) after the turn to self-determination. 
This study is, then, located within the primarily post-frontier context of twentieth 
and twenty-first century Australia. This space can be conceived in a number of ways, as 
at once: a unified, federated, nation-state (after 1901), as well as a settler colony which 
remains neither republican, nor independent, subsisting symbolically within the British 
Commonwealth. It is at once a space in which the remote frontier continues to exist, as 
well as one in which a (post)colonial logic of liberalism has shaped the elaboration of 
liberal democracy for settler subjects. As such, I do not describe this territoriality—strung 
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between a settler sovereignty and a settler colonial biopolitics—postcolonial. Rather, it is 
necessary to identify the emergence of this settler colonial biopolitics as it was applied to 
indigenous subjects between a certain colonial liberalism, the cultural logic of 
nationalism, and the imagined postcoloniality, which follows either. It is for this reason 
that I will tactically refer to a settler colonial biopolitics retained within a (post)colonial 
nation state. In an ironic inversion of the bank circular, slipped in with the early 
Aboriginal census data—the enumeration and description of the Aboriginal population 
along with the surveillance, discipline, and biopower applied to the Aboriginal body—the 
(post)settler colonial nation came to describe itself as a liberal democracy wherein 
Aboriginal presence was first imagined and later engineered as absence, or, alternately, as 
alterity to be simultaneously normativized and fetishized.  
Yet, while I maintain the understanding that settler colonialism is a process of 
dispossession, emphasizing only this logic of elimination risks homogenizing and 
trivializing the insidious means by which the government of indigenous peoples came to 
render itself through a rhetoric of welfare, health, and normativization on Western modes. 
Taken as a whole, Australia’s settler colonialism does not lend itself to a chronology 
which separates the predominantly nineteenth century practice of settler massacres from 
the predominantly twentieth century practice of eugenic absorption, or the disciplinary 
normalization exemplified in the policy of assimilation. Nonetheless, assimilation must 
be theorized, within its twentieth century biopolitical frame. As I examine at length in the 
next chapter, logics of disappearance through a eugenics without literal killing retains a 
thanatopolitical dimension. The idea of elimination represents the pervasive underbelly of 
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settler colonial biopolitics and cannot be ignored. Nonetheless, policies such as 
assimilation were often seen by their contemporary framers as part of the ostensibly 
progressive---though in fact, paternalistic and dictatorial---civilizing mission annexed to 
the logic of colonial liberalism. As such, I take seriously the continuity of thanatopolitics, 
elimination, and genocide as it subsisted from nineteenth century settler colonialism into 
twentieth century (post)colonialism.  
Hanging in the background of this genealogical project is an attempt to tactically 
critique the project of adapting liberal norms to postcolonial societies. As we saw, 
Foucault’s lectures titled The Birth of Biopolitics, gesture to the way liberalism’s ethos of 
diminished government genealogically links to the emergence of technologies of 
aggregation such as the census and complementary practices of biopower. Yet Liberalism 
is not only a question of the diminution of government. It also evolved a cultural logic of 
neutrality regarding conceptions of the good fostered by private individuals. Postcolonial 
scholars have, however, drawn out the historical limits to this formation. Edward Said, 
most famously, showed how liberals concerned with private autonomy and national 
independence at the Imperial metropole were simultaneously happy to justify the 
sequestration of distant colonial territorialities.5  
Postcolonial studies has contributed greatly to healthy skepticism around 
liberalism’s attempt to account for diversity while simultaneously bracketing the 
historical and cultural conditions that constrain such debates in actually existing 
postcolonial nation states. For political philosophers operating within the framework of 
liberalism, the genealogy of liberalism within which it is possible to link the discursive 
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positivity of liberalism within actually existing political orders to the arsenal of 
governmental and biopolitical practices, is consistently bracketed. Such political 
liberalism becomes a “complex of evolving discourses, beliefs, and ideals,” within which 
even the unregulated market so embedded in actually existing liberalism and 
neoliberalism can be bracketed. Duncan Ivison locates the central principle of 
postcolonial liberalism within the concept of neutrality. Succinctly describing the liberal 
attitude to state power, the establishment of norms, and the regulation of difference, he 
states:  
[a] liberal political order is said to be neutral with regard to controversial 
conceptions of the good. Note that it remains a moral idea. It aims to justify 
political principles that do not rely on controversial conceptions of the good, but 
which can still provide the grounds for regulating the exercise of the coercive 
power of the state that citizens holding diverse worldviews could accept.6  
For such notable liberal theorists as Charles Taylor, the recognition of cultural difference 
is a significant aspect of a meaninful liberal political philosophy. But difference cannot 
be valorized in and of itself according to any perspectivalism or relativism. Rather, 
differing cultural conceptions of the good are maintained only insofar as they cease to 
violate a sequence of norms about which it is no longer possible to be neutral. These 
would include Indigenous cultural practices conceived as harmful, but it would also 
include those simply understood to be abnormal within the aspiration of maximizing the 
wealth of the settler nation. The state should be neutral, liberals say, so long as there is no 
violation of norms conceived as agreeable. As Ivison puts is: “if the ultimate aim of 
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postcolonial liberalism is a form of mutually acceptable coexistence between indigenous 
and non-indigenous peoples, such arrangements require a set of transitive concepts and 
norms to guide these interactions.”7 The question becomes how these norms are formed 
and under what conditions. Even as political philosophers adopting the language games 
of rational argument through which liberalism might be idealized, the norms on which 
these language games rely derive from a genealogy.  
Amidst all else, the liberal accounting of difference assumes a synchronic state of 
affairs within which those cultural practices that deviate from western norms are referred 
to within an accounting of the good modeled and evaluated on the grounds equivalent to 
any individual conception of good. As the parable of the bank circular suggests, this good 
is not merely calculated in terms of a neutrality but is also referred to the ideal vital, 
normative, and economic flourishing of the nation. In either the case of culture or private 
predilection, the liberal says, if normal (and certainly, if harmful), then state neutrality 
can be suspended, acts can be criminalized or subject to the forceful hand of civilization. 
Such insistence on norms precipitates justification in the mode of cultural memory by 
which such projects as assimilation are remembered and reparatively addressed. Some 
modes of remembering and forgetting past policies can even derive legitimacy for 
modified forms of comparable strategies of economic normativization. This play of norm 
and state neutrality emphasizes a temporally static logic of subjection’s justification 
divorced from the histories that give rise to the culture of liberalism in actually existing 
(post)colonial civil societies and, indeed, the enduring forms of colonized cultures that 
comport themselves within this frame. As Homi Bhabha points out, liberals such as 
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Taylor assume a congruence of positions which freezes the frame within which cultural 
difference is construed: 
At the point at which liberal discourse attempts to normalize cultural difference, 
to turn the presumption of equal cultural respect into the recognition of equal 
cultural worth, it does not recognize the disjunctive, ‘borderline’ temporalities of 
partial, minority cultures. The sharing of equality is genuinely intended, but only 
so long as we start from a historically congruent space; the recognition of 
difference is genuinely felt, but on terms that do not represent the historical 
genealogies, often postcolonial, that constitute the partial cultures of the 
minority.8  
As Bhabha elaborates, “Taylor always presents the multicultural or minority position as 
an imposition coming from the ‘outside’ and making its demands from there.”9 He quotes 
a glaring revelation of this in Taylor’s rhetoric: “the challenge is to deal with their sense 
of marginalization without compromising our basic political principles.”10 Not only is 
Taylor’s they fixed outside the deliberative sphere but this evacuation risks fixing the 
position of the other as a relic of the past—as Johannes Fabian has effectively shown.11 
The idea that modernity has proceeded by excluding indigenous others (for instance) and 
the correlative understanding of the position of the other as fixed, misses something 
distinctive about the actually existing mode by which indigenous people comport their 
identities and make political claims. Much of the way the contemporary deliberative 
sphere has sought to include indigenous people has been by a process of norming of 
indigenous bodies and cultures and a simultaneous fetishization of a domesticated form 
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of this culture. This means that the position of normativity does not occupy a “pure” 
Western position, and neither that the position of Aboriginal tradition is statically bound 
to a precolonial past subject to salvage. Rather, not only indigenous speech, but the 
adjudication of the state itself is subject to the history of the norms produced in the 
twentieth century government of indigenous people.  
Liberals can be apologetic in relation to such genealogies, and they can also be 
triumphalist. Culturally tolerant theorists of liberal democracy emphasize liberalism’s 
project rather than its fixation by contingent and empirical correlation to practices of 
disenfranchisement and dispossession. Ivison is quick to note that “[i]n liberal political 
thought . . . the most interesting work on cultural rights rejects the bounded and static 
view of culture and accepts the more open-ended and dynamic notion familiar to the 
student of the best recent work in anthropology and cultural studies.”12 This claim would 
no doubt need to be tested on a case by case basis and it is not my goal to disavow or 
deauthorize the liberal political project tout court. However, while liberal thinkers in the 
political philosophical sphere aim to accept the dynamism of cultural change as a means 
to model diversity, normality, and neutrality toward a political theory at the end of 
history, they may remain blind to the genealogical privileging of western economic and 
even social forms of property, sovereignty, and liberty—all of which act to immunize the 
exposure of the common to alternative heteronomous collectivities, particularly when 
such collectivities pose the risk of “abnormality.”13 The (post)colonial liberal project of 
cultural assimilation in Australia did not only focus on aberrant aspects of Aboriginal 
social life whose difference risked harm, but also on any and every instance of difference 
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which threatened the economic and spatial distribution of the settler colonial order of 
land and law.  
Just as Ivison and Taylor variously desire to model cultural difference within 
liberal neutrality within a synchronically determined postcolonial moment (one blind to 
genealogies on which Bhabha rightly insists), so Francis Fukuyama famously defends the 
separation of an a priori project of liberalism, separated out from the empirical flaws, 
limits, and crimes with which it has been associated. Jacques Derrida zones in on the 
limits and blindnesses of this dialectic of a priori and empirical liberalism. Fukuyama 
admits that the horrors of state crime have not abated after the delegitimization of the 
totalitarian forms—right and left—under which they (he claims) arose and continued in 
the twentieth century and continued in its second half. As Derrida notes: 
[A]s telos of a progress, this orientation would have the form of an ideal finality. 
Everything that appears to contradict it would belong to historical empiricity, 
however massive and catastrophic and global and multiple and recurrent it might 
be. Even if one admitted the simplicity of this summary distinction between 
empirical reality and ideal finality, one would still not know how this absolute 
orientation, this anhistoric telos of history gives rise, very precisely in our day, in 
these days, in our time, to [a triumphal liberalism] that he dates very explicitly 
from ‘The most remarkable evolution of the last quarter of the twentieth 
century.’14  
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For Derrida, instead, liberalism always bears with it the specters of its past, as do such 
traditions as Marxism which have opposed it. We can say that the revenants—as he 
names these specters—of governing modes do not permit an evacuation of the concrete 
institutions in which their political philosophies were embodied. The empirical marks of 
colonizing normativization and genocide that emerged alongside (post)colonial liberalism 
may not be so extraneous to the norms for determining the interactions between 
indigenous people and settler states as liberal political theorists would depict matters. The 
empirical coemergence of colonizing biopolitics and the colonial form of liberalism 
might rather cast spectral remains in even the most apparently a priori of norms. The 
strategy that Ivision names postcolonial liberalism relies on the recognition of such norms 
and their constraint of difference. The point is that the “a set of transitive concepts and 
norms” that Ivison sees as necessary “to guide these interactions” between settler-
descended and indigenous subject do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, as Foucault reminds 
us, the history of the way subjects and spheres have been produced through a process of 
normalization is not extraneous to the formation of the norms guiding debate about what 
should count in the public sphere and what ways of life are worth allowing to live 
through the accordance of rights, protections, and obligations. 
One assumption of this study is that liberalism has always been bound up with the 
government of life, value, and utility---a government of life which, in refracting norms 
into the deliberative sphere finds problems in cultural paradigms which differ from these 
norms. As Esposito puts it: 
What we are dealing with [in liberalism] is the establishment of the biological life 
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of individuals [singoli] and populations as fundamental to all of the most 
important political decisions of today . . . when the living or dying body becomes 
the symbolic and material epicenter of the dynamics of politics as well as its 
conflicts, we move into a dimension that lies not simply, as we sometimes hear, 
after or beyond democracy but resolutely outside it—not only re- moved from its 
procedures but from its language and conceptual apparatus.15  
Biopolitical governance of life has a great deal to do with the norms assumed in terms of 
economic policy (for instance), down to the kind of house one lives in, one’s attitude to 
extended family, or the kind of distribution of land and the value vested in it. Liberalism, 
as it attends upon minority and subaltern subjects (particularly those displaying strong 
cultural difference) demands not only (and sometimes not even) democratic participation, 
but further, the imperative to comport a whole way of life to “civilized” norms. It is no 
accident that such compulsive norms subsequently return as pre-conditions to rational 
deliberations about political good and correlative democratic practices of participation. 
While not constraining a a democracy to come—unbound from the political 
economic tradition and the way of governing bodies and territorialities arising from a 
western cultural locus parallel to that of liberalism, indeed, including it up to a point—it 
has a lot to do with the deliberative sphere that actually exists in Western democracies 
and their engagement with difference. An easier target in the liberal tradition than 
Ivison—whose political project may well be pragmatically defensible—would be a 
critique of Fukuyama’s logic. Yet, Fukuyama  need nonetheless not be dismissed as too 
easy a target—with such a critique becoming a quick potshot at a synecdoche of 
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liberalism not born out across its whole spectrum. The troubling fact is that Fukuyama 
may better represent aspects of the liberal tradition’s real politik as it concerns the 
operations of political debate around cultural memory and interventionist, normativizing 
projects of state craft and assimilation. One useful ground for thinking the insistence of 
historically emergent constraints on the liberal category of norms is the Feminist tradition 
in political theory. Such theorists of the public sphere as Nancy Fraser have pointed to the 
necessity of thinking “actually existing democracy” in the genealogy of projects of 
political liberalism.16 In a related vein, Elizabeth Povinelli, in her work on the genealogy 
of Australian multiculturalism and indigenous alterity, delineates what she calls the 
“liberal diaspora.” For Povinelli, the liberal category of norms, given rise to by the 
“enlightenment idea that society should be organized on the basis of rational mutual 
understanding,” forms itself at the colonial margins not only through a transplantation of 
liberal traditions and ideas but also through the emergence of concrete institutions 
simultaneously drawn from these traditions and comported to particular colonizing 
concerns.17 For Povinelli, liberal preconceptions of the autonomy of rational critical 
discourse in forming norms need to be contrasted to the affective and historically bound 
forms which public reason takes.18 While liberal political philosophers operate with an 
untrammeled faith in the language games of norm and neutrality, of anarchy and liberty, 
state and utopia, Povinelli suggests that rational critical discourse doesn’t only deliberate 
on a synchronic arrangement of interests (in which some happen to be different). Rather, 
rational critical discourse, as a language game, “refers to a describes a procedure of 
interaction (that is, how one should do this thing called rational critical discourse in the 
process of stating what is)” while bracketing the genealogies of how such norms came to 
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be formed and peoples came to embrace or resist them.19 One aspect of this caveat to 
liberalism as it engages cultural difference concerns affect.20 Povinelli, in engaging this 
affective caveat to the idea of norms, notes that such frames constrain the production of 
public reason and its presentation as merely the operations of rational critical discourse. 
Instead, she suggests, far from a neutral skyhook within which agreeable norms can be 
debated, rational critical discourse “is itself a metadiscursive characterization of a social 
interaction—namely, what type of talk (rational, self-reflective) counts as an instance of 
public reason.”21  
While postcolonial liberals aim to introduce and develop a tradition whose 
“genuinely felt” respect for difference can condition liberalism’s desire for norms of 
conduct, reason, interaction, and debate, politicians, policy makers, jurists, journalists, 
novelists, film-makers and others in the settler colony refer not only to a political 
philosophical tradition but a tradition of concretely governing difference. This latter 
tradition, I contend , is genealogically linked to a (post)colonial liberalism emergent in 
the twentieth century, one whose form and structure relied on biopolitical strategies of 
producing indigenous people as bearers of socio-culturally normative subjecthood. 
Traversing the sacral and the economic, the familial and the aspirational, this 
normativization is not extraneous to the present. The chapters that follow trace a partial 
genealogy of moments when these framers of the public sphere fail to successfully 
evacuate the legacy of settler colonial policing of norms from their enunciations, as well 
as a partial history of how these norms were produced and disseminated. One key aspect 
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of this genealogy relies on the microphysical government of indigenous bodies and the 
enclosure of colonizing territoriality. 
 
Nomos, Terrapolitics, and Settler Colonialism  
This is a study of settler colonial biopolitics, of the form that biopolitics takes in 
the settler colonial paradigm. It takes Australia as an exemplum for a number of reasons. 
Some of these are personal. Growing up as a settler and migrant descended Australian, as 
a whitefella (a wadjela as my Noongar friends and acquaintances might say, or a gardiya, 
as Yamatji friends might also call me), I became personally invested in the new 
possibilities on the Australian public sphere which were marked by the 2008 Apology, as 
well as the abiding constraints and elisions that survive this event. Part of this choice also 
concerns the opportunities that my citizenship and access offered me in terms of 
undertaking sustained archival and even some occasional ethnographic research. But the 
partiality of this story might also permit it to have unforeseeable transnational 
implications. Rather than seeking to write a “history of biopolitics in Australia,” this 
study aims to unravel the genealogy of some microscopic tendencies emergent from 
settler colonial biopolitics which suggest specific technologies that repeat and return: 
ways of thinking about the census, about kinship, and about the logics recalled as settler 
subjects look at and evaluate indigenous people. 
This study aims not only to reveal the tense oscillation between a politics over life 
and a politics of death which subsisted within colonial spaces, but also to examine the 
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strange paradox that such a politics of life and death should remain within settler colonial 
spaces alongside the emergence of (post)colonial liberalism. In the current moment, it is 
impossible to ignore the influence of Giorgio Agamben from this paradigm, even as 
many followers of his work have perhaps too readily exported its rich insights across 
territorialities with their own particularities. As we have seen, Foucault’s notion of how 
life takes shape through governmentality remains elusive. Perhaps, for this reason, 
Agamben initially turns to reveal why the politicization of life —from the classical 
moment —has remained bifurcated. He writes: 
The Greeks had no single term to express what they mean by the word ‘life.’ They 
used two terms that, although traceable to a common etymological root, are 
semantically and morphologically distinct: zoē, which expressed the simple fact 
of living common to all living beings (animals, men, or gods), and bios, which 
indicated the form or way of living proper to an individual or group.22  
Without stressing the difficulties of projecting a classical European division between 
forms of life and its expression as global and transhistorical, this initial distinction 
remains useful. Zoē expresses the immanent vital quality common to bodies across 
species (and indeed, penetrating the divine), while bios stands for the form which life 
takes, a form given to a selection of sociality or relation that is marked as proper (as 
distinct from an improper form) .23  
Agamben has emerged as the thinker who most emphasizes the persistence of 
sovereignty into the contemporary moment—albeit in paradoxical form. For Foucault, 
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death had been the province of the sovereign. But, as Foucault introduced this notion, he 
also emplaced sovereignty as the site of the production of a subject whose vitality is 
initially irrelevant: “in relationship with the sovereign, the subject is, by rights, neither 
alive nor dead.”24 i Put another way, the possession of zoē, the mere fact of being alive, is 
a matter of indifference to the sovereign. But the fact of the subject’s relationship to its 
form of life (bios) nonetheless becomes of immediate concern within the sovereign field. 
As I earlier noted, for Foucault, race can always become a means to reverse the logic of 
biopolitics from a practice of making live and letting die to a process of state destruction 
of colonized peoples and societies. But the mode by which the state does away with 
forms of bios which exceed, challenge, and threaten its norms are diverse. 
For Agamben, under modernity, state killing happens as the result of a return of 
the repressed form of Western sacral practice after the increasing secularization of the 
enlightenment.25 Drawing from the ancient Roman concept of homo sacer, Agamben 
generalizes the logic of sacrifice in antiquity from a text of Pompeius Festus: “The sacred 
man is the one whom people have judged on account of a crime. It is not permitted to 
sacrifice this man, yet he who kills him will not be condemned for homicide . . . this is 
why it is customary for a bad or impure man to be called sacred.”26 The ancient figure of 
homo sacer is a figure who, as a result of transgression, has ceded his right to life and 
abrogated the inviolability of his zoē. In doing so, Agamben argues, he becomes bare life, 
reduced to zoē; as such homo sacer is removed from the bios of the polity and considered 
a being whose vital existence subsists in the mere fact of being alive, without political 
agency or political content. Within the bios of ancient Rome, the impurity of this figure 
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left him neither worthy of consecrated sacrifice nor of the citizenship that would 
immunize him from the violence of the populace. Homo Sacer becomes, then, killable, 
but not sacrificable.27  
In the modern moment, subjects of racial difference become, for Agamben, a 
strange form of homo sacer. Considered aberrant and impure not as a result of a 
transgression but in light of the pathological lens through which racial difference was 
viewed, these others suffer the threat that their lives be rendered “unworthy to be lived” 
along with the abnormal elements of the European polity: the mad, sick, and disabled.28 
Where this figure of homo sacer remained marginal in Agamben’s depiction of the 
political ecology of classical Europe, Agamben detects the centrality of bare life to the 
founding of political orders. While homo sacer becomes bare life—zoē without inclusion 
in the polity (bios), nonetheless, this figure is not extraneous to, but, in fact central to the 
making of the political community of a state, particularly under modernity: 
[T]he decisive fact is that, together with the process by which the exception 
everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of bare life —which is originally situated 
at the margins of the political order —gradually begins to coincide with the 
political realm . . . At once excluding bare life from and capturing it within the 
political order, the state of exception actually constituted, in its very separateness, 
the hidden foundation on which the entire political system rested.29  
In order to cleanse the vital aggregates of the dominant, “other” forms of life are 
evacuated from the bios of the nation and become bare life, alive only in the brute sense, 
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deserving only death. The modern political sphere of law cannot evacuate a logic of 
sovereignty whose primary focus is decision on who belongs through categories of 
citizenship and immunity. While it is supposed within liberal democracy to be 
diminutive, for Agamben, such political practice retains its foundational reliance on 
deciding who belongs, who is included in the polity, who has bios that does not simply 
coincide with zoē, and, at the extreme, who should live and who should die. Within this 
notion, the most marginal become foundational to the cultivation of the polity, even as 
they are subject to its most brutal violence and sustained exclusion. This notion that a 
minority is central to the quasi-sacred meaning of the life of the nation resounds in the 
archives of the settler colony. The economic maximization of utility sought by the 
bankers of New South Wales relied on the targeting of a minority of the population: 
Aboriginal people and non-European migrants. At key junctures in this study, I zone in 
on the moments when a small handful of individuals become the most crucial figures of 
unease for the Western Australian Aborigines Department in its efforts to normativize the 
population; for instance, Aboriginal people married to non-European migrants were 
produced as just such feared figures. Here I will remain with more theoretical concerns 
which frame such figures. 
What Achille Mbembe calls necropolitics marks the most cogent theorization of 
the uses of this politics of life and death in colonial, late colonial, and even postcolonial 
or (post)colonial spaces. For Mbembe, the condition of inclusion in the polity of a 
modern society has, since Hegel, relied on a mode of bios that insists on the full 
possession of logos in the subject and the historical denial of this logos to the non-
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Western subject.30 Mbembe sustainedly develops a theory of the deathly subjection of the 
lives of colonized people that may or may not be literally or immediately taken up by the 
colonialist state-formation: 
The most original feature of this terror formation is its concatenation of biopower, 
the state of exception, and the state of siege. Crucial to this concatenation is, once 
again, race. In fact, in most instances, the selection of races, the prohibition of 
mixed marriages, forced sterilization, even the extermination of vanquished 
peoples are to find their first testing ground in the colonial world. Here we see the 
first syntheses between massacre and bureaucracy, that incarnation of Western 
rationality.31  
In this situation, though the non-Western subject is not always literally or immediately 
put to death, his or her right to the protections of the state are given away within a state of 
siege that withers the capacity to be, speak, and resist or maintain civil society. Writing of 
slavery, Mbembe identifies the way: 
in the context of the plantation, the humanity of the slave appears as the perfect 
figure of a shadow. Indeed, the slave condition results from a triple loss: loss of a 
“home,” loss of rights over his or her body, and loss of political status. . . As an 
instrument of labor, the slave has a price. As a property, he or she has a value. His 
or her labor is needed and used. The slave is therefore kept alive but in a state of 
injury, in a phantom- like world of horrors and intense cruelty and profanity. The 
violent tenor of the slave’s life is manifested through the overseer’s disposition to 
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behave in a cruel and intemperate manner and in the spectacle of pain inflicted on 
the slave’s body. Violence, here, becomes an element in manners, like whipping 
or taking of the slave’s life itself: an act of caprice and pure destruction aimed at 
instilling terror. Slave life, in many ways, is a form of death-in-life.32  
Mbembe’s model is more nuanced than Agamben’s for the colonial context in which the 
present study is situated. This is particularly so since Mbembe accounts for the way those 
subjected to the denial of bios, inclusion in the polity, and status as inhuman are made so. 
As Mbembe points out, the condition of the slave, subject to this triple loss, is produced 
as a body whose only accounting is economic and whose instrumentality sees his or 
herself produced in the status of “death-in-life;” we might generalize this condition to 
also include the Indian and Chinese so-called “coolie” indentured servants distributed 
around the British Empire after the abolitionist successes of 1807 and 1833, as well as 
indigenous peoples compelled to labor for subsistence rations and wages held in trust for 
their continued state management. I also take a cue from Mbembe’s attention to the 
eugenic measures evolved under colonialism, not only the specter of occasional 
sterilization, but also and more fully, the regulation of marriage including, though not 
exclusive to “the prohibition to mixed marriages.” In the Australian context, as I 
emphasize in the next chapter and return to throughout the study, one also must take into 
account the sanctioning of certain mixed marriages and the prohibition of others derived 
from a very peculiar and exceptional taxonomy of race. Here I spend much time 
elaborating the specific thanatopolitical and necropolitical conditions to which 
Indigenous people were subjected in twentieth century Australia. 
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In accounting for the insights of Agamben, Esposito, Stoler, Mbembe, Povinelli, 
Scott, and others in the analysis of the management of life, death and birth in the settler 
colony, I have developed a particular nomenclature. By settler colonial biopolitics, I 
mean the general form of this distribution of the protection and negation of life in the 
spatial and temporal territoriality I have used as my exemplum: Australia from the late 
nineteenth century to the 1970s. While the terms thanatopolitics (used predominantly by 
European elaborators of Foucault) and necropolitics (coined by Mbembe), were both 
available to me and both possessed their own values, emphases, limits, and vicissitudes, I 
have chosen to return to their etymologies in order to retain some precision. Mbembe 
better accounts for the condition of death-in-life that describes colonial biopolitical 
situations wherein literal state killing is either sporadic or absent. But Mbembe also aims 
to include practices of eugenics within a logic of death alone. Agamben and Esposito too 
readily generalize from the European politics of race and death apotheosized in Nazi state 
killing. I do not contest the saliency of either term in the uses to which they are put by 
any of these thinkers, to whose insights I am greatly indebted. Instead, I have developed a 
nomenclature that functions well in the settler colonial context, its (post)colonial turn, 
and the Australian exemplum I have focused upon most particularly. This nomenclature 
will no doubt be attended by its own emphases and blindnesses, though it might also be 
useful for scholars concerned with the governmentality that imposed itself on comparable 
indigenous populations in the Fourth World, particularly the United States, Canada, and 
Aotearoa New Zealand. My focus on one “national” exemplum, then, is not an attempt to 
reify the sovereignty of the (post)settler colonial nation-state we call Australia. Rather, I 
follow Partha Chatterjee in his contention that a too hasty turn to the transnational, 
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without attention to the complex modes of internal colonialism that occupy the formation 
of a given (post)colonial national sovereignty may risk obscuring and indeed eliding 
complexities which might ultimately inform a more critical analysis of transnational and 
comparative aspects of subjection. My study aims to ground itself in this journey into the 
heart of a “politics of the governed” bounded loosely within a territory identified with a 
single national sovereignty. “The journey,” Chatterjee asserts, 
that might take us beyond the nation must first pass through the currently 
disturbed zones within the nation-state, and that in fact a more satisfactory 
resolution of the problems within could give us some of the theoretical 
instruments we are looking for to tackle the questions beyond.33  
By proceeding into the distribution of life and death surrounding an indigenous 
population in one settler colonial nation, I want to mark the beginning and not the end of 
a critical itinerary for myself and others. 
The etymological distinction between necros and thanatos is a necessary one in 
dividing state sovereignty over life and death in the settler colony. Within a nineteenth 
century necropolitical imaginary, indigenous peoples were often imagined as already 
vanishing, doomed, and subject to extinction. However, simultaneous sovereign measures 
were put in play to “ease the passing” of this population or, alternatively, to 
thanatopolitically intensify the deathly disappearance of the indigenous other. In the 
Oxford English Dictionary, necro- is listed as a combining form, designating any word 
“relating to a corpse or death” and derives from the Greek nekros: “corpse.”34 The 
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retention of the morpheme thanatos is derived from the Greek for “death.”35 By 
necropolitics, then, I refer to the understanding of death in native administration as it was 
attended by the idea of indigenous extinction. Where indigenous peoples were understood 
to be inevitably on the path to extinction, this myth of the already dead marked 
indigenous peoples and the framing of the politics of death that surrounded them—an 
idea indexed by the etymology of nekros. By thanatopolitics, I mean to designate the 
specific moments when the colonial biopolitical distribution turns to the negation of life. 
Thanatopolitics, then, is a term I use broadly as the designator for the deathly and, at 
times, genocidal reversal of biopolitics. Necropolitics, within my nomenclature, then, is a 
species of thanatopolitics, as is also what I term natal-thanatopolitics. In the next chapter, 
I describe and elaborate this term, natal-thanatopolitics, which explicitly emphasizes the 
regulation of the carnal and the removal of children as a means to implement a project of 
eugenic regulation that avoided literal killing; this natal-thanatopolitics was allied with 
state enunciations of genocidal intent, and many of its technologies and practices 
continued even after the withering of such enunciations. As such, natal-thanatopolitics 
and thanatopolitics itself are mobile concepts irreducible to genocide even as they include 
it. The juridicalization of the concept of genocide binds it to the idea of intent to kill. In 
Chapter 3, I spent much time implicitly parsing the necessity of this broader category of 
thanatopolitics. Where genocide relies on intent to establish culpability, it risks eliding 
the seriousness of structural projects of dispossession, domination, and destruction. As 
such, genocide must be annexed to a wider biopolitical analysis of the way peoples are 
made to live in certain ways and the occasions when they are killed or allowed to 
fragment and even die.  
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Finally, as Povinelli’s recent work shows, indigenous peoples endure all the more 
insidious modes of doing away with their form of life. As Povinelli puts it: 
What Foucault did not discuss was that neoliberalism transformed an older 
liberal governance of life and death. Neoliberalism has not merely mimicked the 
move from faire mourir ou laisser vivre to ‘faire’ vivre et laisser ‘mourir.’ It has 
resuscitated faire mourir into its typology of faire vivre and laisser mourir, even 
as the more dominant powers of making live and letting die have changed the 
techniques of state killing. Any form of life that could not produce balues 
according to a market logic would not merely be allowed to die, but, in situations 
in which the security of the market (and since the market was now the raison 
d’etre of the state, the state) seemed at stake, ferreted out, and strangled.36  
Even as self-determination and anti-colonial movements have had a significant effect in 
transforming the way indigenous peoples are governed in (post)settler colonial nation 
states, new modes of making die subsist. These modes attend most significantly on what 
Foucault gestured to in his reference to “kill[ing] civilizations” as a key aspect of 
colonizing genocide. 
In order to delineate the emergence of this newer mode of committing a form of 
bios to the past, it is necessary to grapple with the mode of settler colonial biopolitics 
which is retained after the most intense form of natal-thanatopolitics has been disavowed 
by state power, if not entirely defeated in practice. For instance, Indigenous children are 
still disproportionately removed from their families in Australia, despite the 
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recommendations of the 1997 Bringing Them Home Report. After the Second World 
War, ideas about eugenics could hardly be spoken aloud in the liberal democratic world. 
Nonetheless, we must take seriously other forms of immunitary normativization which 
were retained in the post-war period among settler colonies. The collective social life of 
indigenous peoples which constitute their system of land tenure (Country) and 
collectivity was subject to an intense normativization even after the war. Further, the 
removal of children and powers of marriage regulation were each retained to accomplish 
this goal despite the muting of any potentially eugenic or genocidal enunciation of 
justification for these technologies and practices. For the purposes of this theoretical 
schematic, it is crucial to ask how the endurance of the indigenous mode of life can be 
articulated in relation to this discussion of its attempted natal-thanatopolitical destruction 
and its assimilationist normativization. How is the alterity of indigenous land and law 
conceived outside the settler colonial nomos? According to what mode does the 
indigenous mode of belonging subsist, with its lines of kin and Country, its consanguinal, 
affinal, totemic, and other modes of organizing the social relations within which people 
belong? How, in other words, are we to envisage the mode of law and the mode of life of 
subjects who are emplaced outside the settler colonial production of law (nomos) and 
absented in the position of mere life (zoe) to the exterior of the settler colonial logic of 
proper life (bios)? 
Beyond the treatment of bare life in the colonial context, a treatment of the 
biopolitics of the settler colony necessitates certain further caveats for the dominant 
treatment of biopolitics in the anglo-American academy, represented most of all by 
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followers of Agamben. This caveat concerns the understanding of law (nomos) in 
Agamben’s thought and the blindnesses his treatment entails. Succinctly put, this caveat 
runs as follows: nomos is not simply a system of precedent, nor a sphere which can be 
fully accounted for by the postulate of the state of exception within this system, 
containing and contained by the sovereign.37 Nomos is no doubt given through a state of 
exception but also through a conception of the earth and its territorial distribution. It is 
necessary to work slowly backwards through Agamben’s uses of the work of Carl 
Schmitt, and through the vicissitudes of Schmitt’s own thought, in order to draw out the 
implications of this thesis. 
As is now much remarked, Schmitt defined the sovereign as “he who decides on 
the state of exception.”38 Sovereignty is the expression of the function by which a figure 
of authority decides that the law might be suspended. This figure includes not only an 
executive but also, say, a judge. The executive decides that a situation of peril is of an 
extreme to warrant the suspension of law and the protection of the populace through (for 
instance) emergency powers. The judge decides that the norms of law derived from 
precedent do not apply in a case: that something new has happened. The sovereign, 
Schmitt insists: 
decides whether there is an extreme emergency as well as what must be done to 
eliminate it. Although he stands outside the normally valid legal system, he 
nevertheless belongs to it, for it is he who must decide whether the constitution 
needs to be suspended in its entirety.39  
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For Schmitt, reflecting on Weimar constitutionalism, the liberal understanding of law 
appeared intrinsically bound to the inclusion of its own capacity for suspension. As a 
general principle, liberalism is never a machinic inscription of legal norm and precedent. 
Rather than this nineteenth century legal positivism (which Schmitt despised), the 
function of such a legal machinery always relies on the immanent inscription of a 
decision with the power to instantly transform, remodulate, and—at its extreme—suspend 
the law in toto.40 While this limit case of the legal norm is often obscure, Schmitt insists 
that it remains immanent even as it only comes to full relief in moments of emergency: 
“[u]nlike the normal situation, when the autonomous moment of the decision recedes to a 
minimum, the norm is destroyed in the exception. The exception remains, nevertheless, 
accessible to jurisprudence.”41 The moebian condition of included exclusion of force 
from law and the inverse of this logic has been Agamben’s focus in his elaboration of 
Schmitt. 
For Agamben, the logic of sovereignty derived from Schmitt becomes a way to 
formalize the threat of violence and the suspension of law that subsists within liberal 
constitutional frameworks. Where Schmitt prescribed the reverence for sovereignty as a 
means to unite the polity, Agamben takes up his position as a cautionary caveat to liberal 
constitutionalism’s management of violence, exclusion, and norm. Ultimately, Agamben 
offers a vision of law that cannot extricate itself from the included exclusion of force in 
law (nomos); law enters a dialectical relation with the sovereign violence that 
simultaneously founds and threatens it. A representative instance of this in Agamben’s 
phrasing suffices to parse his treatment of the question: 
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Law is made of nothing but what it manages to capture inside itself through the 
inclusive exclusion of the exceptio . . . The sovereign decision traces and from 
time to time renews this threshold of indistinction between outside and inside, 
exclusion and inclusion, nomos and physis, in which life is originarily excepted in 
law. Its decision is the position of an undecidable.42  
Agamben’s cross mapping of the Schmittian and Foucaultian logics of sovereignty has 
given much substance to the recognition of its continued role in defining the borders of 
proper and improper life, bios and zoē, the polity and the merely living figure of homo 
sacer.43 There remains a series of significant caveats in regard to the extrapolation of this 
critique of liberalism and its correlative biopolitical operations to situations of colonial, 
postcolonial, and most centrally (post)settler colonial territorialities. These caveats 
circulate around the elision of the role of territoriality covered over by Agamben’s 
formalist conception of nomos. 
While Schmitt defined sovereignty in terms of exception, particularly in his work 
during the Weimar period, his related notion of law became significantly nuanced in his 
post-war work on international politics. In Political Theology, Schmitt attacks the 
positivist tradition in German jurisprudence, which risks reducing law to merely the 
machinal operations of precedent. Yet until his 1950 book The Nomos of the Earth, 
Schmitt does not delineate an alternative view of the specific nomos given between the 
norms of law and the violence of the sovereign. In the latter text however, Schmitt 
describes law as the distribution of order and ordering in concretely spatial terms.44 
Nomos, for Schmitt, is not merely the establishing of order and protection by the 
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sovereign, but also its founding in a specific spatial orientation. The first moment of the 
establishment of law and of the territoriality which founds the sovereign order arises, for 
Schmitt, in the act of land appropriation: 
Either a parcel of land is extracted from a space that until then had been 
considered free, i.e. having no owner of master recognized by the foreign law of 
the land-appropriating group, or a parcel of land is extracted from a formerly 
recognized owner and master, and thereby becomes the property of the new 
owner and master . . . In every case, land-appropriation, both internally and 
externally, is the primary legal title that underlies all subsequent law.45  
Any scholar of settler colonialism will immediately recognize the specter of the British 
Imperial doctrine of terra nullius—the idea that colonial spaces were unoccupied—in 
Schmitt’s descriptive account. Before directly addressing this palpable connection, I want 
to remain momentarily with precisely the way the thought of land appropriation and 
spatial territoriality is central to Schmitt’s conception of nomos and, indeed, sovereignty. 
This is particularly necessary, since Agamben’s formalization of nomos paints over the 
need to think spatial orientation as central to both Schmitt’s thought and a critical 
assessment of the biopolitical contours of settler colonialism—as useful as Agamben’s 
emphases may be in critiquing such paradigms as Nazism or the retention of sovereign 
exceptionalism in such glaring instances of neoimperialism as Guantanamo Bay. 
It is no accident that Schmitt spills much ink analyzing precisely the international 
legal principles which arouse from debates in Catholic jurisprudence over the 
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justification of the conquest of the New World, for instance in the writings of Francisco 
Vitoria, or the debates between Bartolomeo de las Casas and Sepulveda.46 Schmitt takes 
thoroughly seriously the degree to which modern international law, the concept of just 
war, and the economic norms which attend either were established in no small part 
through the justificatory principles emergent from the age of “discovery,” conquest, and 
colonialism spanning the last five hundred years. Land appropriation, which Schmitt 
describes through the logic of both naming and economically enclosing as landnahme, 
does not merely conquer and acquire, it also aims to distributes and divides, founding law 
on European norms of property and possession. If law (nomos) is a norm, it is so in 
relation to a concrete spatial orientation. Schmitt puts this clearly and forcefully, when he 
writes: 
Not to lose the decisive connection between order and orientation, one should not 
translate nomos as law (in German, Gesetz), regulation, norm, or any similar 
expression. Nomos comes from nemein—a [Greek] word that means both ‘to 
divide’ and ‘to pasture.’ Thus nomos is the immediate form in which the political 
and social order of a people becomes spatially visible---the initial measure and 
division of a pasture-land, i. e., the land-appropriation as well as the concrete 
order contained in it and following from it . . . Nomos is the measure by which 
land in a particular order is divided and situated; it is also the form of political, 
social, and religious order determined by this process.47  
Here nomos is connected to the very social, sacral, and economic form that founds law. 
Sovereignty, as a condition for law’s suspension, is indeed immanent in the system that is 
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built on this edifice. But its specific form cannot be rendered entirely formalistic without 
an occlusion of the plurality of forms of sovereign exception, biopolitical management, 
and thanatopolitical turn to violence. As Agamben at one point puts it:  
‘[t]he ordering of space’ that is, according to Schmitt, constitutive of the 
sovereign nomos is therefore not only a ‘taking of land’ (landnahme)---the 
determination of a juridical and a territorial ordering . . . but above all a ‘taking of 
the outside,’ an exception (Ausnahme).48  
Agamben is quite right that every taking of land and its consequent nomos produces 
exclusions, suspensions, and the reduction of the colonized to bare life. Thus “the nomos 
of the earth always implies a zone that is excluded from law . . . in which the sovereign 
power no longer knows the limits fixed by the nomos of the territorial order.”49 However, 
Agamben moves this observation from a useful emphasis to a dogma when he writes: 
“The state of exception is thus not so much a spatiotemporal suspension as a complex 
topological figure in which not only the exception and the rule but also the state of nature 
and law, outside and inside, pass through one another.”50 Agamben’s reading of Schmitt 
overemphasizes the centrality of ausnahme and, in evacuating the significance of 
landnahme from the conception of the nomos, risks obscuring other forms of subjection 
and domination which are readily apparent in the settler colony. These forms of 
subjection are defined most in the general epistemology of space and possession which 
defines the settler colonial order and marginalizes the durative indigenous modes of 
conceiving land, property, and space. The census of Aboriginal people, as we saw, 
certainly used race to divide its subjects into the exceptional spaces of exclusion and 
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regulation in which they subsisted: supervised camps or “half-castes,” reserves for 
“tribalized” Aborigines, and frequently “full bloods.” Further, defined both as British 
citizens and subject to exceptional regulation as “Natives,” the legal status of Indigenous 
people in Australia can be read through Agamben’s useful ntion of the included 
exclusion. Agamben, in emphasizing the conditions for the most extreme suspension of 
bios and the reduction to bare life in the logic of the camp, risks obscuring the way 
colonized peoples (for instance) can be culturally, socially, and economically 
undermined, fragmented, and destroyed by the sense of Nomos as “the measure by which 
land in a particular order is divided and situated.” Insofar as nomos “is also the form of 
political, social, and religious order determined by this process” the colonizing form of 
this order aims to destroy the indigenous logic of political, social, and religious order 
which is central to its autonomy and e endurance. To be sure, this often lands the 
colonized in camps. Nonetheless, it remains a form of dispossession even when this is not 
the case, or not only in the form of the camp. 
A certain formalization and ubiquitization of this mode of power is precisely what 
Agamben moves toward in his thesis that the concentration camp is the paradigm of the 
modern, the principle form by which people are made subjects and excluded from the 
realm of bios. Agamben, accepting the centrality of landnahme to Schmitt’s conception 
of sovereignty and law nonetheless subtly and gradually evacuates it in order to posit the 
camp as the singular paradigm of the moder: 
The term Landnahme (land-appropriation), used here to describe a process of 
order and orientation . . . is in some way also a division and distribution of the 
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seized land. But the division is only a consequence of land-appropriation; it is the 
effluence and effect of the radical title established externally and internally by 
land appropriation.51  
Radical title, in the English tradition, meant the ultimately ownership of all land by the 
crown and, in this way connects sovereign power not only to the capacity to suspend law, 
but also to the capacity to determine the proper means of deriving private possessions 
from Commonwealth in the sense given form by John Locke in his Second Treatise of 
Government.52  
In connecting the body to property, Roberto Esposito brings out the immunitary 
structure that connects biopolitics to the nomos of the Earth. In so far as property acts as 
one mode by which individuals are immunized from a sustained obligation to 
community, Locke marks the figure most central to the thought of property. Esposito’s 
reading of Locke links the emergence of modern conceptions of enclosed individual 
property to the very condition of embodiment. For Locke, property is defined in and 
alongside the tension between being and having a body. As Esposito puts it:  
The body is the primary site of property because it is the location of the first 
property, which is to say what each person holds over himself . . . It is in this 
exchange—together both a splitting and a doubling—between being (a body) and 
having one’s own body that the Lockean individual finds its logical and juridical 
foundation for each successive appropriation.53  
64	  
	  
In this formation, the capacity to autonomously own one’s own body is the rehearsal and 
precondition of the capacity to carve individual property out of what is originally held in 
common and, in the English theologico-economic conception, the ultimate radical title of 
the sovereign and of the monotheistic God whom the sovereign represents. Esposito 
elaborates further: 
The exclusion of someone else cannot be established except as part of the 
consequential chain that originated in the metaphysical assumption of bodily 
inclusion. Property is implicit in the work that modifies what is naturally given as 
work, which in turn is included in the body of the person who performs it. Just as 
work is an extension of the body, so is property an extension of work, a sort of 
prosthesis that through the operation of the arm connects it to the body as part of 
the same vital segment; not only because property is necessary to materially 
support life, but because it is directed to corporeal formation.54   
In Esposito’s reading, the immunitary paradigm of the West links property and the body 
in the nomos of the earth. As Western powers were terraforming their colonial 
possessions and exporting their economic, religious, and social norms, the nomos of the 
colonized came under constant attack. 
Opposed to this, of course, is any other economic conception, grounded in 
alternate theologies. It is the indigenous subject (“the Indian”) whom Locke designates as 
lacking in the logos of property in the body.55 For Locke, though “the Indian” is as 
capable of extracting properties from commonwealth as a European subject, it is an 
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absence of enclosed land, the (perceived) absence of an exchange economy, and the 
reduction of division of labor to nature, which disqualify “the Indian” from alienable land 
ownership. Despite the recognition that the Indian can place his labor on a natural being 
and render it property, nonetheless the new world becomes, “the wild woods and 
uncultivated waste of America left to Nature, without any improvement, tillage or 
husbandry,” such that the maximum productivity (as Locke sees it) of a tract of land is 
not attained.56 The indigenous subject and the nomos of the New World similarly become, 
for Locke, the body and space of “wastefulness” given by the absence of enclosure and 
individuation of what is properly one’s own. The very nomos of the indigenous subject in 
the imaginary of the enlightenment is construed as without property. Yet some critics in 
the biopolitical tradition have aimed to rethink this inheritance, taking seriously the 
recent recognition of Native Title and other forms of land and water rights. Morgan 
Brigg, for instance, distinguishes between, on the one hand the Western emphasis on the 
centrality of the body with its concomitant insistence on the sovereignty of the speaking 
subject and, on the other, the terrapolitics of indigenous subjects. He writes: 
[T]he Western traditon emphasises a magical investment that excises the logos 
from the voice in the human, [whereas] Australian Aboriginal traditions 
emphasise magical investments that locate ancestors in land. This generates 
Country and brings people into existence in a sentient landscape that is the 
medium for transmitting political and social order. Land, thereby, fuses being and 
political relations. Existence is profoundly relational: 'life' is embedded in other 
people, entities and the landscape rather than concentrated in individual figures 
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like the self and the sovereign. To construe this distinction, Aboriginal political 
ontology can be termed terrapolitical in contrast with the Western and 
biopolitical.57   
Further, Brigg insists that not-withstanding biopolitical domination and the globalizing of 
the Western nomos of the Earth, Aboriginal traditions, while subject to change, have 
maintained the continuity of terrapolitical conceptions which orient an ontology in which 
tenure and property makes land (and not the body) primary: 
biopolitical dominance is the main story of Settler–Indigenous political relations 
and Australian Settler-Colonial governance, but it is also accompanied by a story 
of Aboriginal survival, including survival of Aboriginal political ontology. 
Aboriginal cultural values persist despite massive change. Skillful adaptation to 
Settler circumstances can be . . . a way of protecting rather than denying or 
abandoning Aboriginality.58  
Indigenous peoples in Australia have survived and endured the withering of their 
customary systems of law, belonging, and tenure in the face of the imposition of a 
colonizing nomos. As Povinelli notes, the tense by which we narrate such endurance, says 
much about our attitude to the ethical substance of indigenous claims and, I would add, 
the descriptive precision through which we become aware of precisely what indigenous 
subjects are up against when they assert their survival in attempts at state recognition. 
While it is significant to recognize the presence (in both its ontological and grammatical 
sense) of indigenous modes of kinship, identification, and collective belonging, and their 
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instantiation in terrapolitical ways of being on and maintaining custodial tenure over 
land, it is also important to narrate this presence in a mode that recognizes the 
considerable challenges indigenous political ontologies face given the subsistence of a 
settler colonial sovereignty, vested in radical title, the nomos of which is being both 
transformed (and yet maintained) by (and despite) its recognition of indigenous tenure. I 
want to mark this tension through a description of several eventful moments in the history 
of the colonial nomos and indigenous challenges to it. 
The first major litigation on Aboriginal land rights in Australia took shape in the 
1960s when the Yolngu people petitioned the Australian Commonwealth with a 
document—written on bark and in traditional iconography—to avert the course of a 
Bauxite mining lease granted over the Gove Peninsula, a part of their traditional land. In 
1968, the Yolngu and their legal and anthropological representatives took the case to the 
Supreme Court of the Northern Territory. The eventfulness of this decision is doubled, 
since Justice Blackburn’s ruling upheld the doctrine of terra nullius, yet the decision also 
established certain contours of precedent. Blackburn recognized “a subtle and elaborate 
system of social rules and customs which was highly adapted to the country in which the 
people lived and which provided a stable order of society.”59 The Yolgnu social system 
was explicitly recognized as having law. Yet the nomos of Yolngu terrapolitics was 
questioned by Blackburn as it regarded proprietary possession. Blackburn’s decision 
excluded the communal form of ownership of land he identified with each individual clan 
among the language group; communal title was excluded in the case from recognition in 
the nomos of English common law. Dismissing the Commonwealth counsel’s claim that 
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law should be vested in the written word, Blackburn acknowledge that an orally vested 
society could certainly hold proprietary interest. Nonetheless, he asserted: “I think that 
property, in its many forms generally implies the right to use or enjoy, the right to 
exclude others, and the right to alienate” and he concluded, “by this standard I do not 
think that I can characterize the relationship of the clan to the land as proprietary.”60 The 
problem, for Blackburne, was that “the clan’s right to exclude others is not apparent.”61 
The fact that clans in the wider Yolngu society did not value the right to exclude other 
clans from their lands was sufficient for Blackburn to render the Yolngu system of 
property alien, incompatible, and undeserving of recognition by the legal nomos of the 
settler colony. The nomos of radical title then, emerges simultaneously from the 
insistence that all systems of ownership conform to its strictures and, particularly, in 
relation to the right of alienation. Alternative conceptions of custodianship as proprietary 
were similarly excluded by Blackburne, who wrote:  
[t]hat the clan has a duty to the land—to care for it—is another matter. This is not 
without parallels in our law, which sometimes imposes duties of such a kind on a 
proprietor. But this resemblance is not, or at any rate is only in a very slight 
degree, an indication of a proprietary interest.62  
The point that should be stressed here is that what excludes recognition is not the 
rejection of any system of law or possession, but a perceived absence of “resemblance” 
and “parallel” with the tradition central to the sovereign colonizing conception of law. 
The nomos of the Earth established through English common law in the settler colony at 
first recognized only that which adequately resembled its own conception of property. As 
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such, recognition models of land rights eschew sovereignty and maintain the sovereignty 
of the colonizer, even as a new nomos no doubt emerges from the in-between space 
between two cultures. 
The doctrine of terra nullius was not overturned until the monumental event of 
the Mabo decision in 1992. In that instance, the full panel of the High Court of Australia 
ruled both that the people of the Murray Islands had a system of land tenure that was not 
automatically extinguished by the nomos of radical title established at the moment of 
conquest. One significant aspect of the system established in the wake of Mabo is that 
since radical title was maintained by the judgement, subsequent recognition of native title 
is established on the analogy of the extraction of property from the commons given in the 
conception of radical title. I quote the relevant text of the judgement at length: 
The notion of radical title enabled the Crown to become Paramount Lord of all 
who hold a tenure granted by the Crown and to become absolute beneficial owner 
of unalienated land required for the Crown's purposes. But it is not a corollary of 
the Crown's acquisition of a radical title to land in an occupied territory that the 
Crown acquired absolute beneficial ownership of that land to the exclusion of the 
indigenous inhabitants. If the land were desert and uninhabited, truly a terra 
nullius, the Crown would take an absolute beneficial title (an allodial title) to the 
land . . . there would be no other proprietor. But if the land were occupied by the 
indigenous inhabitants and their rights and interests in the land are recognized by 
the common law, the radical title which is acquired with the acquisition of 
sovereignty cannot itself be taken to confer an absolute beneficial title to the 
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occupied land. Nor is it necessary to the structure of our legal system to refuse 
recognition to the rights and interests in land of the indigenous inhabitants . . . The 
English legal system accommodated the recognition of rights and interests derived 
from occupation of land in a territory over which sovereignty was acquired by 
conquest without the necessity of a Crown grant.63 
Given the recognition of indigenous possession of land, in this passage, terra nullius is 
overturned and native title is recognized. Yet it is precisely this process of recognition 
that is established in the judgement. Native title does not establish sovereignty, but rather, 
a precedent for the recognition of proprietary forms which can be derived within Crown 
land whose claim to possession is radical title. 
Having said all this, my emphasis in this study is more on the biopolitics by which 
indigenous life was constrained and attacked than the terrapolitics which nonetheless 
survived these assaults. Even so, as settler colonial biopolitics moves away from an 
openly thanatopolitical project to a process of sociocultural normativization, 
governmentality targets indigenous bios not only by reducing indigenous people to bare 
life and essentializing cultural modes (though it does both these things). It also operates 
through a sustained attempt to transform this indigenous collectivity through economic 
and sacral means, which aim at the fragmentation of terrapolitics and the imposition of 
norms, the ur-moment of this process can be located in Locke.  
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Chapter 2 
Breaks and Transmissions:  
Temporalities of Biopolitics in Australia 1896-1963 
 
As the episode of the New South Wales Bank’s report on population emphasizes, 
in twentieth century Australia—with biopolitics intensifying from the Commonwealth 
census (1901)—the state aimed at regularizing the settler population at the service of the 
vital and commercial wealth of the state. That we found it filed away in a folder of census 
documents in the Western Australian Aborigines Department archive reveals something 
further. As we saw, “race decay” marked a concern within this macroscopic survey. But 
how was the outcome of the nation’s regularization at the level of population connected 
with the concrete tactics of discipline and biopower deployed at the level of the 
individual lives of Aboriginal people? Time is a crucial factor here.  
Here, I describe how two forms of governmental power over indigenous people— 
absorption and assimilation—were respectively framed as policies; I further describe how 
apparatuses of discipline and biopower emerged and were applied to Aboriginal subjects 
within and across these two policy articulations. As I do so, it will become clear that 
while absorption and assimilation were marked by divergent discursive formations—the 
one openly eugenic and embracing the rhetoric of race—the other insisting on liberal 
egalitarianism and the rhetoric of humanism, nonetheless, this break occurs only at the 
discursive level and not at the level of the application of power to Indigenous subjects. As 
manifest ideas about Aboriginal “destiny” and its place within the population were 
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coming under revision, each of these forms of the settler colonial biopolitical regime 
retained continuous techniques at the level of the anatamo-physical. With respect to the 
apparatus of biopolitics directed toward Aboriginal people in twentieth century Australia, 
even as a shift took place in the projection of normalization toward a regularized telos, 
the apparatus which produced this teleology retained the same panoply of measures, 
technologies, and institutional practices. These, as we shall see, included sovereignty 
over native marriage, the removal of children of mixed descent, and the granting of 
exemptions from native status under Aborigines legislation.  
Settler colonial biopolitics has a chronotope, as does its reversal into death, 
disappearance (thanatos), or the presumption that the other is already passing away, 
imagined as always already a corpse (necros). As framers surveyed the indigenous 
population, they found their previous assumptions that Aboriginal people were passing 
away in this imaginary necropolitical malaise increasingly untenable. The recognition of 
a rising population of people of mixed descent challenged dubious assumptions of 
indigenous extinction. A biopolitical field developed primarily around the eugenic 
control of Aboriginal birth, a necropolitics countenanced by a natal-thanatopolitics. As I 
have already maintained, this twin logic of death manifested an attempt to, in Neville’s 
words, “eventually forget that there ever were any Aborigines in Australia.” Paying 
attention to this temporality of the eventual within the politics of death, disappearance, 
and imagined “extinction” is instructive. Except in the case of directed, immediate, acts 
of genocide and mass-killing, such eugenic processes of necropolitical imagination and 
thanatopolitical power surge up in the directive efforts of policy framers as projects 
directed toward the future. As Allison Bashford points out: “the blood lines Foucault was 
74	  
	  
interested in were largely about preserving the pure past[,] [e]ugenic culture and its 
public health expressions problematised the sexual and racial connection between the 
present generation and its progeny—one, two, one hundred generations into the future.”1 
While such efforts to eugenically breed out, “forget,” and otherwise absent the 
indigenous body from the state’s biocultural aggregate are despicable, it is also necessary 
to observe the maintenance of the concrete applications of disciplinary power and 
biopower which subsist even after these enunciations have become illegitimate, the 
language of race and colour has been elided or underplayed, and the normalization of the 
indigenous body turns from race to culture. This chapter traces a shift in the aims of 
regularization and the maintenance of technologies of discipline and biopower. This 
maintenance traverses a break from an intense natal-necropolitics which makes its telos 
absorption (as forgetting) to a more general disciplinary biopolitics which makes its telos 
assimilation. This is the crucial crux in the temporality of settler colonial biopolitics: 
while the projected telos shifts in the middle of the twentieth century, the operations of 
discipline remain in place. 
As Patrick Wolfe has observed, unlike those colonies more fully premised on the 
extraction of surplus value from native labour, “settler colonies were (are) premised on 
the elimination of native societies;”2  the settler colony is premised on a logic of 
elimination.3 Through the nineteenth century, much of frontier contact in Australia 
between Aboriginal people and settlers had led to settler violence of the Imperial 
pacificationist mode.4 At times, this settler killing bore the signature of the state, at others 
it did not, or even bore the repudiation of charitable societies at the Imperial center.5 
Similarly, residual elements of earlier colonial power remain with the emergence of 
75	  
	  
settler colonial biopolitics and the Foucaultian reversal of the power over life. While in 
the twentieth century, frontier violence against Aboriginal people was rare and largely 
repudiated, there remained instances of the practice. In Western Australia, for instance, 
punitive frontier massacres took place as late as the Forrest River incident of 1926 where 
“the bodies of 20 or more” murdered Aborigines were “burned” in an act of “‘revenge’ 
for the fatal spearing of one European.”6 One contemporary commentator broke his 
silence on the matter half a century later and noted that such attacks were understood by 
reference to the “generally accepted principle” that 
Aborigines had to be kept in their place. Even a government officer, a 
Protector of Aborigines, who had contributed to the costs arising from 
[the] punitive expedition [at Forrest River] in 1926, explained that 
Aborigines had to be given a lesson from time to time.7 
Yet the twentieth century would predominantly see a shift in the colonizing policy of the 
new settler nation. Much of this shift circulated around competing claims based on 
emerging knowledge about the demography of the newly Federated colonies; as well as 
the semantic valence of the resilient Aboriginal population. This shift in demographic 
modeling led to, at once, a politics of miscegenation, its regulation, and a regime of 
surveillance, marriage regulation, and child removal through which it was implemented.  
In 1896, reflecting on his observations as part of the Horn Scientific Expedition, 
the biologist and influential contributor to early Australian ethnography Walter Baldwin 
Spencer wrote that “[i]n contact with the white man the aborigine is doomed to 
disappear.”8 Seventeen years later, in his Preliminary Report on the Aboriginals of the 
Northern Territory, Spencer would be one of the first to note a countervalent tendency in 
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the demography of Aborigines, the increasing number of people of mixed descent. “The 
question of half-castes,” he wrote, “is a somewhat difficult one to deal with . . . it is 
sincerely to be hoped that as the country becomes more populated, the proportionate 
number will become less.”9 After increased investigation into the question of Aboriginal 
population, particularly in remote areas of the Commonwealth like the Northern 
Territory, with its small and precarious white population, it became clear by the 1920s 
that the population of people of Aboriginal descent was in fact increasing.10 The 
demographic revelation that the “half caste” population was increasing confounded and 
complicated the doomed race assumption. The absence of census data drawn from the 
“full blood” population contributed to this assumption also; as Gordon Briscoe observes, 
“[t]he lack of public knowledge about [full blood Aboriginal] numbers helped to create 
the myth of a disappearing race that became all the more difficult to reverse.”11 By 1937 
at the first Commonwealth Conference of Chief Protectors, the question of population 
would again decide proceedings. Commonwealth Chief Protector Cecil Cook would 
assent to the certain fact by that time that “[t]he number of half-castes in certain parts of 
Australia is increasing.”12 For Aborigines Department administrators like Cook, the 
question of what was to be done about this demographic paradigm was central. 
Discursive responses to this crisis took multiple forms. In 1941, Norman Tindale, 
ethnologist at the South Australian Museum was reporting on the results of a Survey of 
the Half-Caste Problem in South Australia, the articulations of findings from a 1938-9 
expedition undertaken by ethnologists from Harvard and Adelaide Universities (and no 
doubt with the policy enunciations of 1937 hanging thick in the air). He asserted that 
“[t]he aborigines of South Australia are a dying remnant, but the half-castes who replace 
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them are increasing in numbers and need attention and care.”13 He went so far as to assert 
that the expedition’s findings were “[s]ufficient to indicate that the half-castes replace 
vanishing fullbloods in short time and appear to be steadily increasing at a rate probably 
greater than among any other type of the general population.”14 The prospect of a rising 
half-caste population was received, at first, as a threat and a potential crisis. 
As we have seen, at the 1937 Conference, Neville would enunciate the most 
racially oriented response to this perceived crisis when he stated: “the problem of the 
native race, including half-castes, should be dealt with on a long-range plan . . . by 
accepting the view that ultimately the natives must be absorbed into the white population 
of Australia.”15 It was here that Neville enunciated the chilling rhetorical question, 
Neville asked: “[a]re we going to have a population of 1 000 000 blacks in the 
Commonwealth, or are we going to merge them into our white community and eventually 
forget that there ever were any Aborigines in Australia?”16 In Western Australia and the 
Northern Territory, this notion of “merg[ing]” the racially other colonized subject into the 
community had for some time informed the racially eugenic policy of absorption which 
only culminated at the 1937 conference. Child removal on different grounds had also 
been a practice in New South Wales and Victoria.17 Similarly, Queensland had managed 
and controlled regulation across the color line, though more through segregationist than 
absorptionist tactics. Nonetheless, the settler colonial nation state everywhere aimed to 
regulate marriages across the color line and take charge of the social, religious, and 
biocultural status of indigenous children. 
Following a policy shift, which culminated after the war, the replacement of 
Neville by Stanley Middleton in Western Australia, the move for a “new deal for 
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Aborigines” in the Northern Territory which eschewed Cook’s earlier policy of breeding 
out color, and related shifts, the subsequent cultural civilizing mission of assimilation 
would refuse racialized legislation, even as it maintained the subterranean transmission of 
techniques of disciplinary practice. By the equivalent conference of 1963, questions of 
disparity of population based on racial fear had been apparently evacuated from the 
discourse. Framed by the Minister for Territories Paul Hasluck, now “the policy of 
assimilation” would mean that “all Aborigines and part-Aborigines will attain the same 
manner of living as other Australians and live as members of a single Australian 
community enjoying the same rights and privileges, accepting the same responsibilities, 
observing the same customs and [be] influenced by the same beliefs, hopes, and loyalties 
as other Australians.”18 This resolution of the 1963 conference retained a vision of a 
regularized community, with homogeneous cultural “beliefs, hopes, and loyalties.” Race, 
it seemed, was no longer the touchstone of demographic regulation. The Conference 
resolutions explicitly disavow race in fact: policy was “not [to be] based on race.”19 This 
lofty outcome of liberal progress was to be achieved through exceptional measures. 
These governmental categories would see indigenous people subject to particular forms 
of treatment designed to prepare them for what was seen as a civilized nomos: civilized, 
sedentary, European: “[a]ny special measures taken for Aborigines and part-Aborigines 
are regarded as temporary measures, not based on race, but intended to meet their need 
for special care and assistance to protect them from any ill effects of sudden change to 
their social, economic, and political advancement.”20  This was so, despite the fact that 
until 1967 Aboriginal rights granted by citizenship were subject to a provisional system: 
“exemptions” from being treated as a Native under state and Commonwealth legislation 
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could always be revoked. Such preparation for provisional citizenship was to be achieved 
through a rigid control of the social and sexual lives of indigenous people, culminating in 
the removal of their children. 
Ten years earlier, the Commonwealth had held a conference of Missions and their 
role in Native Administration. There, “[t]he Government looked to the Missions as its 
agents for carrying out its native policy.”21 At the 1953 Mission Conference, Hasluck 
emphasized the missionary role of “spiritual guidance,” and pastoral care “because we 
recognize that the missions can also make a major contribution to those measures in 
health, education and training for citizenship which open a path for the native people 
towards full social acceptance in the community.”22 The social emphasis of assimilation 
was clear, as was its role in “training or citizenship.” The provision of exceptional 
measures of governmental health, education, and training for indigenous people was 
similarly laid in place. Where Hasluck’s 1963 statement explicitly disavows race, in 
1953, Acting Director of Native Affairs R. K. McCaffrey clearly laid out the template for 
social assimilation as well as its retention of the exception: 
Assimilation is the objective of native welfare measures. This means that the 
aborigines and persons of mixed blood are expected eventually to attain to the 
same manner of living and to the same privileges of citizenship as white 
Australians and to live, if they choose to do so, as members of a single Australian 
community, observing the same customs and influenced by the same beliefs, 
hopes, and loyalties as other Australians . . . Any discrimination between the 
treatment of the white and the coloured person is to be regarded as a temporary 
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measure based, not on colour, but existing needs for the guardianship and tutelage 
and is to be removed as soon as the need for it disappe[ars].23 
One can see the emergence of the 1963 rhetoric in this earlier moment. At the Missions 
Conference, the rhetoric of race was not yet as neutralized as it was in the 1963 
enunciation. Indeed, while colour is eschewed, what would become “Aborigines and part-
Aborigines” were still “aborigines and persons of mixed blood.” Between 1953 and 1963, 
one sees uniformity of policy (training for citizenship, exceptional measures) alongside a 
gradual sharpening of the rhetorical strategies in play. Aborigine is capitalized. The 
language of blood is downplayed. Social and cultural assimilation diminished the 
emphasis on blood, race, and the eugenic. Yet distinctive policies continued to be 
implemented between people of “full” and “part” Aboriginal descent and disciplinary 
practices of marriage regulation, “exceptional measures,” and child removal continued. 
Despite the 1963 disavowal of race, the Conference resolutions nonetheless 
retained an analytics of descent; subjects were already “Aborigines” or “part-
Aborigines.” Also the necropolitical palliative of the doomed race had been abandoned. 
In opening the 1963 Conference, Hasluck would explicitly deny the premise. The idea of 
the dying race had been receding as the presupposed assumption of evolutionist thought 
on the part of anthropologists and other “experts” on the “Aborigines problem.”24 
Hasluck explicitly disavowed the theory as a damaging myth, but tellingly retained the 
language of population and vitality that had once given rise to it.25 Demography, health, 
and vitality would remain a principle means of managing and transforming the social life 
of an enduring native population, rather than functioning as evolutionist evidence for its 
demise. Just as Neville had advocated a “long-range plan,” so the administrators meeting 
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26 years later would themselves consider an analogous plan—one of “progress to full 
citizenship status for Aborigines.” They would reverse the emphasis of this long range 
plan from a strictly racial logic of disappearing the population to an explicitly 
deracialized, apparently humanist practice aimed at universal citizenship. However, in the 
process of the diminution of race thinking as a basis for policy, the policing of Aboriginal 
social life was slower to recede. 
Just as the 1953 and 1963 enunciations increasingly emphasized socio-cultural 
factors and downplayed race, their categorization retained an analytics of descent, as well 
as reserving the right to manage each category of descent based on temporary protection 
measures that are now well known today (despite the unfortunate persistence of historical 
denial from some quarters)—the removal of children, the status of wards, the regulation 
of marriage etc. It becomes necessary, as we shall see, to distinguish the futurity of this 
settler colonial biopolitics from its immediate special measures. If the racialized futurity 
of Neville’s imagined nation to come, absented of “blacks,” is to be explicitly 
deracialized by the 1963 conference, what are we to make of this retention of the “special 
measures” for the everyday intervention in the native population? I would suggest that 
what unites the field of the temporally distinct statements I have outlined here is a general 
concern with the health, welfare, and security of the population of the settler colony with 
a particular focus on this other population: this distinct and destabilizing category of 
“Aboriginality” as it is positioned distinctly but also bearing recognizable parallels 
through the whole field of statements I have briefly described here---from 1896 to 1963. 
Where the projected outcome of regularization had shifted emphasis, technologies of 
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discipline and biopower traversed either side of the apparent break between absorption 
and assimilation. 
 
The Politics of Death and the Idea of the Primitive Caucasian 
The attitude of some amongst us and some who ought to know better seems to be that 
these people are doomed to die anyway, therefore it is better to let them die!26 
A. O. Neville 
Beginning with Wolfe’s contention that settler colonies are premised on a logic of 
elimination, it is incumbent to ask what form this logic takes. Does a native society’s 
destruction imply the genocidal putting to death of its people? Does it proceed through 
such killing, or can it be understood to proceed through parallel mechanisms such as the 
regulation of birth and reproduction, the categorization of colonized subjects into 
regulable kinds of beings, or a sense of the inevitable extinction of a “race” as “species?” 
The difficulty of course, emerges from the realization that, at various times, it has been 
all of these things. Finally, what is one to say of the “elimination of native society” at a 
cultural and social level, particularly after the diminution of racial biology in the wake of 
the lessons of the Nazi period in Europe? What form of necropolitics is retained after the 
end of genocidal aims and the turn to a (post)colonial liberalism rooted in norms of 
cultural exchange? What imaginaries of assimilation form as artifacts, retaining the desire 
to evacuate difference?  
The imaginary assumption of the notion of a doomed native race did not 
necessitate a response beside either ignorance and, at times, frontier violence, or, on the 
other hand, appeals to notions enunciated by missionary figures such as Daisy Bates that 
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“smoothing the pillow of a dying race” behoved the enlightened European settler 
subject.27 The question of the fitness of the nation’s population was not a question to 
which the existence of Aborigines posed a challenge while the doomed race theory was 
presumed. Bates asserted in a lecture of 1907 that since “we are dealing with a dying race 
. . . all that can be done is to render their passing easier.”28 The notion of the passing away 
of a race is necrological, it understands the remnants as already given to a corpse-like 
decay, it need not kill, since death is presumed already to be attendant upon the “native.” 
If a native population is to pass away inevitably according to the imaginary rendered 
through evolutionism, then there is no need for a decision to “put to death” a portion of 
the population.  
For Bates, the adequate response to this idea of inevitable extinction as Aboriginal 
fate was “‘strict segregation’ of Aboriginals ‘on native reserves far removed from white 
settlement.’”29 Within this framework a certain function of segregation and strict race 
partition was considered the appropriate response to the protection of Aborigines. 
Tindale, for his part, believed that if any hope existed for the survival of “full blood” 
Aborigines, it would come through the maintenance of pockets outside the bare minimum 
of disciplinary control. It was predicated on the form of segregation, which Bates had 
also advocated. The further difficulty in generalizing about the desire to absent 
Aboriginality lies also in the popular fetish and scientific fascination that emerged from 
primitivism. This arises when we observe that ideas of native disappearance also 
subsisted alongside aims at preservation and protection of Aborigines. Those who were 
identified as nomadic in their mode of life were seen as incapable of adaptation to any 
other mode of life.  
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Tindale, for instance, remarked that “it may well be that unless the aborigines of 
the Great Western Desert can be prevented from leaving their environment, and induced 
to retain their present nomadic habits they are likely to suffer rapid decimation and 
decline.”30 He further suggested that: 
if the area could be held for the aborigines, and whites excluded, it would be an 
economic advantage to the whole community. The 800 to 1000 aboriginal 
individuals could be in isolation, be maintained without cost to the community 
(beyond the minimum necessary for occasional medical and police work) as 
permanent game wardens.31 
Some state regulation was to be maintained through regular surveillance, but the mode of 
life proper to indigenous people of “full blood” was, for Tindale, their traditional way of 
life. These pockets of indigenous endurants, he maintained, could be attempted through 
three mechanisms: 
Practical means for the bringing about of the desired seclusion of the present 
desert inhabitants could be best initiated (a) by the prevention of formation of 
permanent institutions and stations within reserved areas; (b) by instituting and 
maintaining routine patrols in their stead and (c) by active discouragement of all 
outward migration of nomad folk.32 
Nonetheless, there was little optimism undergirding Tindale’s proposal. As he had 
asserted a few pages earlier, “[p]olicies of isolation and segregation are palliatives; they 
do not reach the heart of the problem.”33 The politics of the doomed race is a 
necropolitics. One modality of necropolitics in the settler colony is formed as the spatial 
distribution of the territory as it organizes itself around the assumption that the 
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“primitive” body, the “primitive” economic mode, and the “primitive” sacral conception 
is already on its way toward death. 
This necropolitical strategy of segregation was certainly not the solution for 
mixed-descent Aboriginal subjects. As Tindale would put it in 1941, “half-castes” at least 
“should not be shut away in segregated (almost caged) communities.” Where, as Neville 
had it, “some amongst” the white Australians of the early twentieth century, may have 
felt it better to “let [the native] die,” those amongst his administration were fomenting a 
more “liberal” set of answers that met the imperative to racially and socially regularize 
the white settler nation’s population and to provide disciplinary surveillance of 
Aboriginal people in the present. In obscure ways, Aboriginal people were to be made to 
live (assimilated) in a way that would allow their way of life to be forgotten. 
 However, what is most crucial is to see the way technologies of population 
management and control vis a vis Aborigines as a distinct racial group change in light of 
the recession of the truth produced within the nexus of knowledge power named: the 
“doomed race theory.” As I have already indicated, the emergence of more regular 
Aboriginal censuses, particularly after 1911 and 1924, led to the apprehension that the 
“half-caste” population—the offspring primarily of white men and Aborginal women—
was increasing.34 The technology of the census, as I argued in my last chapter, developed 
as a way to produce large aggregates at the level of the whole population, and to identify 
trends of crossing within that population. It further actualized specific technologies of 
surveillance and discipline, as we there saw. Here, let us remain at the level of aggregates 
as they produced a national imaginary within which these interventions were framed and 
coordinated.  
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As Warwick Anderson has shown, the single biggest exception to colonial racism 
displayed on the part of its Australian version comes in its positioning of the Aboriginal 
body in relation to the concept of degeneration: the cultural fear that miscegenation might 
introduce atavistic traits into a population.35 As Anderson has identified, a school of 
physical Anthropological thought emerged from a cadre of thinkers working at the 
University of Adelaide and the Adelaide Museum. This cadre would come to change the 
terms of racial classification in Australia and, using physiognomic testing and 
calculations about blood type, taxonomically position Aboriginal Australians as “dark” 
Caucasians rather than members of an aberrant, degraded race.36 This school included 
such figures as Frederic Wood Jones, Tindale, and, notably, J. B. Cleland. As Anderson 
succinctly puts it: 
 
Cleland and his younger Adelaide colleagues predicted that dark 
Caucasian genes would eventually be submerged in the larger white 
Caucasian gene pool, and then proper training and instruction in hygiene--
-the same discipline as inculcated in poor whites---would do the rest . . . 
Cleland could thus predict a day when, as the result of a scientific 
breeding and education program, all Australians claimed some Aboriginal 
ancestry.37 
 
In other words, if the question of a large population of Aboriginal people of mixed 
descent had come to be of great concern in the earlier part of the twentieth century, in 
light of the Adelaide School’s taxonomic assertion, absolute regularization of 
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miscegenation could become a means to combat it. The Adelaide School provided a 
taxonomy, undergirded by a set of technological and experimental claims about blood 
type and physiognomy, that supported the view that intermixture between “Caucasian” 
peoples and Aborigines would not risk degeneration through the introduction of atavism 
into the dominant population.38 While the Adelaide School was most committed to the 
hypothesis of the Aboriginal Caucasian, the biological assimilability of Aboriginal people 
would become a pervasive idea. As late as 1964, cultural anthropologists Ronald and 
Catherine Berndt would warily refer to the question of “throwbacks,” asserting their 
skepticism about such atavistic risk but noting the significance of “this question [which] 
has, of course, a direct bearing on current policies of assimilation.”39 Even as Hasluck 
aimed to deemphasize the racial, biological justifications of assimilation in favor of a 
cultural emphasis, such cultural anthropologists as the Berndts were willing to at least 
consider the earlier postulates of physical anthropology. Monogenism with its emphasis 
on Aboriginal absorbability wariness of racialized fears of atavism seemed to remain an 
implicit precondition for even enlightened commentators on cultural assimilationist 
policy as late as the 1960s. 
 Across the States and Territories, various approaches to managing the “half-caste 
problem had sprung up in the first decades of the twentieth century. In Western Australia, 
from 1905 with the introduction of a new Aborigines Act, the state Government gained 
far reaching powers pertaining to Aboriginal people; the Act rendered Aboriginal people 
as subject to ward status and precipitated subsequent removals of children.40 These 
powers were exercised with particular vigor when Neville became Chief Protector in 
1915 and set about the creation of several “Native Settlements” (Carrolup in 1915 and 
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Moore River in 1918) to which fringe dwelling Aborigines could be removed and 
Aboriginal children could also be removed, ideally (for him), in separation from their 
parents.41 A similar act came into being in Queensland in 1897.42 In Victoria, with a 
smaller Aboriginal population, wide reaching Aborigines Acts had been in place since 
1869. A subsequent Act of 1886 compelled Aborigines of mixed descent to enter the 
work force while withholding full rights of citizenship and precipitating special 
protections.43 A new version of this law came into existence in 1910, relaxing some 
provisions but retaining numerous legal distinctions between Aboriginal people and non-
Aboriginal people. Many of these acts contained provision for the full regulation of 
people on reserve lands. Many also contained provisions for the removal of children on 
the grounds of neglect or of “mixed” blood status. The New South Wales Aborigines Act 
of 1909 was quite explicit about the removal of children on either of these grounds. A 
1911 Act in South Australia gave the newly created office of Chief Protector power over 
Aboriginal children, though the 1923 Aborigines (Training of Children) Act would most 
rigorously impose powers of child removal.44 South Australia required that its Aborigines 
Protection Board coordinate with its mainstream Child Welfare and Public Relief Board 
in any removals of children.45 But, as a recent study by Cameron Raynes has shown, in 
many instances and particularly under the protectorship of William Penhall, these 
legislative guidelines were circumvented.46  
As early as one South Australian government report of 1860, an experiment with 
indigenous children’s schooling “gave rise to the idea of founding an institution in an 
insulated position, to whence the children could be removed after their preparatory 
training in these schools.”47 It may have been the influence of the proposal of such child 
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removal measures in such earlier governmental enunciations that lead Baldwin Spencer 
to recommend in his 1913 Preliminary Report to the Commonwealth Government on 
Aboriginals in the Northern Territory that: “[n]o half-caste children should be allowed to 
remain in any native camp, but they all should be withdrawn and placed on stations.”48 
Indeed, the Northern Territory had, since 1911, contained a provision in an Ordinance 
that the “Chief Protector shall be entitled at any time to undertake the care, custody or 
control of any aboriginal or half-caste if in his opinion it is necessary or desirable in the 
interests of the aboriginal or half-caste for him to do so.”49  
In other words, measures for the regulation of Aboriginal people via the removal 
of children, and the regulation of marriage, often articulated via categorization by blood 
and behavior had come into existence through the first decades of the twentieth century. 
The techniques of disciplinary power, justified via the critical health and welfare of the 
dominant population (and sometimes that of the Aboriginal population) were laid in place 
as potentialities for a national policy. However attitudes to the teleology of the 
“Aborigines problem” differed from State to State and from colonial administrator to 
colonial administrator. For some, preventing the extinction of Aboriginal people 
remained paramount,50 for others protecting the interests of settlers from perceived 
threats to health and land was a necessity,51 the capacity to simply keep Aboriginal 
people out of sight and out of the way of expanding settlement---except of course, where 
their labor might be desirable---was no doubt also a concern.  
In other words, in the first decades of the twentieth century, a diffuse set of 
disciplinary  measures, powers, and technologies came into existence across the various 
States and Territories that responded to a perceived shift away from depopulation in 
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Aboriginal demography, particularly in the remote areas of the north and center. What 
one can see in this period is a set of concerns---overlapping and contradictory---alongside 
a set of techniques, but hardly a national aim vis Aboriginal policy and certainly not one 
which can be equated with an identifiable intentionality. The text of the 1937 Conference 
on Native Welfare reveals that these competing concerns found themselves in 
confrontation and a set of determined National policies, with specific aims and 
definitions, was laid in place as a signature of the Australian settler colonial state.52 The 
1937 Conference was the culmination and framing of a set of disciplinary measures that 
had developed over the preceding decades. In the period prior to the Second World War, 
I understand this emerging logic of policing through the terms of what I call natal-
thanatopolitics. Natal-thanatopolitics describes the way a politics that regulated birth, 
marriage, and the family could be employed to imagine the future disappearance of a 
colonized people without recourse to their literal or immediate killing. Where the 
mechanism of disappearance is no longer explicitly murderous, natal-thanatopolitics 
nonetheless relies on the sovereign exception which decides on the future absence of a 
given racialized population.53 Where this practice is directed towards an eventual 
disappearance of the native, in the immediate future, the control of birth, marriage, and 
the rearing of children reveals the way, as Ann Laura Stoler puts it, “[c]olonial control 
was predicated on identifying who was ‘white,’ who was ‘native,’ and which children 
could become citizens rather than subjects.”54   
 The idea of natal-thanatopolitics achieves its enunciation alongside a whole 
panoply of as yet undirected juridical powers and disciplinary practices. The Western 
Australian Aborigines Department had, since the 1905 Act, the power to grant 
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exemptions from the status of “Native,” to regulate marriage, and to remove children to 
institutions (under a clause whereby the Protector was the legal guardian of all natives 
and half-castes to the age of 16). However, the fact that this power was vested in the 
Department did not entail the further fact that the Department was financially equipped to 
implement these powers to their full extent. Nor were the ideas of racial purity yet 
developed among the cadre of “experts” from physical anthropology, functional 
structuralist anthropology, and native administration; the idea of the necessity of 
Aboriginal-European miscegenation, and the exclusion of “aliens” would, as I have 
mentioned, only coming into relief with field expeditions by Adelaide Scientists in the 
1920s. What developed along with the discourse of racial crossing were the technologies 
of surveillance and discipline that could be retained even where their aim shifted. It might 
do, then, to examine the development of these technologies of surveillance in one 
Aborigines Department. 
However, first, it is necessary to show how technologies of disciplinary biopower 
sometimes precede the enunciation of thanatopolitical (or cultural civilizing) missions, 
aims, and teloi. As such, I want to trace the surveillance of marriages across the colour 
line in a particular administration (Western Australia) which led up to the 1937 
consensus. 
 
Discipline, Biopower, and the Emergence of Governing Practices 
Here I trace the emergence of practices of surveillance around marriage as they 
pertained to a microscopic genealogy of the governance of a small number of mixed 
descent Aboriginal people in Western Australia from 1915 to the late 1930s. The 
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principle biological and racial justification of absorption did not emerge until the idea of 
the Aboriginal as a primitive Caucasian was developed (principally by J. B. Cleland) 
through the 1920s. It was from this period that it was taken up by the administration, 
most forcefully by Neville and Cook. But the power to decide on who married whom and 
the fate of the children, as well as the focus on colour as an outcome, precedes the notion 
of the primitive Caucasian.  
Rather than a neatly articulated plan of sinister natal-thanatopolitical intent which 
flowed immediately into a set of operations of surveillance and control, one sees a 
different attitude to normativization in the period from 1915 to 1939 in the Western 
Australian Aborigines Department. There appear, instead, a set of practices for deciding 
on the acceptability of interracial relations which precede, complement, and come into 
conflict with gradually articulated fears about the atavistic threat of “crossing.” These 
practices necessitate an adaptation of Foucault’s notion of the abnormal to contemporary 
thought on race. Foucault famously noted that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
in Europe a set of marginal and occasional transgressions took on an inflated weight of 
importance in relation to the regimes of normalization. In relation to sexuality 
particularly, at that period, Foucault identified “three figures, or, if you like, three circles, 
in which the problem of abnormality is gradually posed.”55 While the historical detail 
surrounding these three figures is of a radically different kind from that of the figure of 
the “coloured persons of  Alien race”56 and his or her relations with a “native or half-
caste,” the theoretical prism of thinking a “figure . . . in which a problem of abnormality 
is posed” is precisely crucial to identify how technologies of surveillance form around 
such liminal figures even prior to the emergence of a positivity, a discursive apparatus 
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which makes a fiction appear true (the absorbability of the primitive Caucasian) with 
which they will eventually combine to produce a deathly decision.  
 In Western Australia during the second decade of the twentieth century, it became 
common practice for Missionaries and Government Superintendents, (for instance of the 
Carrolup Native Settlement established in 1915) to ask for the advice of the Chief 
Protector as to the desirability of a given marriage—making the Protector aware of 
children perceived to be candidates for removal. At times, marriages were approved 
according to schema that would later come under objection. Such objection was, as we 
saw, based on the fear of producing a separate racial population made up of people of 
mixed descent. In 1919, for instance, Neville approved the marriage of a 25 year-old 
“half-caste” shearer named Alex Forrest to a “half-caste” girl identified in their file only 
as Kitty.57 Where such a union might have brought objection twenty years later as the 
discourse of governmental miscegenation had developed its fictive internal logics, at this 
time there were only two concerns. First, Neville used the occasion to identify further 
details about Forrest, particularly whether he was the same individual as a “Norman 
Forrest.” Norman Forrest was established to be a different person of mixed descent, and 
had himself married a girl named “Eva.” This inquiry, before ruling on the legitimacy of 
the given union, had managed to gather information on two marriages that crossed the 
color line to add to his gradually amassing files and observations. The second concern 
was made clear when, later in the year, Neville agreed to the marriage, but after doing so 
wrote insistently to determine whether it had taken place and under what circumstances. 
It seemed that for unknown reasons, Alex Forrest had left the district before the marriage 
could take place. Initially, then, the desired outcome of the power of marriage approval 
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was dim, but it nonetheless remained possible to use the powers of the Act to gather 
information on individuals of part-Aboriginal descent. 
 Once such marriages were registered with the department, the children produced 
became objects of surveillance and potential removal to Carrolup, or after 1919, to Moore 
River Native Settlement.58 Children of mixed descent were removed wherever possible. 
As early as 1916, at least one ground for removal could be the perception of acute 
intelligence on the part of a mixed descent child. One such case saw the removal of a 
“half-caste” child being raised by a female family member— “a gin named 
Bindummo”—as her daughter. The policeman who acted as Protector for the district 
remarked in a dispatch to the Aborigines Department that “[t]he child appears to be a 
very intelligent little girl & in my opinion it would be desirable to remove her from her 
present surroundings and place her in the Mission School.”59 As early as 1915, the 
Department had begun to keep lists of all “half-caste” children as they were earmarked 
for removal, removed from their parents, and sent to missions and Government native 
settlements.60 From 1928 onward, when Moore River and Carrolup were both 
simultaneously operating, most “Native” and particularly “half-caste” children in the 
settled southern regions of Western Australia were held in one or either institution or in 
smaller Mission facilities. By around the same time, regular circular dispatches from the 
Aborigines Department to police and missionaries were used to enumerate the number 
and “type” of Aboriginal subjects present in each region. Further, regular records were 
kept of Aboriginal children removed to the settlements and the adults who followed them 
there to camp on the outskirts.  
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 The sphere of concern over the crossing of the color line was particularly acute 
with regard to those perceived as “coloured Aliens.”  In July of 1915, a representative of 
New Norcia Mission wrote to the Chief Protector. “I shall feel obliged,” he began 
if you forward to this Mission as soon as possible the necessary 
information regarding the lawfulness of a marriage intended between a 
half-caste girl, aged 15 years, mother of a child, and a single man 28 years 
old, son of a white woman and of a coloured American man.61 
The request was processed through an implicit three generations of genealogy. The 
Department’s response was frantic and referred the matter all the way to the Colonial 
Secretary. Neville’s initial action was to reply immediately to request more information; 
most particularly, he requested the details of the girl’s legitimacy. This would, no doubt, 
indicate best whether the Department already held information on her. The exact 
parentage of the child was also an issue.  
By the middle of August, the Mission supplied further particulars to the 
Department. The unnamed half-caste woman had been born from a legitimate matrimony 
of two half-caste parents. Further, the Protector was informed that “[t]he father of the 
child is not the man who intends marry her, but another native . . . [T]he parents of the 
man are Harry Michael and Annie Martin, the former son of an American born in 
Australia and the latter an Australian white woman.”62 The genealogical inquiry had 
provided sufficient information, had been expanded and been cross-referenced to 
concerns of legal legitimacy and racial admixture. The issue that arose, however, was that 
such a union had not been legislated for; the idea of providing for the circumstance of 
intermarriage between an indigenous person and a “coloured American man” had not 
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been anticipated, so few were the numbers of people of perceived “coloured American” 
background in Western Australia. Neville wrote to the Colonial Secretary to seek his 
legal advice as to whether the 1905 Act gave him grounds to prohibit the marriage. The 
Secretary knew of no such objection but referred the matter to Crown Law Authorities. 
Ultimately, on the 27th of August 1915, Neville was forced to advise New Norcia that 
“there would appear to be no legal impediment to the proposed union.”63 
 The Department continued, where possible, to gather information on the 
interactions between “natives,” and people of “alien” and particularly “alien coloured” 
background. However, it would be another twenty years before Neville would take 
significant action to address the possible extension of the Act to regulate such unions. At 
stake in the correspondence which circulated was the degree to which surveillance and 
intervention could be accomplished in relation to people of mixed descent without the 
need to refer the matter to parliamentary legislation. The degree to which micrological 
interventions could be accomplished beneath the level of the legal apparatus and 
addressed at the level of race and miscegenation was of great concern. On the 11th of June 
1937, Neville wrote to the Deputy Commissioner for Native Affairs, F. I. Bray, to consult 
on the matter. He had just consulted with the Chief Secretary for Native Affairs; together 
they had resolved to take extensive action to address the question of marriage across the 
color line, particularly those that involved “aliens” and were not yet legislated for. Of 
particular concern, wrote Neville to his Deputy, were “native marriages” and “negroes in 
native camps.”64 Bray returned the memo, advising that though it would be impossible to 
declare “persons of alien coloured race” natives themselves simply because they “live 
and associate with natives;” impossible, at any rate, without amending the Native 
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Administration Act---which itself had only a year earlier been enacted and revised from 
its 1905 form in response to the Moseley Royal Commission of the early 1930s.65 
Legislative revision seemed unlikely in these circumstances.  
Nonetheless, it was potentially possible under the extant legislation to forbid 
“alien” individuals to enter native camps and thus potentially to cordon off “aliens” from 
natives. Bray suggested that if amendment was made to the Act, “it would be advisable to 
see that a door was not left open for coloured aliens to come in and consort with 
natives.”66 Previously married families of mixed “coloured alien” and “native” descent 
could not so directly be managed under the existing terms of the Act. If such changes had 
been contemplated, as Bray put it, there were “existing cases of aliens married to or 
consorting with natives who have families with whom, in your opinion as Commissioner 
of Native Affairs, it may not be desirable to interfere.”67 One matter at stake was how to 
employ extent powers as mechanisms of surveillance and information gathering without 
the need to push for legislative change, which were more difficult to obtain. As such, 
what emerged were less prescribed tactics of intervention and prohibition but rather, a set 
of technologies of demographic surveillance that could be adapted to differing concerns. 
Neville’s preferred outcomes for the “coloured” population of Western Australia 
would be manifest publically in his 1947 book on the topic. There he emphasized his 
belief that while European and Aboriginal intermarriage was preferable, occasional 
exceptions were possible and a very few instances had to be avoided at all cost. While 
unions of people of “Negro, Asiatic, Indian, or other coloured ancestry” would 
necessarily imply “greater risk of atavism,” he also pointed to exceptions.68 As such, 
“persons of Negro-Aboriginal descent sometimes strongly exhibit certain deleterious 
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cultural traits, while in those of Chinese-Aboriginal origin the good qualities of the 
Chinese may present.”69 Though Neville certainly accepted a hierarchical pseudo-
scientific scale of traits and characteristics, “[b]etween the full-blood and the near-white 
there are now so many grades of colour that it is impossible here [in Australia’s Coloured 
Minority] to make more than passing reference to what really constitutes a scientific 
study.”70 The application of the perceived scientific hierarchy of race and crossing was to 
be regulated, according to Neville, through a government manifestation of power which 
he named “Authority.” This trope, always capitalized in Neville’s book, appeared to 
denote the application of power by state officials with the advice of “science” as their 
operative guide. “Governments,” he wrote, “have the money, land, the command of their 
officials, and the power to administer the law. The obligation by law to educate, feed, 
medically attend and otherwise safeguard its wards also rests upon Authority.”71 
Anthropological taxonomies were also useful, since “[t]he Scientist, with his trained 
mind and keen desire to exert his efforts in the field investigating native culture and in 
studying the life history of the species, supplies an aid to administration.”72 Government 
“Authority” then, was to unify the various levels at which pastoral power, biopower, and 
discipline could be applied by the settler colonial state: “[l]et the Government, then, look 
to the practical side, the Church take care of the spiritual, and let Science help to train and 
advise both the nature of the people and its culture, towards whose enlightenment all 
three are working.”73 The limits, then, of whom could be directly managed, compelled to 
avoid fraternization and marriage, and even the preliminary question of the racial identity 
of individuals vexed Neville in 1937. Ten years later, he would reflect on the limits of the 
Government capacity to know race through practices of surveillance. He admitted that 
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“[t]he various cross-sections often puzzle officials who at times find headache-making 
problems in deducing who is or is not a native or aboriginal in law.”74 In this way, the 
moment of this informal 1937 inquiry into the status of “coloured” and aboriginal legal 
status represented an attempt to bring to bear the available technologies of surveillance 
and apparatuses of racial and conjugal discipline on a section of the population consider 
perhaps the most worrying figures of tension for the Department of Native Affairs.  
In 1937, two months after the April Conference in Canberra, Neville was 
energized by the acceptance of many of his policies at the Commonwealth level. In July, 
several days after his consultation with Bray, Neville dispatched a circular to the 
principle Protector in each District in the state. It read as follows: 
I am desirous of learning as quickly as possible the names and 
particulars of all coloured persons of alien race, including Negros, who 
were living with natives in the relationship of husband and wife, legally or 
otherwise, prior to the passage of the “Native Administration Act, 1905-
1936,” and still are so living. 
 In addition to the personal particulars of the alien or Negro, I 
would also like to know the name and age of the native concerned, 
together with particulars of any children.75 
Not surprisingly, the majority of Protectors returned the statement that there were no such 
persons living in their District. Neville’s circular was not responding to a pervasive 
practice, but rather to the most tense figure of transgression within the discourse of 
Native Administration. While there were only a handful of “negroes” in Western 
Australia, and still a minority of childbearing marriages between Aboriginal people and 
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such “coloured Aliens” more generally, nonetheless, the potential introduction of the 
stock of such individuals was an immense source of  anxiety in the Department and 
called for excess of surveillance. 
 The Department kept all responses to Neville’s circular on file and tabulated them 
into a central table. However, unlike the formal system for returning Aboriginal census 
information, which had been in place since as early as 1928, this request did not receive a 
uniform response from the Protectors who gathered the information. The Protector for the 
District of Subiaco, for instance, felt it his duty to report on all native marriages in the 
District and on all of the children despite the lack of any individuals perceived “alien or 
Negro” individuals married to “Natives.” Fremantle, another metropolitan district 
provided particulars of each of the several Aboriginal and half-caste residents along with 
age and employment particulars. Two of the individuals resident in Fremantle were 
identified further as what the Department called “coloured aliens.” One was referred to as 
“Afghan-halfcaste,” and the other as the “half-caste” child of a “Malay-Abo native” 
union.76 Even where sexual unions across the “colour line” were not present, their mere 
potential prompted surveillance of non-whites generally. 
The Port Hedland Protector, a Constable Mounter reported one “actual alien 
married to a native,” whom he named and identified as “Chinaman 51 years.” His wife 
was identified a “h/c, 32 years,” and their seven children were named and identified by 
age.77 Mounter also identified the marriage of a “believed h/c Malay” to a “half-caste” 
woman; again, Protector responses gave  age and the names of the  individuals under 
surveillance as well as of their children.78 The same identifications were also observed for 
two further couples and the fathers of the families in each instance were cited as 
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“believed h/c Malay.”79 Finally Mounter noted the existence of a white man married to a 
“native,” and a man “I understand is a h/c Maori . . . married to a h.c.”80 The Marble Bar 
Protector was more certain in his presentation. Laying out his limited district findings in a 
fixed table, he identified the single marriage of an elderly Malay man and an “abo 
Nat[ive]” whom he noted had no children.81 The Derby Protector, a Sergeant Hopping, 
supplied the names of a number of children whose parents were an elderly couple; the 
father was identified as “Chinese,” the mother as “native.” As well as particulars of age, 
this protector offered the professions of each child and felt compelled to offer a legal 
interpretation of the status of one child. “Nellie Ah Chee (nee Loquin)” though included 
among the children of the family, was probably a member of the family by marriage to 
one of the brothers. Hopping insisted that Nellie, “is a half-caste woman and does not in 
any way associate with natives. She is not, therefore, in my opinion, a native within the 
meaning of the Act.”82 Where Mounter offered his “belief” as an uncertain caveat to his 
identification of people by racial admixture, Hopping asserted his legal interpretation that 
a “half-caste” who does not “associate with natives,” should be a subject of exemption 
from legislative Acts pertaining to Aboriginal people. This was not in line with 
Department policy, which tended to refuse exemption until at least “quadroon” status had 
been attained. 
The Carnarvon Protector provided the ethnicity, age, and number of children in 
each union. He identified two “Indian” men, each married to an “1/2 caste native.”83 The 
Carnarvon Protector also noted the marriage of a Japanese man to a woman who, along 
with her siblings, “claim[ed] to be quadroons.” In pondering this legal classification, he 
drew on his investigations, in this case “their mother being a ½ caste native and father a 
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Malay.” In this instance, one certainly found what Neville called a “puzzled official,” 
uncertain of either the “Scientific” or the legal grounds of “Authority,” which could be 
brought to bear on the individual in question and the marriage to which it pertained. This 
woman’s status as a quadroon in relation to her “half-caste” and “Malay” background, “is 
something I would like to know definitely,” he wrote.84 Several districts, for instance 
Fitzroy Crossing and Busselton, provided information on European “Aliens.” Where 
some unions involved Southern Europeans, the Department paid some attention. 
Some Districts, did not provide the Department with what was seen as sufficient 
information and queries were used to generate action slips, which the Department 
dispatched and pursued.85 The Officer from the Dumbleyung district, for instance, 
included a list of three “persons of alien race living as man and wife” along with their 
names and ages and those of their children.86 He did not, however, speculate on or specify 
the details of the suspected racial makeup of the individuals surveyed; further information 
was therefore requested. On the other hand, other Protectors went beyond the circular’s 
brief to investigate both current and historic unions across the color line in their district. 
Though Constable Molloy, the Busselton Protector “made inquiries and ascertained that 
there are no coloured aliens living or married to natives in Busselton District,” he 
nonetheless provided information on the various past instances of miscegenation in the 
district. He claimed to know of at least three marriages of “American Negro[es]” to two 
white Australian women and one “half-caste” respectively.87 One of these instances had 
been in recent memory. These former residents of the district descended from a “negro,” 
and a white woman he claimed, and their children had moved to Perth. A “William 
Strachan,” he noted, was “an american Negro [who] lawfully married” a “Mrs Rose 
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Isaacs of Quindalup about 23 years ago.”88 She was, it seemed, recently deceased. The 
Isaacs family was also “supposed to have negro blood but I am unable to verify this.”89 
He delved even further into the distant past of the district, insisting that “an American 
negro named John James Love, known as ‘Major’ Love married a woman believed to be 
half caste named Mattie or Mathilda Herron of O’Hern or Herne about 70 years ago and 
had a large family as follows.”90 Molloy enumerated the six children of the couple. Three 
of the children were deceased and had no family. One son was not explicitly named as 
deceased, but had no family. Molloy mentioned a daughter named Jane was also listed as 
deceased but who had two sons by a man named Nannup. One of these sons was 
deceased. The other “has a large family address unknown.”91 “Eli Love, aged about 70 
years” was the “only surviving issue of Major Love,” still residing at Busselton and the 
pair had children who were understood to be residing in Perth. Molloy also noted an 
Italian couple and made a point to identify the wife as “very dark.” He went on: “it is 
rumoured she was the daughter of Arthur Sambo a half-caste.”  
Neville’s Protectors and officials paid particular attention to the few people 
perceived as “Negros.” The Protector from the Shire of Pingelly reported to Neville a 
“John Michael,” the son of the same George Michael and Kitty whom Neville had 
inquired about more than twenty years earlier. It seemed Neville had kept a close watch 
on this situation despite his diminished power; the protector would remark that, 
pertaining to John Michael “you have all the family history on his file at your office.”92 
The only other marriage involving African-American descent was reported from Guilford 
Police Station in the greater Perth metropolitan area. William Bodney resided in the area, 
the “father of this man, I am informed, is an American negro, and the mother an 
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Australian abo native.” Bodney himself was listed as “48 years,” and “married to a half-
caste abo native woman, and she has two children to him, Christopher 4 yrs, and William 
2 yrs.”93  
Protectors were then empowered to decide the racial makeup of an individual by a 
combination of investigation into their background and sighting of their complexion. 
While most used genealogy as a mechanism to investigate the background of individuals, 
mere complexion and the visible detection of external features were also employed to 
decide the “Scientific” status of an individual’s racial-biological makeup. This 
categorization could then be referred to legal classification: the Department could use its 
various powers to intervene into the marriage, approving or disapproving it if one or 
other party was descended from a native. Though not characteristic of the whole field, the 
Busselton Protector’s recourse to a rumored “half-caste” father could be correlated to his 
observation that she was “very dark” and render her subject to potential proscriptions of 
marriage and procreation at the most and ongoing surveillance at the least. Across the 
circular’s replies and, indeed, even in the Department’s own tabulations, queries stood 
over the heads of certain individuals who were listed to “believed h.c.” 
Examination of such a sample technology of racial surveillance as the 1937 
circular, reveals what a skepticism about such racial physiognomic claims should already 
find one suspecting: that this pretension to visualize a supposed genealogical rigor of 
surveillance was a fiction. The annotation of an individual as half-caste, for instance, was 
often subject to “belief,” rumour, and anecdote. Further, individual protectors exercised 
their own interpretation of the legal classification of people under the Acts as “native” or 
otherwise. Some were more liberal than the Department, for instance Sergeant Hopping, 
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who spilt ink making the case for Nellie Ah Chee’s exemption. Others, such as the 
Carnarvon Protector are uncertainty to the law and enquire for instructions from above. 
Busselton’s Constable Molloy is content to draw from local rumour and his own 
perception of the “darkness” of his constituents to speculate on their racial makeup. Bray 
and Neville were concerned over their limited powers. Bray would even offer the opinion 
that some “octoroons” should be reclassified as natives as, like those of “Negro” descent, 
they could not be classified as natives but often associated with them.94 The legal powers 
of the Chief Protector and his Department inferior to what the discourse of protection 
gradually aimed towards in the period up to the end of the 1930s. Further, many of their 
functionaries were less capable of rigorously identifying their charges than Neville would 
later claim in his public writings. The period from 1915 to the late 1930s in Western 
Australia produced many technologies and pretentions at racial surveillance. Two things 
must be emphasized. Where racial surveillance was based on certain physiognomic 
fictions it follows that it was also flawed from the start. Nonetheless, the technologies of 
information gathering and sharing by the Department did increase in intensity and 
efficiency over the period, this apparatus produced an internally cogent network which 
actualized the pretention of racial looking.  
 
Threshold: 1937 
The apparatus of absorption, then, was a network of the kind described by 
Foucault. Recalling Foucault’s characterization of the apparatus, we observe that it is 
situated between discourses and institutions and through it emerges “a set of strategies of 
the relations of forces supporting, and supported by certain types of knowledge.”95 
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Disciplinary technologies around Aboriginal marriage and children, as well as the feared 
figure of abnormality ascribed to “coloured people of Alien race” emerged as 
technologies and fears prior to the construction of the “type[] of knowledge” which 
justified absorption (the idea of the Aboriginal as primitive Caucasian). Here, I want to 
discuss how, in 1937, this field of knowledge had coalesced into an apparatus whose aim 
was the natal-thanatopolitical “forgetting” of Aborigines through eugenic means. 
By the 1937 conference, framers posited a racial outcome of absorption, based on 
the Adelaide School’s racial classification and the techniques of regulation, protection, 
and child removal would be positioned as a set of policy enunciations—speech acts that 
would inaugurate a shift and unification in policy toward Aborigines. As historian 
Russell McGregor has argued, the appointment of the physician Cecil Cook as Medical 
Officer and Chief Protector of the Northern Territory in 1927 was crucial to the influence 
of a policy of “breeding out color” in the Territory.96 While, in 1928, when Cook had first 
become Chief Protector of the Northern Territory, J. W. Bleakley was in the process of 
drafting a set of recommendations about the fate of the “Half-caste Aborigines of North 
and Central Australia.” He had recognized that the “future of the crossbreeds” if it lay 
with the “white community” required that “we [be] prepared to absorb them, and grant 
them equal rights and social advantages until this is accomplished.”97 However, since 
“they are human beings with a conflicting mixture of civilised and savage,” they were 
therefore “more susceptible to contaminating influences,” and Bleakley ultimately 
recommended that “the best solution from the point of view of race purity” should see 
“half castes” remain “members of a protected and civilised aboriginal community;” this 
was especially so since in Bleakley’s opinion, “in 90 per cent of the cases the natural 
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leanings are more towards the Aboriginal than the white side.”98 Such varying 
segregationist solutions as those of Bates,  Bleakley, and, in part, Tindale (though he 
ultimately favored assimilation) to this question of race and population that so troubled 
these self-appointed guardians of a white Australia no doubt represent tendencies 
countervailing those of absorption. Segregation could function as a gesture of sovereign 
exception, but it could equally function as a mechanism for research, or as a government 
response to public fears about race hygiene.  
Other commentators such as Neville, Cook, and Tindale rejected the idea of 
segregation and of half-caste segregation particularly. In his Survey, Tindale noted that 
the result of half-caste segregation would be the continual intermarriage of people of 
mixed descent. He worried that “[i]f this type becomes fixed, it may, in the future, be 
necessary to recognize a Neo-Australoid stock, a fixed blend of Australoid and 
European.”99 Ultimately, Tindale came to favor what he called “assimilation” in the 
Survey (though his emphasis on racial stock, physical anthropology, and breeding 
populations positions his enunciations in the realm of its more eugenic form, absorption). 
While some favored assimilation for all Aborigines, Tindale saw segregation as only 
useful for full-blood Aborigines who remained connected to their traditional Country. 
Sydney Anthropologist and prominent government advisor A. P. Elkin saw all 
Aborigines as potentially capable of social and cultural uplift and assimilation although 
he retained much biological essentialism in his thinking, as I detail in the next chapter. 
Neville divided full blood Aborigines into a three tiered social scale which informed their 
relative assimilability. The “class (a)” of “full blood” Aborigines were the “detribalized” 
whose children could be educated would be treated differently to the “semi-civilized,” 
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who should remain subject to “benevolent supervision” in regard to employment and 
medical treatment until such time as they might reach “their ultimate destiny” in class 
(a).100 The “uncivilized native” was to be “preserve[d] as far as possible . . . in his normal 
tribal state by the establishment of inviolable reserves.”101 In Neville’s 1947 summary of 
his outlook on Aboriginal policy (which largely reiterated the 1937 plan), “[n]o neglect of 
the full-blood classes was thus implied. It merely placed the people in evolutionary order 
looking at it from the point of assimilation,” this social-stadial view of policy was 
ultimately oriented to Neville’s natal-thanatopolitical ambitions as regards the future 
racial and social absorption of Aborigines: oriented to “the future of all native people.”102 
Neville probably derived the scientific justification for his plan for the “uncivilized 
native” from Tindale’s Survey.  
It was at the 1937 Conference that an attempt to decide between such 
countervailing policy tendencies and position matters for a unified Commonwealth 
scheme. The mechanisms primarily decided as means for accomplishing this destiny were 
the controlled miscegenation of natives “not of the full blood” and the removal of all 
children of this kind. As regards the latter, the disagreement came only over the 
appropriate age for child removal.103 If, as I have remarked, protection and care were the 
catch cries of a racial discipline oriented to the immediate management of indigenous 
subjects, the child became the locus of a natal-thanatopolitics of the future. For Neville, 
where it had “been stated many times that natives, even if given a chance, will always 
live as they have lived for generations past,” and where “[t]hat is probably true, as far as 
the adults are concerned . . . [w]e have to reach for better things always through the 
children.”104 The biopolitics of assimilation and absorption in Australia in the mid-
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twentieth century was oriented toward this bifurcated temporality: protection and care for 
those who remained, absorption for the future. The most literal form of putting to death—
the massacre—had largely ceased and was circumscribed by Aborigines Departments. 
Natal-thanatopolitics would proceed through a disciplinary set of practices whose 
practices emphasized the functional segregation of Aborigines within reserves, native 
settlements, and children’s homes, even as their ultimate goal was absorption. Absorption 
was to disappear the Aboriginal population on a long time-line projected toward an 
imaginary future. Such figures of abnormality as “coloured aliens” would worry this 
apparatus, as we have seen. 
 In 1937, the policy emphasis on “controlled breeding” that had been already 
begun by Cook and by Neville in Western Australia were enunciated as the correct aim of 
policy nationwide. Further it was precisely the effect of the Aboriginal population’s 
existence on the racial and cultural composition of the nation that mattered to the most 
extreme advocates of absorption. Neville’s rhetorical question to which I referred in my 
opening sketch asked about the racial composition of the “Commonwealth”---whether 
this political economic category of state composition was to support a future of “1 000 
000 blacks” or whether absorption as a policy would foment a future in which the 
Aboriginal population would be forgotten. Of course, for Cleland this question of 
forgetting was not necessary. As Anderson notes, Cleland “predict[ed] a day when, as the 
result of a scientific breeding and education program, all Australians claimed some 
Aboriginal ancestry.”105 In either case, absorption and “breeding out of color” would be 
the goal of policy for a future nation, whose normativity would be both racially 
homogeneous and culturally regularized. 
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The policy of absorption based on miscegenation would indeed become the 
dominant strand in the discussion at the 1937 Conference in Canberra. Reading the 
conference proceedings, one encounters a field of competing enunciations which bear 
upon: the fate of the nation, the fate of the Aboriginal “race,” the categorization of 
Aboriginal people into kinds based on numerous categories---habitation, blood quantum, 
relative tribalization. The Conference brought together the cadre of policy experts (for 
instance Protectors such as Neville, Cook, and J. W. Bleakley), scientific experts 
(Cleland, for instance, attended), and Federal and State Politicians. They would decide 
that “the destiny of the natives of aboriginal origin, but not of the full blood, lies in their 
ultimate absorption by the people of the Commonwealth and it therefore recommends 
that all efforts be directed to that end.”106 This question of destiny and futurity is not 
incidental and is intrinsically bound to that of race and nature as either describe the 
normativity of the population at a biopolitical level: its physiognomy, its fitness and 
health, and its economic and cultural mode of life.  
The biopolitical management of population, directed toward a vision of the 
dominant race and nation (“the people of the Commonwealth”) was the ultimate telos of 
this vision, even as it was most immediately and in its technologies of intervention a 
vision directed toward the destiny of the “natives.” Within this logic of futurity and 
destiny, the notion of the doomed race was retained, insofar as it referred to “full bloods.” 
Equally, a natal-thanatopolitical logic was put in place for the rising population of half-
castes---they were to be absented for all time, not by a mechanism of death, but by the 
removal of children and the management of miscegenation.  
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At the Conference, policy framers would decide through such a governmental 
speech act as the invocation of “racial destiny” what kinds of Aborigines existed and 
what they were like both racially and behaviourally. What was a “full blood native” like, 
behaviourally and relative to contact with whites? How tribalized was a given full blood, 
how proximate to a town did he or she reside? How did a “half-caste’s” relative 
tribalization affect their futurity and that of the normative, white, national population. 
Finally, under what conditions could an Aboriginal person be exempted from the juridical 
status of “native?” At what status was one legally, racially, and behavioural absorbed 
enough to---under continued surveillance---take one’s “place in the community”?107 
Similar questions were asked as regards the “mixed” population. A regulatory definition 
of “native” was laid out based on pre-existing Western Australian legislation, “Native 
means---” the paragraph began, a speech act ready to define Aboriginality for the nation’s 
present and future 
(a) Any person of full blood descended from the original inhabitants of Australia. 
(b) Subject to the exceptions stated in this definition any person of less than full 
blood who is descended from the original inhabitants of Australia or from 
their full blood descendents, excepting, however, any person who is--- 
1) a quadroon under 21 years of age who neither associates with or lives 
substantially after the manner of the class of persons mentioned in 
paragraph (a) in this definition unless such quadroon is ordered to be 
classified as a native under this act; 
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2) a quadroon over 21 years of age, unless that person is by order of a 
magistrate ordered to be classed as a native under this act or requests 
to be classed as a native under this act; and 
3) a person of less than quadroon blood who was born prior to the 31st 
day of December, 1936, unless such person expressly applies to be 
brought under this act and the Minister consents.108 
According to the Conference’s logic, “natives” were to be bound to state control, whereas 
those of mixed descent who demonstrated education, employment, and an avoidance of 
traditional custom---who avoided fraternizing with “natives” could be exempt from 
classification as native under Aborigines legislation. Nonetheless, as we shall see, this 
provisional citizenship could be revoked at any time and functioned as much as a 
mechanism of surveillance as a provision of rights. 
For the Conference attendees, regarding the “full bloods,” the question of 
thanatopolitical “passing” was a palpable possibility. “If we leave them alone,” Cook 
stated, “they will die, and we shall have no problem apart from dealing with those pangs 
of conscience which must attend the passing of a neglected race.”109 “Full bloods” were 
not seen as a “problem” for the futurity of white Australia. Rather, in Northern Australia, 
the fear of a “mixed” Aboriginal population outstripping the numbers of the white in 
several generations precipitated great anxiety. In the settled southern regions, this was not 
an issue. But nonetheless, the survival of a mixed population risked disease and ill health 
(it was believed) for the dominant population because of poor living conditions, and 
threatening the physiognomic and cultural homogeneity of the envisaged white Australia.  
Cook argued that, in regard to these anxieties over population, the absorption of half-
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castes, based on Cleland’s science of race was a forgone conclusion. As regards “full 
bloods,” “there [were] three alternatives,” in Cook’s view: 
first, we may adopt a policy of laissez faire which, to every Protector of 
Aborigines, is repugnant; secondly, we may develop an enlightened 
elaborate system which will produce an aboriginal population that is likely 
to swamp the white; or thirdly, we may follow a policy under which the 
aboriginal will be absorbed into the white population.110 
The policy of eugenic absorption would be abandoned after the war, at least in its most 
explicit form. The 1937 Conference can better be read as a culmination and framing of 
views about Aboriginal destiny and that of the Australian national racial pool during the 
preceding decades, with particular acuity in Western Australia and the Northern 
Territory. It was not Cook’s preferred third option, but the second of his prescriptions---
“enlightened” protection, cultural regularization, and forced civilization---that came to 
dominate in the subsequent assimilationist period.  
Rather than focusing on the racialization of legislation (that would soon be 
absented and disavowed), what mechanisms of control does one see fomented by and 
retained in light of this legislative speech act?111 Indeed, education and civilization or 
“uplift” as they were often called, were provided for in the resolutions that, subject to the 
goal of absorption, “efforts of all State authorities should be directed towards the 
education of children of mixed aboriginal blood at white standards.”112 Through the 
period of absorption, mechanisms for regularization of population, education, and other 
behaviorist standards were laid in place. As regards “full blood” Aborigines, a 
mechanism meant to provide for their “train[ing] for absorption”---if they were to 
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survive, the logic went---was put in place. “Full blood” natives were to be divided into 
three classes of supervision. Class (a) were “children of the detribalized living near 
centers of white population,” and were to be educated up to a standard enabling them to 
enter the workforce.113 Class (b) was to include the “semi-civilized” and “unemployable” 
natives who would be relegated to “small local reserves selected for tribal suitability,” 
where they might live “as nearly as possible a normal tribal life, and unobjectionable 
tribal ceremonies may continue.”114 The “ultimate destiny of these people should be their 
elevation to class (a).”115 The third class was the “uncivilized native” who was to be 
“preserve[d] as far as possible . . . in his normal tribal state” on “inviolable reserves.”116 
Whether missionary access was to be granted to this last class was to be a decision of the 
States and Territory in question.  
All people of Aboriginal descent came under the Aborigines Acts, however many 
States held a provision known as “exemption.” By showing their willingness to adapt to 
white settler economic and social modes of life, Aboriginal people could apply to be 
exempted from the measures of the act; though they were often subject to continued 
surveillance, since exemption could be revoked at any time. In his final annual report, 
Neville exemplified the Western Australian Native Welfare Department’s attitude to this 
draconian measure: 
Exemption should be a valued privilege granted only to the really 
deserving, prepared to live according to decent white standards—but when 
once granted it should bestow upon the recipient all the benefits we 
ourselves enjoy as citizens of the State. It should also carry the obligations 
such citizenship entails.117 
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Exemption can be read as a governmental mechanism of surveillance of control; the 
colonial liberal logic of “civilization” was managed through this mechanism. Within the 
purview of “exemption,” Aboriginal people could enjoy the conditions of citizenship only 
on the proviso that they avoid all social and cultural aspects of Aboriginality and embrace 
a white economic mode.  
 
Though the vision of futurity framed by the policy act produced an aim at the 
“ultimate absorption [of part-Aboriginal people] by the people of the Commonwealth,” 
there were also mechanisms of immediate implementation that were social as well as 
racial. These mechanisms operate as a model for subsequent policies, even as these 
absented the notion of race from their language. Biopolitical aggregations of population, 
having identified aberrations of health, welfare, and cultural normativity as it refers to 
reproduction (the nuclear family) frequently turn to disciplinary mechanisms. It is crucial 
to note, then that while the goals of futurity shift, many of the mechanisms for regulation 
produced under eugenic absorption, remained in place from their culmination at the end 
of the 1930s into the “period” of cultural assimilation. Though not in the exact form it 
took in 1937, such a classification by relative “tribalization” was to repeated in the 
cultural assimilationist era. 
 
Assimilation and its Technologies 
As we have seen, from roughly the middle of the century, the telos of assimilation 
shifted; race was de-emphasized, the potential for a slow process of acculturation leading 
to Aboriginal citizenship was foregrounded and colour became less central (at least in the 
articulation of policy). As we saw, in my opening sketch, by 1963 policy was “not [to be] 
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based on race,” even as “temporary” exceptional powers could be applied to Aboriginal 
subjects. The outcome posited was no longer the forgetting of Aborigines according to a 
natal-thanatopolitics, but rather emphasized the aspiration that: 
all Aborigines and part-Aborigines will attain the same manner of living as other 
Australians and live as members of a single Australian community enjoying the 
same rights and privileges, accepting the same responsibilities, observing the 
same customs and influenced by the same beliefs, hopes, and loyalties as other 
Australians. 
Historian Anna Haebich notes that this shift began “[f]rom the 1950s” when “the policy 
of assimilation was adopted by governments across Australia as the road to take the 
nation’s estimated 80 000 Aboriginal people out of institutions, pastoral stations, 
camping reserves, and fringe camps, and into a modern suburban family life.”118 But, as 
Haebich is quick to note, “[a]dministrative controls were also put back into place. Rather 
than developing on Aboriginal initiatives, administrators regrouped, reasserted their 
former powers, and embarked on the new battle to enforce Aboriginal assimilation.”119 
Marriage was still regulated, exemptions still the only mechanism of provisional 
citizenship, and “the forced separation of children from their parents continued.”120 By 
the time of Hasluck’s 1963 statement with which I opened, discipline lay below the 
surface of apparently benevolent, culturally directed intentions. 
 Chiefly with reference to A. P. Elkin’s influence in the Northern Territory, 
McGregor argued, in his Imagined Destinies, that the culmination of racial and colour-
oriented biological absorption in 1937 was almost as immediately done away with by 
Interior Minister Jack McEwan’s 1939 “New Deal for Aborigines” in the Northern 
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Territory.  McGregor insisted that this new brand of assimilation “far from seeking 
elimination of the Aborigines” was “the first in more than half a century to seriously 
envisage Aboriginal survival, to seek to ensure survival, and to prescribe strategies 
predicated on their survival.”121 For McGregor, the pre-war form of absorption is 
genocidal in emphasizing race and framing policy through reference to color, as well as 
the disappearance of Aboriginal subjects from the Australian national polity. On the other 
hand, McGregor marks assimilation as cultural disintegration and normativization and in 
so doing, attempts to exclude assimilation from any subsistence of thanatopolitical 
power. He does so, as I trace more closely in the chapter that follows, through a rhetoric 
of intentionality. The primary proof McGregor would use to mark this epistemological 
break is vested in the intentions of one advisor (Elkin), his influence on several 
legislative framers (notably McEwan), and the effect this precipitated from its 
implementation in one territory of the Commonwealth (the Northern Territory). 
McGregor, in other words would mark an epistemic break at the level of an intentional 
ethos, manifest in discourse. 
I address these questions of thanatopolitics, necropolitics, biopolitics, and the 
relation of each with genocide at greater length in the next chapter. There I also deal with 
the mode of acknowledgement by which intentionality continues to function as a state 
signature of abdication of culpability; a state signature actualized by neat historical 
periodization.  Here I want to close by introducing certain pertinent subterranean traces of 
a natal-thanatopolitical apparatus that subsists beyond the epistemic break marked by the 
second World War. As we just saw, despite the break at the level of state enunciation 
which we saw between, say, the 1937 and 1963 conferences, many of the technologies of 
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discipline and biopower associated with natal-thanatopolitics are transmitted across this 
threshold even as the framers of legislation de-emphasize race and its disappearance as 
the telos of policy.  
As framed in 1963, the eventual outcome of assimilation, its meaning in the future 
is that subjects are to take their place in a Commonwealth of shared values that is yet to 
come; an idea of future homogeneity “not based on race” which might be read as a 
dialectical inclusion in the mode of an exclusion. This futurity replaced and supplanted 
the vision of racial homogeneity offered by the attendees of the 1937 Conference with the 
transmission of a vision of a future homogeneous population that must conform to “the 
same customs and [be] influenced by the same beliefs, hopes, and loyalties as other 
Australians.”122 The logic of a future homogeneity of population is retained between 
assimilation and absorption. “Race” and “color” have indeed been absented (even as the 
former is retained in the mode of a negation: “not based on race,” a possible recognition 
in the mode of a misrecognition of wider public apprehension of the goal and practice of 
assimilation).123 In 1953, federal legislation broke down the distinction between “full 
blood” and “half caste” Aborigines even as it retained and reemphasized the logic of 
“exemption”: 
3A.-(1.) The Director may, subject to the approval of the 
Administrator, by notice in the Gazette declare- 
(a) that a person specified in that notice is deemed not to be 
an aboriginal within the meaning of this Ordinance; 
or 
( b ) that a person, at least one of whose ancestor was a 
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person described in paragraph (a.) of the definition 
of ‘Aboriginal’ in the last preceding section, is 
deemed to be an aboriginal within the meaning of this 
Ordinance if he considers it to be in the best interests 
of that person.124 
Exemption remains as a mechanism of exception by which Aboriginal individuals could 
be made subject to the bios of settler colonial liberalism. Yet, the Director nonetheless 
retained the power to decide, within the apparatus, who belongs to the citizenry of the 
new state and who must remain outside it, marked as other and awaiting incorporation 
into the body politic. Indigenous people remained subject to a genealogical surveillance 
which could decide on their inclusion within the citizenry or their absenting as a subject 
beyond the pale of the polity. Further, to be a citizen meant no longer being native; 
emphasized by key aspects of the logic of exemption which stipulated that fraternizing 
with other Aboriginal subjects or continuing any aspect of a traditional way of life could 
mean a revocation of the provisional citizenship which exemption granted.  
 Exemption was not the only technology that crosses the apparent threshold from 
explicitly eugenic absorption to the apparently socio-cultural assimilation. At the 1953 
Conference, well after the move to assimilation and the diminution of the rhetoric of race, 
agents of assimilation nonetheless emphasized the removal of Aboriginal children of 
mixed descent. Using the terms “mixed-blood” and part-Aboriginal interchangeably, the 
Conference resolutions not only reinstated the need for removal but insisted on 
implementing this strategy at as early an age as possible.125 
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 In 1951, policy framers had contemplated a more radical diminution of the 
language of race and blood as it pertained to the application of such measures. Yet this 
diminution is less evidence of a genuine move to social equality and the bracketing of 
race, but rather more fully reveals the transmission of technologies of distinction which 
subsisted despite policy language. Framing and defining assimilation at the 1953 
Conference, McCaffrey noted that the 1951 meeting of Commonwealth and State 
Ministers, “proposed to abandon the method under which an attempt was made to define 
the terms ‘Aboriginal’ or Native.”126 Instead, “all persons” would be “covered by the 
definition subject to special legislation unless they obtained special exemption from it.”127 
Instead, “under the new legislation proposed,” a native “will be committed to the care of 
the State solely on the grounds that he or she stands in need of special care and 
assistance.”128 This more egalitarian policy was immediately criticized. Reverend A. F. 
Ellemore noted the hypocrisy it betrayed. As he noted, while the words “Aboriginal” and 
“Native” were no longer used in the new Welfare Ordinance, “the Welfare Ordinance can 
apply only to Aborigines; and it therefore becomes a farce not even to mention it.”129 As 
Ellemore noted, the more neutralized the language of legislation became, the more clear 
it was that it was intended to operate as a means of policing, surveilling, and disciplining 
Aboriginal subjects. Ellemore’s criticism emphasizes the degree to which special 
measures “not based on race,” were indeed so. Ellemore counseled that policy framers 
accept their own assumptions about the inferiority and incompatibility of Aboriginal 
social life, claiming that extant policy was not “discrimination (an unworthy thing),” but 
racial distinction (a realistic and necessary thing).”130 “It would surely be far better,” he 
wrote, “to treat them on the dignified basis of their different stage of development, and 
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recognize that this is because they are of a special racial group.”131 Ellemore’s racist 
distinction in kind between Aboriginal and European ways of life reveals the degree to 
which such assumptions pervaded even the more progressive assimilationists—who 
wished to continue the same practices of government while evacuating an explicit avowal 
of the racism they nonetheless entailed. 
 While there is a rhetorical transformation in the 1963 document, at the twilight of 
assimilation, not only in the absenting of the language of race and the extension of 
provisions for assimilation to all Aborigines, from its preamble on the “meaning of the 
policy of Assimilation,” the question of the technologies of power that the sovereign 
institution retains is one of transmission and not of transformation. Indeed, where the 
thanatopolitical presumption that “full blood” Aborigines leading a nomadic life would 
vanish had been eclipsed, now they could be subject to mechanisms to transform their 
mode of sociality.  
As late as the 1963 Conference, many of the framing mechanisms surrounding the 
social “type” of Aboriginals and even their racial “blood content” remain in play despite 
their “intentional” eschewal of matters of race. I have mentioned, while explicitly 
disavowing race, it nonetheless retained an analytics of descent; subjects were already 
“Aborigines” or “part-Aborigines.” Further, forms of social life recur in the 1963 policy 
shift as formed around the same overlapping collapse of socio-cultural factors and racial 
factors. Now, race is merely occluded in a rhetorical gesture. As the document’s 
definition provides: “[a]ny special measures taken for Aborigines and part-Aborigines are 
regarded as temporary measures, not based on race, but intended to meet their need for 
special care and assistance to protect them from any ill effects of sudden change.”132 As 
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such, the document retains the capacity to take into account temporary special measures 
directed at the subjects variously prepared for citizenship. The amount of preparation for 
assimilation was a significant question within the 1963 Policy Document. Of course, this 
document is explicitly of the period of the latter end of assimilation, where fomenting 
measures to make special laws apply only to Aboriginal subjects was a practice that was 
becoming less central to Aboriginal policy. It is precisely this positioning that is 
illuminating: a consideration for protective measures and mechanisms (including, for 
instance, the permission for medical testing on Aborigines by blood type133) applied 
specifically to Aborigines that would be temporary and responsive to certain special 
needs vis the production of Aborigines as adequately normatively Australian citizens 
sharing “the same customs and influenced by the same beliefs, hopes, and loyalties as 
other Australians.”134  
The mass-mediated devices by which non-white subjects were solicited to 
perceive this shift away from race nonetheless retained the categorization of people by 
blood quanta as a corollary to the new social stadial model which undergirded 
assimilation. As Anna Haebich has noted, from the 1950s, the Commonwealth 
Government intensified its campaign to “spin” assimilation, endeavoring to make it 
acceptable as a policy to white Australians; one of the means of doing so was through the 
dissemination of a series of propagandist pamphlets.135 The Northern Territory’s 1958 
pamphlet boasted about the achievements of the 1953 amendments, saying that in light of 
them “all people of mixed blood living after the manner of Europeans were freed from 
the restrictions previously imposed.”136 It also insisted that “perhaps the most positive 
step taken by the Government in regard to people of mixed race has been to transfer, 
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where practicable children of mixed race from the Territory environment, and give them 
a chance to develop normally in Southern States where colour consciousness is 
practically nonexistent.”137 Where measures of “uplift” were in place for all Aboriginal 
people and not merely those of mixed descent, the categories of descent based on blood 
remained in play as technologies for dividing and surveilling the population. Inherited 
from the more openly racial policy of absorption, these categories were blatantly on 
display even in such propagandist documents that aimed to norm the question of “color” 
acceptability. As the documents aimed to educate citizens away from their color 
prejudice, they also relied on the analytics of blood that had been instantiated under 
absorption.138 In 1963, the same year as Hasluck’s Conference, the Commonwealth 
released The Aborigines and You, which conceded that  
most aborigines are still in various stages on the way to assimilation, some 
legislation applicable to them as aborigines is still extant. These special 
measures taken for aborigines and part-aborigines are regarded as 
temporary. They are not based on race, but are intended to meet the 
special needs of these people at this time to protect them from any ill 
effects of sudden change and to assist them to make the transition from 
one stage to another as easily as possible.139  
Here, the notion of types based on “stage[s]” of accommodation to civilization is 
distributed across a population divided by an analytics of blood and race (“aborigines” 
and “part-aborigines”). This retention of the capacity to define the Aboriginal population 
as subject to protection at the whim of Government Administration clearly forms a 
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transmision in the technologies of protection and assimilation, even as a break at the level 
of imagining the national futurity of the nation can be said to have taken place. 
Where absorption and assimilation differ according to their visions of national 
homogeneity in the future, they retain many mechanisms for the decision about who is 
“native” and who is not until the beginning of the recession of such policies and the 
emergence of civil rights discourse predicated on citizenship in the 1960s. As late as 
1963, we can see that where ultimate goals have changed, temporary measures are 
retained as a mechanism for the policing of cultural normativity and biopolitical policing 
of familial normativity. Not only did this mean the surveillance and selection of aspects 
of Aboriginal cultural practice that would be acceptable in the future but also, this 
selection process referred to the melancholic appropriation of artifacts and aspects of 
Aboriginal culture insofar as they could function as fetishes of a new nationalism distinct 
from the British Imperial Metropole.140 Where absorption aimed to police the cultural 
lives of “half-castes” and palliatively segregate and “preserve as far as possible”141 the 
“tribalized” “full blood,” assimilation aimed at the regulation and cultural subjection to 
European normativity of all Aboriginal people---who were nonetheless still divided into 
categories of descent and behavior. This eschewal of race in cultural assimilation 
extended the reach of special measures by emphasizing its intention to act with equal 
vigor on not only the “part-Aboriginal” but also the “full blood” Aboriginal population. 
It is in the context of this question of categorical mechanisms for dividing and 
distinguishing types of Aboriginal—according to blood, according to social life—that, 
while I accept the shift identified by MacGregor at the level of intentionality, I would 
maintain a need for discursive vigilance around the continued cross-mapping of social 
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forms of life, and rhetorics of crossing or of stage. There is indeed a shift at the level of 
the national teleologies of homogeneity undergirding policy speech acts. After the 
Second World War, no longer do policy framers aim to forget or disappear Aborigines in 
the years to come (at least if their framing enunciations are to be believed). However 
there also subsist alongside such shifts, a transmission of discursive categories of 
population and protection and variously determines the categories that are going to 
surround the making of “kinds” of Aboriginal: “full blood” / “half caste” / “octoroon” 
etc., or later, “Aboriginal” / “part-Aboriginal,” or those quasi-sociocultural types, 
“tribalized” / “detribalized” / “exempt,” and therefore a precarious subject of the nation’s 
normative citizenry. The stadial model of assimilation essentially retained the technology 
of division between types (social, sanguinal) that had been developed under absorption. 
Early in this chapter, I asserted that across assimilation and absorption, 
continuous techniques of discipline and biopower were retained over Aboriginal subjects. 
I should signal and delineate the methodological assumptions which accompanied that 
tactical choice of language, since what I have here identified is not exactly continuous. 
Foucault’s archeological method, which I have employed, challenges the historian’s faith 
in continuity. As he puts it: “We must renounce all those themes whose function is to 
ensure the infinite continuity of discourse and its secret presence to itself in the interplay 
of a constantly recurring absence.”142 Earlier, in the same text, he complicates this 
association in advance. Where discourse is seen to be continuous, 
the great problem presented by historical analysis is not how continuities are 
established, how a single pattern is formed and preserved, how for so many 
different, successive minds there is a single horizon, what mode of action and 
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what substructure is implied by the interplay of transmissions, resumptions, 
disappearances, and repetitions . . . the problem is no longer one of tradition, of 
tracing a line, but one of division, of limits.143 
Indeed, at the level of discourse, many contrary horizons emerge from minds which 
conceive regularized teloi differently—whether in synchronic disagreement or through 
diachronic heritance and filiation of ideas. Further, and crucially, where certain horizons 
emerge to form and define a period, these horizons also rupture and break. Yet Foucault’s 
wariness of the possibility of continuity should not lead to an inevitable elision of 
genealogical filiation or to a scepticism around the maintenance of technologies of power 
at the level of disciplinary institutions; it should not, in other words, lead to skepticism 
regarding the subsistence of modes of power across discursive breaks. To be sure, there 
are “transmissions, resumptions, disappearances, and repetitions” at the level of 
apparatuses and technologies, but these become suspect when (and only when) they are 
referred to a “single pattern” at the level of the “minds” and discourses whose 
“substructure” would be implied by the auto-affective presence of mind to discourse, 
intention to horizon. From absorption to assimilation, then, one finds a movement of 
intentionality around discourse which obscures the transmissions, resumptions, and 
repetitions which connect the two at the level of a biopolitical apparatus. 
Unless one fetishizes the panoply of conflicting intentions of policy makers, there 
is no hard epistemic break between assimilation and absorption.  Insofar as a shift in the 
discourse around the aims moved from an open embrace of a politic directed toward the 
death and/or disappearance of natives (thanatopolitics), which alternated with an 
assumption around the extinction of natives (necropolitics) to another telos of population 
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regularity. This new telos manifest around the rhetoric of civilization, cultural uplift, and 
economic capability, all of which would be the metric by which Aboriginal preparedness 
for citizenship would be gauged. As I will show across the next two chapters, this shift in 
telos reveals a discursive maneuver around the regularity posited in the project of a 
biopolitical futurity. But, as I will also show, the shift in the discourse of demographic 
regularization and its concomitant implications for indigenous subjects does not reveal an 
epistemic break, a move from thanatopolitics to some antiquated and objectionable, but 
well intentioned move toward Aboriginal citizenship. Rather, breaks at the level of 
colonial power must be identified not only at the level of discourse but also correlated 
with the apparatus by which the ideals of policy framers and the heads of bureaucracy 
(such as so-called Native Protectors) apply biopower and disciplinary power toward the 
ends of normativization. Such breaks are only meaningful when they are compounded by 
the transformation of the apparatuses by which they are implemented. 
To be sure, overtly racializing discourses are enunciated in relation to the 
governmental, disciplinary, and regulatory practices most common prior to 1945 and 
most pervasively in the Northern Territory and Western Australia. However, to assert a 
discrete break in the post-war period is to deemphasize the subterranean lines of force 
through which Aboriginal people were policed and governed, subsisting across both 
absorption and assimilation. There are, in a sense, two parallel operations which 
characterize settler colonial biopolitics. On the one hand, there is the set of enunciations 
about the telos of intervention in the colonized population, the enunciations about its 
regularization and aggregation: the destiny of the race, or training for equal citizenship 
and partnership in a shared commonwealth. On the other hand there subsist biopolitical 
128	  
	  
mechanisms for ordering the colonized and technologies of biopower and discipline by 
which they are affected, their children removed, their marriages forbidden (or sanctioned 
and then surveilled), and exemptions from the legal category of “Native” granted. The 
telos of homogeneity transforms much more rapidly and markedly than the mechanisms 
in place to accomplish either end.  
While rhetorics of race and of external physiognomic difference may recede after 
the second world war, the fragmentation of indigenous culture remains annexed to the 
biopolitical imaginary of normativization at the level of the body and regularization at the 
level of the population. I now move to examine how the artifactuality of assimilation is 
actuvirtually managed through the epistemic insistence on intentionality in political and 
historiographic discourses. The way such historiographic divisions are made bears direct 
consequences in the economy of cultural memory in the present. 
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Chapter 3 
State Signatures:  
Intentionality, Normativization, Artifactuality 
 
Our generation does not own these actions, nor should it feel guilt for what 
was done in many, but not all cases, with the best of intentions.1 
Brendan Nelson’s Response to the 2008 Apology to the Stolen Generations 
[L]eaving aside for the moment the matter of intent, it is possible to make 
a case that there has been conduct by non-Aboriginal people towards 
Australian indigenes that falls within at least four of the categories of 
behaviour mentioned in the Convention definition of ‘genocide.’2 
Wilcox J, Nulyarimma v Thompson, 1999. 
 
On the 13th of February 2008, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd apologized to the 
Stolen Generations—the indigenous people who had been forcibly removed from their 
families by the Australian state. This act, itself disseminated and repeated, contested and 
affirmed, bore the signature of a state attempting to atone for a history of dispossession 
and removal. It bore the signature of the very entity which had formulated and 
implemented this apparatus of dispossession inscribed in such policy ideas as absorption 
and assimilation. The apology came heterogeneous to any commission of recompense or 
to extant adjudications of individual or state fault—though such adjudications have taken 
place, however occasionally and sporadically.3 The apology was instead a sovereign act, 
undertaken by an executive seeking symbolic reparation and national reconciliation. In 
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his response to Rudd’s speech, opposition leader Brendan Nelson offered his own 
apology, but in doing so, de-emphasized guilt or culpability. He framed this elision 
through the insistence on the “good intentions” of “many, but not all” of the acts 
undertaken by the agents of assimilation, an utterance I have quoted with significant 
irony in my epigraph. 
Envisioning the regularization of the settler-colonial polity through the 
disappearance of indigenous peoples, the apparatus of natal-thanatopolitics is embedded 
in the biopolitical management and normativization that exceeds and outlasts it. Genocide 
is an immanent and potential  aspect of any thanatopolitical regime. Yet genocide as a 
juridical concept that has developed since its signing into international law by the United 
Nations in 1948 relies on an identification of intentionality which is often diffuse within a 
thanatopolitical regime and present only as a silenced trace (though not by any means an 
aphasic absence) from the archive that subsists in its wake. 
As such, theorists of biopolitics such as Agamben and Esposito have chosen to 
use the term thanatopolitics rather than genocide, in order to draw out the symbolics of 
death that surrounds and accompanies the biopolitical immunization of life beyond the 
literal facts of state killing—extending indeed to what Foucault called the desire to “kill 
civilizations.” Further, as we have seen, Achille Mbembe prefers the term necropolitics, 
perhaps because it describes the positioning of late colonial occupations (for instance in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories) as well as of postcolonies in states of vulnerability 
wherein neoliberal maneuvers of capital extract wealth through logics which suspend the 
vitality and rights of the postcolony’s population.4  
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Further, Esposito sees thanatopolitics as immanent to inversions in the 
immunitary power over life and locates it not only in the death camps of Nazism, but also 
in Nazism’s three dispositifs (apparatuses): absolute normativization of life, the double 
enclosure of the body, and the anticipatory suppression of birth.5 This may be the reason 
for Esposito’s fairly narrow description of genocide, relative to the literature on genocide. 
Esposito notes that “scholars do concur that in order to be able to speak about genocide, 
the following minimal conditions must be met: (1) that there exists a declared intention of 
the part of the sovereign state to kill a homogeneous group of persons; (2) that such 
killing is potentially complete, that is, involves, all its members; and (3) that such a group 
is killed insofar as it is a group, not for economic or political motive, but rather because 
of its biological constitution.”6 If by scholars, Esposito means those legal scholars who 
frame their analyses within the ambit of the U. N. Genocide Convention as it was 
signed—to the exclusion of key aspects of the notion which its framer, Raphael Lemkin 
had wanted included—then Esposito is correct. 
While attended upon by wholesale denial and revision, Australian Aboriginal 
history has also attempted to deal with the destructive implications of a policy of control 
and normativization that, while for some time imagining the disappearance of the 
colonized population, rarely turned to state-sanctioned models of putting to death. This is 
no doubt in part a result of the force of existing legal categories and doctrines. Indeed, the 
1997 Bringing Them Home Report on indigenous child removal characterized 
assimilation as genocidal while drawing its authority from the 1948 Convention. Russell 
McGregor, as I noted in the last chapter, insists that the pre-war eugenic form of 
Australian aboriginal policy (absorption) was indeed a coordinated effort to “breed out 
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color” and disappear the Aboriginal population. McGregor however contests the 
existence of genocidal intentions as a basis for the postwar form of Aboriginal 
administration which came to be known as assimilation, insisting instead on the United 
Nations definition of genocide that includes the forcible transfer of children from one 
group to another under article 2 (e). With this in mind, he asserts that: “legitimizing 
miscegenation must be clearly distinguished from programs seeking to engineer 
miscegenation to the predetermined outcome of effacing one of the groups involved. 
Interwar absorption did seek to engineer this outcome; postwar assimilation did not.”7 In 
a maneuver that rhetorically evokes Nelson’s logic of cultural memory, archiving and 
recalling “what was done in many, but not all cases, with the best of intentions,” 
McGregor grounds this claim to a large degree in the intentions of one figure: 
anthropologist and policy advisor A. P. Elkin “who could be justly regarded as the 
leading mid-century theorist of Aboriginal assimilation.”8 Elkin, McGregor insists, 
“distinguished sharply between the assimilation he espoused and the absorption he 
deplored.”9 
 Historian PatrickWolfe has succinctly and forcefully put a key criticism to 
McGregor’s historiography: 
McGregor has asserted that, because officials talked publically of preparing 
Aborigines for assimilation into full membership of mainstream Australian 
society, post-World War II Aboriginal assimilation was cultural as opposed to 
biological, and therefore, not genocidal. Apart from the fact that Hasluck-era 
policy sought to elevate Aborigines from out of their group and into mainstream 
Australian society as individuals (a strategy aimed at eliminating the group), and 
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apart from the fact that, however it may be ideologically rationalized, child 
abduction is child abduction, the unexamined assumption that ‘culture’ and 
‘biology’ are discrete categories is untenable.10 
Indeed, in the last chapter I delineated certain key instances where the supposed shift 
from “biology” to “culture” was embedded in the continuance of technologies of 
biopower (“child abduction is child abduction”). However, there, we had not yet 
encountered the concept of intentionality. Here I take it up not within its own terms but in 
order to deconstruct a number of the consequences of this methodological device for the 
historiography of settler colonial biopolitics and the practices of cultural memory which 
rely upon it in the sovereign gestures of apology and excuse one finds emerging from 
Nelson’s reply to Rudd. What does it mean for the signature of the state to ground its 
memorialization of its own disciplinary practice in the rhetoric of intentionality? 
Where McGregor’s archivization anchors itself in a periodization grounded in 
intentionality, it also relies on a conception of self-presence, one which does not account 
for the transmission of disciplinary practices from one “period” to the next (and one 
would have to deploy similar caveats for Nelson’s practice of memory, or even the 
insistence on intentionality posited in the Bringing Them Home Report). An epistemic 
break does not occur where it only shifts the orientation of public intentions while the 
embedding of the statement in an apparatus retains and reinstalls such abiding 
technologies of power as child removal, marriage regulation, and exemption. McGregor 
insists that the Bringing Them Home Report was insufficiently strict in its principle that 
acts of governance be referred to the policy frameworks in which they were formed (by 
reference to which, intentionality and culpability, not to mention the discretion in 
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identifying either the plenitude or absence of intention can be employed in defining a 
“period”).11   
Many historians of genocide emphasize the limits attendant upon an intentionalist 
approach to the historiography of the concept and suggest that it need be supplemented or 
supplanted by what they call the “structuralist” approach to genocide.12 A. Dirk Moses 
succinctly limns the structuralist approach, foregrounding that it “averts the issue of 
perpetrator agency and intention by highlighting anonymous ‘genocidal processes’ of 
cultural and physical destruction.”13 Further, as Moses notes, there are more supple forms 
that (as he would schematize matters) largely conform to the intentionalist side of the 
distinction. Notable among these is the degree to which Lemkin, the legal scholar who 
principally framed the 1948 U. N. Convention, “also considered the issue of what might 
be called ‘unintented consequences,” and in so doing, “postulated that genocidal intent 
could be inferred where mass death was not explicitly intended but where it was highly 
probable and reasonably forseeable.”14 Here effects of putting the other to death might be 
understood as subject to culpability in so far as they failed to foresee the deathly 
outcomes they no doubt entailed: “[i]n the criminal law of civil law countries such an 
intent is called ‘dolus eventualis’.”15 Here, I suggest an alternative way of thinking about 
the relation between the framing of disciplinary measures in policy grounded in the logic 
of the speech act (and not of intention). I then move to an intensive discussion of the 
discursive formation that developed around the time of the transition between absorption 
and assimilation, in order to draw out the co-articulation of biologism and culture 
subsistent in either apparatus, and the mode of normativization this apparatus entails. 
Finally, I will return to the issue of cultural memory and the sovereign apology with 
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which I opened in order to suggest that the metaphysics of presence (intentionality) 
perpetuates an amnesiac approach to the memory of state crime. 
 
State Signatures 
The signature of the state is identifiable not only in the production of regimes of 
power, but also in their presence as artifactual remnants. The signature of state crimes 
against humanity is iterated in institutional efforts to normativize the memory of past 
injustice. Indeed, such events are never past, but remain immanent as the specters of such 
crimes are to the psyche of the present. If a state is a central agency whose force and 
application of power arises through individual acts, then where does one locate the 
intentionality of the state as a means to evaluate crimes perpetrated through its policies, 
or by reference to the discourses that frame these policies? And further, where 
intentionality is too bound to the fictive notion of the auto-affection of the subject present 
to itself, fully aware of its intentions and desires, as well as remaining similarly bound to 
the immanence of that intentionality in the subject which acts or commands, then where 
might we relocate action under the commandment of  such a state signature?  Where 
intentionality is pragmatically difficult to trace in the archive of an apparatus, with its 
palimpsest of orders and orderings “scratched over and recopied many times,” how might 
we reconstruct a model of state crime, culpability, and obligation to recompense given 
through Jacques Derrida’s supplantation of intentionality by the logic of the signature?16 
For Derrida, a signature marks the spacing between the full presence of intention and its 
absence in the iterable production of acts and enunciations supposed to proceed from the 
intentions of a subject fully present to itself. 
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In order to make sense of this affirmation and deconstruction of the coimplication 
of justice and law, it will be necessary to emplace it in Derrida’s lexicon as it is 
elaborated through a deconstruction of J.L. Austin’s theory of the performative speech 
act. Derrida first described this notion in the essay “Signature, Event, Context” which 
first appeared in English in 1973 in the collection Margins of Philosophy. There Derrida 
deconstructs the grounding of Austin’s theory of linguistic pragmatics in reference to the 
intentionality of the thinking subject. Whereas for Austin, the performative function of 
speech which he remarked, dubbed, and taxonomized, is always referentially grounded in 
the intentions of enunciators, in Derrida’s hands speech acts are revealed to be subject to 
constitutive undecidability at the level of grounding in intention. The performative speech 
act will never be constitutively bound to the intentions of its enunciator but always 
evaluated and circulated within the semantic and illocutionary fields through which it 
circulates. The presence of the agent who “signs” an enunciation will always remain 
simultaneously absent and present as the event of inscription are carried forth into the 
future, producing consequences themselves evaluated, archived, and referred to practices 
of memorialization, mourning, and melancholia. 
For Austin, an enunciation at its locutionary level is refracted between further 
domains by which it enters the world of communication, sense, and action.17 The force of 
Derrida’s elaboration of Austin’s taxonomy of speech acts is most crucial in light of 
Derrida’s affirmation of the signature emergent from the violent acts of states and the 
traces they leave behind. Derrida, in his late writings was more readily concerned with 
concrete issues of justice and law, even as he continued to insist on their 
deconstructability. In one such late moment, he would nonetheless proffer the the logic of 
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the signature as a way to think the violence of the state. In his lecture On 
Cosmopolitanism, framing the concept of a crime against humanity, he attempted to 
remark the inconceivable degree of “violence that still rages on a world wide scale,” and 
in so doing, wondered whether it is “still necessary to highlight the fact that such crimes 
sometimes bear the signature of state organisations or of non-state organisations?”18 If 
state organizations, in their enunciations, inscribe both their presence and culpability and 
the absence of a coherent intention, then one encounters an uncannily similar form of 
colonizing force and dominance, and a rearticulation of the form of the regime of power 
proceeding from it. 
A.O. Neville’s statements about absorption contain not only constative content, 
but also performative force, particularly since the Chief Protector of Aborigines was 
vested with the power to order removals of indigenous children, to approve or deny 
marriage licenses to those classed at “Natives” under Aborigines legislation, to exempt 
people from the status of “Native” under the legislation (which could always be revoked 
and was accompanied by discipline), to decide through the sight of a protector and 
through the genealogical surveillance of a person’s background whether someone was or 
was not native. When Neville made statements of policy aim, his acts of speech not only 
had constative value but also performative value. When, at the 1937 Conference on 
Aboriginal Welfare, Neville stated, “the problem of the native race, including half-castes, 
should be dealt with on a long-range plan . . . by accepting the view that ultimately the 
natives must be absorbed into the white population of Australia,” he was not only stating 
that he believed it was true that the state should frame the powers of protectors in relation 
to a long range plan but that he was recommending—with an illocutionary force—that 
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this framework become Commonwealth policy, become the basis by which the success of 
the implementation of power over Aboriginal people be assessed and framed. In so doing, 
this statement, and indeed, more particular and micro-physical statements and dispatches 
ordering the removal of children, approving certain marriages, exempting individuals 
from the status as native were all illocutionarily soliciting actions whose framing 
outcome was not only that the actions be done, but that their status as actions referred to a 
government of the future. The actions of agents of absorption and assimilation were 
illocutionarily referred to framing strategies which referred their implementation not only 
to the concrete force of a desire to normativize, discipline, and apply biopower, but also 
that the force of these actions be framed in the context of a regime whose actions were all 
contextualized by a biopolitical project of regularizing the settler colonial population and 
a natal-thanatopolitical project of achieving this end through the imagined disappearance 
of indigenous subjects from the projected polity. 
Yet, illocutionary acts are also referred to an agent who acts on them. Austin 
called this perlocution. The illocutionary act solicits that the addressee (the agent of the 
regime: the Protector, the policeman) act on the dispatches of the enunciator (the Chief 
Protector). A communication performatively, and through its illocution, solicits that the 
addressee act according to its dictates and, in the case of a dispatch from a government 
department to an agent or employee, this illocutionary force carries particular weight. 
Derrida’s deconstruction of speech act theory is useful as a framing device for this 
thought of an apparatus of iterable acts and its remnant as an archive of the traces of such 
acts; this is so not only because what is imperative is the evaluation of the potential 
return, remainder, or repetition of thanatopolitics, but also the identification of the form 
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and structure of its subsistence as an archival trace carried into the present accounting of 
apology and culpability (which, as I opened by noting, bears the signature of the same 
state which authorized the regime itself). It is worth quoting Derrida at length. If we are 
suspicious of the grounding of the performative speech act in intention, then its 
displacement by the logic of the signature is instructive, even as: 
In such a typology, the category of intention will not disappear; it will have its 
place, but from that place it will no longer be able to govern the entire scene and 
system of utterance [l'enonciation]. Above all, at that point, we will be dealing 
with different kinds of marks or chains of iterable marks and not with an 
opposition between citational utterances, on the one hand, and singular and 
original event-utterances, on the other. The first consequence of this will be the 
following: given that structure of iteration, the inten- tion animating the utterance 
will never be through and through present to itself and to its content. The iteration 
structuring it a priori introduces into it a dehiscence and a cleft [brisure] which are 
essential.19 
The problematic of grounding the performative speech act in intention, with its 
illocutionary force (the framing of the apparatus, the regularized aggregation of the 
population), refracted through the whole interpretation of this intention, the 
perlocutionary force taken up by its addressee (the implementation of discipline and 
biopower in relation to acts of policy) should be clear. The iterability of the speech act 
enacts a subsistence of the crimes is marks, it produces dehiscence, it opens wounds, it 
inscribes memory. As such, we will no doubt find a whole field of overlapping 
justifications, self-assurances, and affective displacements which accompany the framing 
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of acts in notions of care, welfare, and good. These intentions will no doubt be visible 
and have certainly been enunciated. 
This approach is subtly different to McGregor’s contention that all child removals 
(or the other disciplinary modes of power in the settler colonial regime to which it is 
connected) be evaluated against the backdrop of the policy frame in which it is 
elaborated. Rather than anchoring these claims to the attribution of intentions and 
projects in the enunciations of policy framers (Elkin, say, or Hasluck), it insists on the 
constant slippage between these apparently fully present policy frameworks and the 
framing devices of past policies iterable within them. Further, it insists that the 
perlocutionary force by which such acts are implicated need not be located only by 
reference to the enunciations of contemporary policy-makers but by reference to the 
fragmentary discursive field that traverses either side of a suppose periodization 
(biological racism prior to the war and cultural assimilation after it). Such an approach 
solicits that we draw out the untenability of the divide between ideologies of biology and 
culture that rightly concerned Wolfe. Among its other immediate consequences would be 
to accept that the perlocutionary force underlying the acts of agents of the state under 
absorption might indeed have acted with reference to other motivations than genocide 
and the imagined disappearance of Aboriginal people. But it also entails that no clean 
break can be identified in the acts of those agents of the state after the turn to a discursive 
insistence on culture at the illocutionary level by which injunctions to remove and 
discipline were framed after the War. The wounds of absorption remain open, and the 
devices of power which marked them do not vanish with assimilation’s emphasis of 
culture over biology. 
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While my elaboration of the state signature may superficially appear to have more 
in common with the structuralist thesis, it does not remain proper to either structuralist or 
intentionalist approaches to genocide. Rather than eschewing “intentionality and 
perpetrator agency” (structuralism) or excluding all incidences of genocide which cannot 
be readily refracted through the logic of “perpetrator agency” (intentionalism), the notion 
of state signature proceeds from a deconstruction of intentionality as a category 
presupposing the presence of the self to the self. In so doing, the recognition of the mark 
of state signatures upon crimes against humanity reveals the degree to which the 
performative framing of acts and the application of violence itself are referable to a 
culpable agency whose role in conceiving and implementing acts of disappearance and 
discipline need not and cannot be grounded (only) in the logic of an intentional subject. 
The signature of the state is detectable not only in the production of massive acts of 
violence and biopower aimed at depopulation and assimilation, it is further detectable in 
state attempts to exonerate (and even commemorate and mourn) these acts of violence 
and applications of biopower. As such, the notion of a state signature reveals much not 
only about the culpability of the state, nor only (though certainly significantly) about the 
recognition of the way thanatopolitics, as a horizon of biopolitics “is held in abeyance . . . 
rather than being a thing of the past” therefore helping to “guard against the recurrence of 
what Moses calls ‘genocidal moments’ (social workers continue to take Aboriginal 
children in disproportionate numbers, for example).” The notion of state signature also 
allows one to conceive and critique the way the actuvirtual normativization of the crimes 
of the past through such categories as the “good intentions” acts to elide and obscure 
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these potential recurrences—the specter of the artifactual return which are concealed in 
the selections emergent from actuvirtuality. 
If the illocutionary structure of the speech act is located in part at the policy level, 
then the move to eschew genocidal and race-based thinking in Australian Aboriginal 
policy after the second World War hardly becomes entirely insignificant. As such, I now 
turn to the relation between culture and biology at the level of the absolute 
normativization of life , the latter of which traverses absorption and assimilation. This 
conception has been immanent to nineteenth century racial evolutionism and the British 
Imperial rhetoric of the civilizing mission. Cultural normativization targets the economic, 
the religious-sacral, and fragments constitutive social modes of life given in kinship 
networks---as they traverse and combine consanguinal and affinal modes. Such 
normativization of culture (and particularly of so-called primitive society) as a mode of 
biopolitics is not external to thanatopolitics---as if the two stood in a relation of 
heterogeneity. What remains is to determine the enfolding of the one in the other. 
 
Culture, Normativization, Biopolitics 
In a 1947 United Nations memorandum, Raphael Lemkin insisted that “[c]ultural 
genocide is the most important part of the Convention.”20 Yet while the prohibition of 
cultural genocide was included in the 1947 draft declaration, it was ultimately excluded 
from the 1948 document signed by member nations. For Lemkin, the primary definition 
of genocide included not only putting to death as the apotheosis of the attempt to destroy 
a population, but also all the phases of colonial dispossession which led to it and formed 
it—which Foucault called the attempt to “kill civilizations.” “Genocide,” he wrote, 
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has two phases: one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group; 
the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor. This imposition, 
in turn, may be made upon the oppressed population which is allowed to remain, 
or upon the territory alone, after removal of the population and the colonization of 
the area by the oppressor’s nationals.21 
Noting  that this idea had once been called “denationalization,” and that for some it 
consisted only in the deprivation of citizenship, Lemkin saw in colonial occupation the 
wholesale supplantation of the oppressor’s mode of life for that of the oppressed. For 
Lemkin, there were eight techniques of genocide which preceded from this initial two 
phase process and, indeed, through which this process proceeded. These techniques were 
divided into: political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious, and 
moral modes of disposession.22 Each  mode targeted an aspect of a people’s way of life: 
their way of governing themselves (political), the abolition of a people’s law and special 
forms of knowledge (social),the education system and a people’s practices of art as well 
as their public sphere (culture), a people’s mode of value and subsistence (economic, 
physical), its embedding in sacral beliefs and practices (religious), “measures calculated 
to decrease the birthrate” of the dominated group (biological), and a refocusing of the 
general direction of energy of a group on base instincts over those leading to coherence 
and morality (moral).23  
The proposed criminalization of cultural destruction—excluded from the U.N. 
Convention by law but assented to by many scholars (not the least Lemkin himself)—
renders anew the task of disentangling biopolitics aimed at the regularization of the 
population of a polity from the thanatopolitics to which the colonized are exposed as a 
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result. While respect must be paid to the fact that the mass killing of an entire population 
is the most heinous apotheosis of the thanatopolitical turn in biopolitics and its 
necropolitical form in the postcolony, nonetheless the logic of destruction of a people at 
the level of their sociocultural integrity must also be attended to. This is imperative also 
at the broader level of the biopolitical since, very often, under regimes obsessed with the 
blood and the biologically constitution of peoples, the bios of the colonized  (viewed as a 
“race” for instance) often refers less to a truly biological grouping (since race is a fiction) 
but, in so far as it has a referent at all, to a people’s self-constitution through culture. The 
fragmentation of indigenous modes of kinship (affinal and consanguinal) becomes central 
in light of such consideration, as well as their endurance in the face of state engineering. 
What racialized biopolitical regimes recognize as blood is often an imaginary whose 
referent (if there is one) is to a culturally cohesive group. As Lemkin himself put it: “[i[f 
the culture of a group is violently undermined, the group itself disintegrates and its 
members must either become absorbed in other cultures which is a wasteful and painful 
process or succumb to personal disorganization and, perhaps, physical destruction.”24 
Thanatopolitics, then, is not only the destruction of literal bodies but the aim to destroy a 
population at the level of its coherence, the putting to death of the bios of the colonized---
their mode of life, cultural, collective, and sacral (even as this is imagined to refer to 
blood or more recently, to mitochondrial DNA). This enclosure of culture by blood can 
be most clearly understood in relation to an elaboration of Esposito’s three dispositifs of 
biopolitics, which I will briefly undertake before turning to the form which they took in 
the regime of Aboriginal administration. 
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Esposito identifies three dispositifs or apparatuses by which a people are 
immunized under a biopolitical regime. While these are elaborated from Nazism, one 
may, with attention to the particularity of a colonial scene, identify analogous operations 
of power. The first, he names the “absolute normativization of life,” within which “the 
two semantic vectors of immunity, the biological and the juridical, for the first time are 
completely superimposed according to the double register of the biologization of nomos 
and simulatenously that of the juridicalization of bios.”25 Here life need be read not only 
as a biological kernel immanent to the body, but also as the mode by which this bios is 
attributed to forms of collectivity (socio-cultural, economic, religious).   
The second immunitary dispositif, Esposito calls the double enclosure of the 
body, whereby aspects of subjectivity previously delineated through religious conceptions 
of the self become embedded in the understanding of the subject’s being at the level of 
their biological makeup. The conception of an “absolute identity between our body and 
ourselves” leads all aspects previously attributed to the self, including the religious 
beliefs and economic practices emergent from the elementary forms of kinship, to be 
embedded in the imagined physical makeup of a population and the bodies subsistent 
within it.26 In regimes characterized by the apotheosis of biopolitical thought---those 
given to eugenics and to imaginaries of blood and purity—all that had been previously 
understood as transcendent and directed to the future and its salvation are ascribed to 
their inherence in the biological makeup of subjects. Here “all dualism between the ego 
and body collapses” and everything emergent from culture is attributed to the 
phylogenetic inheritance of the body.27  
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Through the 1930s where Aboriginal people were surveilled through a physical 
anthropological regime, cultural anthropology was gradually displacing this physicalism 
as the primary ethnological mode of conceiving the indigenous self. Nonetheless, one 
does not find a discrete break between culture and the body in the mid-twentieth century 
ethnological conception of the indigenous self that undergirded native administration. 
Instead there emerges a positivity in which culture’s relative autonomy remains 
frequently ascribed to an imaginary by which the past inheritance of the body and 
mentality is positioned within a culture alongside which it “evolved” and through which 
it is seen to be produced. This enclosure of culture in the indigenous body is repeated 
once over in its projection to the future, as the mentality vested in blood and expressed in 
so-called “primitive” culture must be normed in order to occupy a place in the future 
makeup of the social body to be bequeathed to subsequent generations. The indigenous 
body is not only doubly enclosed, but multiply so: once by its inheritance from the past, 
once more in the bifurcation between culture and biology, and finally in the 
normativization of this double enclosure as it is projected toward the regularized future of 
a nation imagined as white. 
Finally, Esposito identifies a third immunitary dispositif: the “anticipatory 
suppression of birth,” wherein power is exercised not only over life but over its genesis. 
The most overt form of the anticipatory suppression of birth is sterilization. Indeed, 
Tindale had mentioned the possibility of “sterilization,” explicitly in his 1941 Survey 
while discussing “methods of half-caste control.” He dismissed the possibility out of 
hand, not rejecting it on moral grounds but merely noting that “the remoteness of the 
possibility of its employment as a racial measure is sufficient to render it a matter of 
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academic interest only.”28 It was at this point in his text that he launched into the 
elaboration of a taxonomy of crossing supposed to inform assimilation and its retention 
of eugenic selection criteria. As we saw in the previous chapter, at the “academic” level 
of physical anthropology, a field of abnormality was articulated whereby certain forms of 
race mixing (Australian-European) would not threaten the regularization of the racial 
makeup of the national polity, whereas the element of abnormal threat came from those 
“crosses” which exceeded this singular crossing. It was through this sovereign power and 
disciplinary intervention that the regularization of the future population could be 
managed. In short, natal-thanatopolitics was the absolute power to decide who would be 
assimilated into the population of the future and normativized according to its projected 
regularity and aggregation, as well as who would be assumed to pass away, always 
already as necron (corpse), and subject to intervention only in the mode of a palliative. 
We have already seen the way Aboriginal administration departments exercised absolute 
control over the right to approve marriages of “Natives” and over the capacity to remove 
indigenous children as wards of the state. What I have already called natal-thanatopolitics 
is more apt in describing this dispositif in the settler colonial context than the anticipatory 
suppression of life taken in toto. Aborigines department regimes held absolute legislative 
control over marriage between those who were legally “natives.” Under this regime, 
those of mixed descent were further subjected to a process of discipline, acculturation, 
and assimilation. While these powers of removal and discipline were couched in 
legislative framing in terms of the “interests of the child” (South Australia particularly 
emphasized this framing), the disciplinary mechanism of colour and physiognomic 
apperceptions of race undergirded this logic at the level of its application (though most 
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forcefully in particular states—Western Australia and the Northern Territory 
particularly). Whether aimed at disappearance or normativization, a field of absolute 
control was applied over indigenous marriage and indigenous children. This legislatively 
guaranteed power, continuing until as late as 1969, was referred to technologies of 
discipline within which the identification of abnormal racial bodies posing the threat of 
atavism was made possible.  
Where, as we saw, the formation of absorption in the ideas of Neville and Cook 
found its justification in the postulates of physical anthropology—located largely, we 
have seen, in the Adelaide University and Museum—the emergent form of assimilation 
was framed by cultural anthropologists. In the late 1920s, the University of Sydney 
established the Foundation Chair in Anthropology.29 Briefly held by A. R. Radcliffe-
Brown, who subsequently moved to the University of Chicago, the position was 
ultimately appointed  to Elkin, who held the position until his retirement. In the interim, 
the position was held by Raymond Firth before his own departure to the London School 
of Economics in 1933. One of the artifacts to emerge from the structural-functionalist 
school of thought as it developed and within the institutional space of the University of 
Sydney was the journal Oceania, published from 1931.  
In the first volume of the newly established journal, Firth published an article 
which explicitly tackled the relation between anthropology and native administration. 
Firth’s fieldwork, primarily in the Solomon Islands, saw his recommendations framed in 
relation to the south pacific, particularly since Australia still held an administrative 
mandate over New Guinea. Firth challenged cultural anthropologists engaged in 
“salvage” research to deal with the problem of cultural clash and depopulation which 
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colonialism had brought about. His broad solution meant anthropologists taking a more 
active role as advisors to the regime of native administration. “By the study of native 
peoples in contact with civilization,” he argued: 
it is held, much light can be thrown on their social and political condition, and 
assistance can be rendered to governments who may be faced with problems of 
depopulation, tribal unrest, economic dislocation, refractory religious cults or lack 
of amenability to medical services.30  
As a guiding principle in this engagement with the advisory role, Firth posited a strategy 
of paternalistic cultural regulation, which he called “constructive substitution.” In this 
conception, Indigenous peoples were to be compelled to adapt to modernity. Yet this 
mode of acculturation, predicated as it was on the contention that so-called primitive 
cultures were unable to survive modernity and “cultural clash,” was not entirely 
assimilationist. Rather, drawing from the observation that Indigenous people had long 
taken on technological instruments and “novel cultural equipment” from colonizers and 
adapted them to their own cultural forms, Firth emphasized the way cultural forms 
themselves could be made subject to such a process of adaptation and “substitution” as he 
called it. This process was to be at least partially imposed: “[t]he principle of substitution 
then, of replacing an item of culture which is ill-adapted to a new situation by one which 
is better fitted to stand the strain, is advocated by modern anthropology.”31 Firth’s 
enunciation implied the compulsion to transform, norm, and develop indigenous 
societies. Constructive substitution would do so not by either segregating indigenous 
societies in their fixed form nor by the assimilation of indigenous people into the 
dominant mode of the colonizer, rather, it was to proceed by: “a change in the native 
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culture which does not break down but builds upon an institution which will fit into the 
general social scheme and is acceptable to the people themselves.”32 
Implicit in Firth’s proposal was a caveat to the position we have seen in such 
figures as Bates, Bleakley, and Tindale, who for differing reasons insisted upon the 
segregation of so-called “tribalized” indigenous peoples—those whose traditional way of 
life had been more readily preserved.  
Too often an analysis of the effects of the impact of European civilization upon a 
native people has been concluded by the implication that absolute cessation of 
contact is the only hope—depopulation and unrest are due to interference and the 
withdrawal of the white invaders will avail to restore the society to something 
resembling a state of equilibrium and save a dying people.33 
Yet Firth framed the goal of substitution not in terms of the assimilationist program that 
would nonetheless soon dominate, with its emphasis on a normativizing mission of 
civilization. Rather, cultural substitution was to be a mode by which “protection” of 
indigenous peoples could be accomplished and their depopulation averted. Within this 
strategy, differing indigenous peoples could be normed and colonial law could take into 
account a unified form of cultural difference. Firth closed by wondering whether settler 
colonial nations could: “carry out in spirit as well as in letter the terms of the mandate of 
protection which by implication if not by express charter they profess to hold from 
civilization?”34 Firth’s proposal nonetheless formed an important early intertext for the 
ideas about assimilation and administration which would emerge over the next ten years. 
As annexed as it was to “protection,” which Elkin regarded as a “negative policy,” his 
notion that cultural substitution should transform and norm so-called “primitive” peoples 
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would recur as a central feature of Elkin’s approach to to what he perceived as the 
“positive policy” of uplift to civilization he would frame as assimilation.35 
 Elkin’s understanding of the Indigenous subject, while predominantly framed 
through a structural-functionalist approach emphasizing culture, retained the physical and 
biological conception of race in which the anthropology of his time was enmeshed.  
McGregor characterizes Elkin’s views as shifting through the 1930s, gradually coming to 
qualify characterizations of “primitive” and “civilized” life in manifestly cultural terms.36 
As he puts it, “[o]ver the course of the 1930s Elkin acquired a firmer faith in the capacity 
of Aboriginals to become civilised.” Yet, McGregor immediately notes that “old doubts 
about racial adaptability remained.”37 The narrative which McGregor paints in accounting 
for Elkin’s positon—a narrative which undergirds his periodizing break between 
absorption and assimilation—is grounded entirely within the observation  that it was 
Elkin’s views that caused the 1939 Northern Territory “New Deal for Aborigines” and, 
through the implication that this transformation diffused throughout Commonwealth 
policy toward Aboriginal Administration. Not only does this logic of intentionality and 
policy framing elides the continuation of disciplinary practices across either side of the 
supposed periodization (as I argued in my previous chapter). Further, it refuses to 
excavate the retention of categorization according biologization of culture, which were 
retained both in Elkin’s thinking and across the regime as a totality. Elkin’s “optimism,” 
while operative through a cultural approach to the “primitive”/“civilized” distinction 
never effaced a latent grounding of culture in biological fixity. 
Elkin’s views emerged initially through an interlocution with Stanley Porteus. In 
1928, the Australian-born racial psychologist Porteus was working at the University of 
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Hawaii. There he conducted a series of investigations into “racial psychology.” 
Employing a series of visual and tactile intelligence tests he had gradually developed, he 
set out in 1928 to extend his investigations to the Australian “race.” Porteus reconfigured 
the notion that Aboriginal people were merely the lowest form of human life, a “living 
stone age man,” and, as Agamben would note, a fulcrum in the “anthropological machine 
of the modern.”38 For Porteus the contention of older contemporaries such as Herbert 
Basedow that assumed that “in studying aboriginal life to-day we are reversing the 
telescope and looking back on our own ancestral life in extremely far distant perspective” 
was a conclusion that “may be somewhat too hasty.”39 Instead, Porteus emphasized the 
many thousands of years of physical and cultural isolation which, he contended, might 
have led to an adaptation of the biological and mental makeup of the Aboriginal subject 
as well as the culture and technology of Aboriginal society. The thesis of Aboriginal 
fixation at the stone age, he contended, “is too sweeping an interpretation of the word 
‘primitive,’ [and] that considering the circumstances the Australian has made 
considerable progress in specialized directions [. . . ] and that we may need to revise 
somewhat our conception of his extremely inferior intelligence.”40 Porteus’s biologistic 
racism took a particular form, implicit in which was the assertion that, while remaining 
“inferior,” indigenous mentality had evolved along with the development and adaptation 
of cultural practices to the environment. For Porteus, “primitive” bios in the sense its 
environmentally-determined biology was subject to an extreme alterity of degree, almost 
extending to that of kind. At the level of the literal constitution of the brain as a physical 
object and the mind as its product the resultant indigenous bios was one immanently 
attached to the cultural and technological forms evolving alongside it. For Porteus, 
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Aboriginal people were of a bios distinct from the European, both as living bodies and as 
a mode of cultural, social, economic bios produced or co-emergent alongside the mind 
itself. Porteus’s conception of biology and of culture were mutually constitutive. 
Employing a number of technologies and taking his samples from both “half-
caste” and “full blood” individuals (though predominantly the latter), Porteus concluded 
that Aboriginal Australian intelligence was inferior but not lacking intelligence; instead it 
was thoroughly adapted to the Australian environment. But his study did cast skepticism 
on contemporary ideas of social and economic assimilation. If the Australian native was 
equally as intelligent as the white settler, for Porteus, he was only so in regard to the 
special forms of memory and geometric capacities which derived from the environmental 
adaptation of his forebears. Porteus’s “conviction” was “that the Australians as a race are 
unadaptable to our kind of civilization, although excellently adjusted, both socially and 
psychologically, to their own natural environment.”41 Indeed, he made this his last word 
as enunciated on the last page of his book on the subject: “They are not unintelligent, but 
are certainly inadaptable to a civilized environment.”42 While this line of inquiry could 
entail the idea that such differences might disappear through crossing, it could also entail 
skepticism with regard to the social assimilability of people of “full blood” or close to it.  
However, before returning to these issues at the level of a further excavation of 
the artifactuality of biopolitics and natal-thanatopolitics as it traverses absorption and 
assimilation, I want to position Elkin in relation to this conception of biologized cultural 
fixity. This is necessary since, while intentionality is eschewed in my excavation of the 
the settler-colonial regime of biopolitics and the state signature it instantiates and iterates, 
nonetheless, Elkin’s discursive project did indeed produce transformative effects in the 
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framing device by which illocutionary force was given to the acts of removal, 
surveillance, and discipline which continued after the second world war. Taking the 
period as a discursive positivity during which much that was imputed to culture bore the 
shadow of essentialism, immutability, and even biologism, Elkin certainly emerges as a 
figure whose views are characterized by an optimism about Aboriginal intelligence—
grounded largely in cultural determinism—uncharacteristic for the period.  Significantly, 
however, where McGregor sees a gradual evacuation of racial and biological determinism 
in Elkin’s thought through the 1930s, what one finds, instead, is an enfolding of the logic 
of the body and of mentality within a form of economic and religious thinking. If Porteus 
represents a figure deeply enmeshed in the environmentalist biologization of culture, then 
Elkin represents a figure who attempts to maneuver away from biologism even as he 
remains enmeshed in the same dispositif traversing physical and cultural anthropology. 
As such, Elkin’s case serves to show the degree to which biologism was insistent even in 
a figure of the most culturally-oriented bent. 
Elkin accepted many of the physical anthropological views put forward by 
Porteus. In his review of Porteus’s text, he remarked that the “smaller brain capacity” 
Porteus’s techniques divined in Aboriginal bodies, “as compared with the bearers of the 
new culture suggests at least a handicap.”43 Elkin elsewhere noted that: the 
“comparatively small size of brain, the average capacity of which is twenty per cent less 
than ours,” indicated, “a handicap of the brain machinery required for adaptation to and 
overcoming of circumstances.”44 Taking on board this physicalism, Elkin expressed 
alarm that: 
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We are almost forced to realize the possibility that the aboriginal race may have 
been so completely adapted biologically as well as mentally to its own cultural 
environment that it cannot adapt itself to a culture of a different type, or, in other 
words, that it lacks the ‘ethnic capacity’ to become civilized.45 
However, his writings on policy resisted this position, emphasizing the suddenness of 
contact as a reason to doubt the extent of Aboriginal biological and mental adaptation and 
immutability: “we must remember that the change in the aborigines’ social, spiritual and 
economic environment which was caused by white settlerment was severe and sudden. 
There was no gradual change in temperature, but a sudden drop.”46 Noting the cruelty of 
settler violence, depopulation, and ignorance around Aboriginal culture, Elkin asserted 
that little had been done to attempt to “uplift” or “elevate” the Aboriginal population. The 
appearance of Aboriginal difference in mentality might, he contended, be attributed to 
this fact. Though many settlers had been cruel, 
of course, there were some warmer and kinder elements in the new environment--
-missionaries and other good souls---but up to the present these have not, except 
in a very small degree approached scientifically the problem of helping the native 
to adapt himself to the change. Until this has been done we cannot say that it is 
impossible for the aborigines to advance along the road of civilization and be of 
positive value in the exploitation of Australia.47 
The history of segregation was taken itself as evidence that the experiment of uplift might 
be evaluated only after its implementation as policy. Elkin refused to accept the 
implications of Porteus’s enfolding of biology in culture, even as he nonetheless accepted 
many of its premises, such as the notion that: “there is no reason for expecting that our 
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civilization in all its developments would be the most suited to the aborigines; there are 
racial differences and inequalities.”48 Elkin, while primarily trained in a field increasingly 
emphasizing culture, remained concerned with an inextricably biologistic question: “Are 
they really biologically capable of playing an average part in a civilised society.”49 The 
idea that half-caste Aborigines might be incapable of education was discussed but 
eventually dismissed at the 1937 conference, but Cook qualified this egalitarianism, 
noting that while “the percentage of children of outstanding ability may be higher among 
whites,” nonetheless, “given equal chances, the average half-caste is not inferior.”50 
 Much of Elkin’s reasoning for maintaining this line emerged not only from a 
conviction which presupposed the assimilation process as the policy to be preferred. 
Elkin also detected methodological problems in Porteus’s investigation which are telling, 
ironically, for his own attitude toward mentality, biology, environmental adaptation, 
culture, and their production of a mutliply enclosed Aboriginal body. One of Porteus’s 
operative assumptions was that Central Australian Aboriginal people as a foundational 
“type” were likely to evince the ideal form of Aboriginal mentality. Ignoring the fact that 
the paradigmatic status of Central Australian Aboriginal society (for instance the 
Arrernte and contiguous tribes) may have as much to do with the prominence of this 
society as an ur-model in the emergence of anthropology—from Spencer and Gillen’s 
earliest forays, through the privileged use of such data by Durkheim and Levi-Strauss. 
Implicit in Porteus’s privileging of the Central Australian “type” was an assumption on 
Porteus’s part that he might also find Central-Australians to be the most intelligent. 
Porteus had clearly aimed to focus on the “purist” model of Aboriginal subject for his 
research. Once on the ground, in July of 1929, Porteus made contact with Neville about 
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the number of “full blood” natives available in the more convenient southern Government 
Native Settlements---the same sites where indigenous wards were interred. Porteus 
visited Moore River Native Settlerment near the town of Mogumber after Neville wired 
him “[o]nly fifty full-blood natives Mogumber. Remainder halfcastes visit can be 
arranged for self and one other.”51 Elkin made much of the limits of full blood testing in 
his review, noting that those whose intelligence Porteus had tested through the Goddard 
method in missions, many of whom were of mixed descent and who had been, he put it 
“Mission-trained” often faired better.52 Those in the Moore River Native Settlement 
scored slightly higher than Porteus’s Central Australian subjects and, Elkin bemoaned, 
Porteus had not even bothered to conduct tests at the Beagle Bay Mission. Elkin’s 
emphasis on the half-caste subject and those Aboriginal people in closer contact with 
settler society is telling. 
 Elkin’s comments imply the attitude that he believed “Mission-train[ing]” and 
exposure to settler industry would allow Aboriginal subjects to display higher 
intelligence. And despite his difficulty in escaping the inheritance of physical 
anthropology, he became increasingly committed to promoting the education of 
Aboriginal people regardless of their blood quantum. Yet, Elkin’s conviction that all 
Aboriginal people deserved uplift, civilization, and assimilation as the ground of a 
positive policy did not emerge entirely from a conviction that mentality was culturally 
conditioned. Elkin himself gathered as much information as he could from white 
informants in the administration and asserted that “half-castes are superior to full bloods 
as consistent workers” and are “higher in intelligence and in capacity for work.”53 Elkin’s 
insistence on the absence of an investigation of half-caste adaptation in Porteus’s study 
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indicates a conviction both that “Mission-train[ing]” was potentially effective for “full 
bloods” and undoubtedly so for “half-castes.” The cause of half-caste intelligence was 
sometimes attributed to their closer social proximity to a settled way of life through 
“earlier association  with whites than is usually the lot of the full-blood.”54According to 
this logic, “half-caste” people displayed greater acumen in the adaptation to civilized life 
because of a longer period of social acclimatization. From as early as 1932, Elkin had 
been attempting to draw generalizations about native educability from anecdotal evidence 
gathered largely through Native Affairs Departments. Amongst these materials was a 
questionnaire meant to be filled out by Native Administration staff aiming to establish 
“whether it is possible for [half-castes] to become part of our social and economic 
order.”55 In June of 1936, he had sought information from Neville as to the degree of 
education “Aboriginal and half-caste” children currently received and inquired as to 
Neville’s opinion about the potential of indigenous subjects for education. On the 16th of 
that month, Neville replied that while he “contend[ed] that children should be educated at 
least up to and including the fifth standard,” at that time, “as a rule, generally [educated] 
to the third or fourth standard.”56 Neville offered his own speculations, as to the reason; at 
the stage they reach at standard four they “are seized with the desire to get out into the 
open and have difficulty concentrating upon school work.”57 Implicit in this assertion 
were several common departmental anecdotal explanations—ones that had indeed 
become both stereotypes and truisms—about inherent Aboriginal psychological 
characteristics. Elkin’s investment in Neville as a source of objective information on 
Aboriginal “mentality” and educability itself indicates Elkin’s incapacity to see the way 
the apparatus of Native Administration produced subjects. 
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Yet, there was another current in Elkin’s thought which came dangerously close 
to attributing this adaptability to an environmentally-conditioned biological determinism. 
Elkin railed against the popular and pejorative assertion that “the half-caste inherits the 
vices of both of the parents, but none of the virtues.”58 Yet he also took seriously the form 
of thinking that came from an absorptionist model correlating blood quantum with 
intelligence, “in the opinion of some teachers,” he noted, “the quadroons and octoroons 
are nearer to the whites in educability than the half-castes.”59 Concluding an article on 
Native Education, Elkin insisted that: 
so far they have shown little power to adapt themselves to our culture; there may 
be biological reasons for this, for their adaptation to aboriginal life may have 
become part of their very physiological make-up . . .The mere fact that the half-
castes are said to be superior to the full-bloods, and yet are only seldom 
successful in adaptation, makes the matter all the more serious for the latter.60 
While Elkin emphasized this in part to show the potential educability of all Aboriginal 
people regardless of “caste” and “blood,” traces of “colour” and blood thinking remained 
in his language and policy prescriptions. As late as 1947, in the introduction he wrote for 
Neville’s book, Elkin, describing “Australia’s population [of] nearly 30000 people of 
mixed White and Aboriginal descent,” and the term “half-caste” which had remained a 
dominant description both in Aborigines departments and the vernacular, he insisted, 
“[b]etter terms would be mixed-bloods, part-Aborigines [or] (part-Whites!).”61 If people 
of mixed descent were part Aboriginal, they were also part white. Where Elkin frequently 
repudiated the pejorative claim that “persons of mixed Aboriginal and white descent 
inherit only the vices, and none of the virtues, of both stocks,” the implication was also 
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that stock was a reality of the mixed person’s body and mind, whether as a virtue or a 
vice.62 He praised Aboriginal institutions, practices, and beliefs—which he perhaps never 
saw entirely disentangled from an evolutionist model of adaptation. Yet, in so far as Elkin 
never escaped a trace of stock thinking, one implication of his insistence on “half-castes” 
being “part whites!” was that not only cultural but also biological proximity played a role 
in their posited capacity for settled modes of economic life and work—and hence 
preparation for assimilation. 
While Elkin advocated “uplift” for all Aboriginal people, his thinking never 
moved from a biologism which retained a kernel of the notion of Aboriginal mentality’s 
fixation to its form. This logic never implied inferiority, but, in a mode reminiscent of 
Porteus, insisted that adapation of culture shaped the mind. The self and its potential was 
enclosed by a biological fixity emergent from culture. The body and its mentality were 
seen as  fixed racial constructs, even as the source of this fixity was embedded in the 
cultural form within which it evolved. It was this tension in his thought, retaining the 
mutual enfolding of culture and biology which led even this most culturalist 
representative of the anthropological dispositf of 1930s Aboriginal policy to an influential 
bifurcated approach to assimilation—a gradualist approach to “full-blood” assimilation 
and the retention of the same disciplinary mechanisms around “half-castes” that had 
developed under absorption. 
Despite his retention of so much biologism, Elkin challenged the contention that a 
difference in Aboriginal intelligence was a barrier to Aboriginal assimilation.  Elkin, for 
instance, felt that Aboriginal people: 
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have evolved a working adaptation to their geographical and social 
environment, and in applying or even modifying their plan of economic, 
social, and spiritual life, they show as much intelligence as does the 
average European with regard to the cultural adaptation of his own group. 
The problem is the extent to which the Aborigines are capable of working 
out a fresh adaptation to the changed conditions which have come upon 
them as the result of the settlement of their country by whites.63 
Where, for Porteus, Aboriginal people could never adapt to “civilized” social life, for 
Elkin “full blood” Aborigines were not essentialy fixed within their social (kinship), 
cultural, and technological adaptation. Through something resembling a form of Firth’s 
cultural substitution, they might be compelled to transform their mentality to the 
dominant social, economic, and political form according to a mode that, for Elkin, 
enclosed the Aboriginal self within a mentality whose fixed difference determined its 
amenability to acculturation and therefore, assimilation. 
 What emerges in the discursive formation that traverses the anthropology of the 
nineteen thirties is a positivity increasingly culturally oriented, yet still bearing the 
unhealed lascertations of environmental determinism and racial-biological fixity. 
Assimilation was formed from the arsenal of techniques, practices, and enunciations 
which culminated between the 1937 conference (administrators such as Neville and 
Cook, physicalists such as Tindale and Cleland) and the turn to culturally-oriented 
assimilation undergirded by the thought of structural-functionalism (Firth and Elkin). 
Yet, as I have indicated, the two cannot be discretely disentangled at the level of a 
discursive formation. Rather, as a discursive positivity giving rise to an apparatus of 
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power, biologism and cultural determinism form the twin poles of a nexus of thought 
within which the future regularization of the Australian population is produced. Here the 
enduring indigenous body is multiply enclosed. Initially, this body and the population it 
makes up is not to be absented from the national population through death but through 
absorption, forming an absent presence in the future. As opposed to the threat of the 
“coloured Alien” other, the indigenous body as much as the white body forms the seat for 
the spiritual as well as corporeal regularity and wholeness envisaged in the biopolitically 
regulated future of the settler colony, even as it is to disappear in its absorption. In as far 
as it is vested in an imaginary of indigenous disappearance, absorption remains 
thanatopolitical. Yet insofar as this disappearance is to be accomplished through the 
inclusion of the biological makeup of the indigenous subject in the population of the 
future, it is also enclosed once more over—by the degree to which the body itself 
becomes the seat of the transcendence and futurity of which it is to be the progenitor. 
Under both absorption and assimilation, culture and mentality are viewed as 
emergent from a parallel and mutually constitutive process of evolution, one perhaps 
even biologically immanent in the body.  The indigenous body and mind as well as the 
indigenous cultural form which is produced and in which it was embedded were given to 
primitivity: “objectionable” sexual practices, the subsumption of the elementary family 
within the kinship structures of the “horde” (as Radcliffe Brown called it),64 non-
economic conduct, as well as religious and sacral difference all functioned as indexes of 
abnormality that were thought as the locus of a necessary imposition of discipline and 
biopower. As such, the Aboriginal body becomes the object of extreme normativization. 
Discipline through education of removed children and the imperative that the docile 
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bodies produced through this process, exempted from the status of native under 
Aborigines Acts, will perform and maintain their normativity as culturally and 
economically whitened subjects.  
Elkin produced a model of assimilation that echoed Firth’s notion of constructive 
substitution. If indigenous mentality was fixed in a mode of difference, it would need to 
be normed through a slow process, built upon its own foundations. The normativization 
of indigenous bios attempts to account for fixed patterns of cultural disposition, economic 
practice, and religious belief. Indigenous people are to be compelled to adapt but: 
What the adaptation in any particular case will be cannot be foretold, for it must 
not only be conditioned by the new, by the changes brought about by civilization 
and its various agents; it must also and inevitably be conditioned by the people’s 
own history and ideals by the patterns and bias of its own culture.65 
Elkin drew from observations of the skill  and adaptation of “full-blood” Aboriginal 
people to station life to insist that nomadism had been exagerated. If Elkin was ever 
explicit about his rejection of biologism, he was so on this point: “We must not therefore 
over-emphasize the nomadic characteristic as though it were a biological endowment—it 
is a limited controlled effect of economic conditions.”66 Instead, the spiritual life, the 
connection to kin and to land are emphasized by Elkin as central to the indigenous mode. 
A central slippage between innateness and culture occurs as Elkin declares that this 
spiritual life: “is psychological, and is felt to be fundamental.”67 Felt to be fundamental 
by whom? The Gordian knot which emerges in this expression encapsulates the degree to 
which cultural difference is imbued with a sense of essential, even innate, psychological 
difference. Clearly, the belief in totemism, kinship, and its connection to country remains 
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central to the Aboriginal sense of self. Yet, in light of all we have uncovered of settler 
colonial biopolitics’ mutually constitutive sense of culture, innateness, and biology, there 
is another sense latent here. Is this psychological imperative to respect the spiritual life 
also perceived as fundamental by the anthropologist—not only in the important sense of 
a respect for the thickness of the other’s conviction—but also, in so far as it might extend 
to depicting the other as static: bound to a co-adaption of mentality and corporeality, 
culture and biology. The question must remain in suspension as regards Elkin’s 
intentions, or the full formation of his conceptions of indigenous mentality. Nonetheless, 
the slippage in Elkin’s oeuvre reveals a field of cultural determinism that remained 
anchored by an essentialism, itself shadowed by a biologistic conception of mentality; 
between either, the Aboriginal body and mind was enclosed as a bearer of disciplined 
potentiality for the projected nation. 
 As McGregor has suggested, albeit within over-emphasis on Elkin’s eschewal of 
biologization, by the close of the 1930s Elkin developed a stadial approach to the 
education and assimilation of “full blood” Aborigines. Where Firth saw constructive 
substitution as a means to norm and protect, Elkin in advocating such “an adaptation to 
the Australian Aboriginal conditions of the principles adopted in the Administration of 
Papua and New Guinea” would move it toward an assimilationist paradigm. This 
program of gradual normativization would be stadial and recall the civilizing mission. If 
“the aborigines do possess a social, economic, legal, political and religious organization 
by which they are able to adapt themselves to their own geographical and social 
environment,” this fact needed to be “taken into consideration in our endeavours to do 
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them justice and to frame and put into operation a policy designed to raise them in the 
scale of civilization.”68 McGregor frames Elkin’s stadial approach in this way: 
Elkin’s conception of the Aboriginals’ ‘own’ civilisation  entailed no radical 
departure from European norms. Rather he envisaged a transformation from an 
indigenous to an essentially Western economic, religious, and social order, in 
which only the trappings of traditional art, ceremony and ritual would be retained. 
His insistence on their retention derived not so much from a desire to preserve the 
exotic, as from lingering notions of a connection between racial and cultural 
attributes.69 
The process involved a temporary deployment of syncretism resembling Firth’s notion of 
constructive substitution, but one which would aim toward the ultimate normativization 
of Aboriginal social life, grounded as it was supposed to remain in an essential 
coadaptation between mentality and environment, biology and culture.  
This process involved the forced adaptation of Aboriginal economic practices 
from nomadic to sedentary subsistence and was articulated alongside an understanding of 
Aboriginal Christianization. Where nomadism was seen as auxiliary to the Aboriginal 
mind, spiritual grounding in land was recognized as primary. Civilization, then, would 
not be capable of transforming the fixed mentality of the Aboriginal insistence upon spirit 
but could rather substitute its manifest content with Christian practices and beliefs: 
Just as most Christians take a long time to pass through the Old Testament type of 
life to that required by the New Testament, so it is with the Aborigines. They, too, 
must pass through the Old Testament state before attaining to our view of life, but 
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it must be their own old testament of myth and sanction, for this alone has 
intimate relationship with their social and economic life.70 
Part of this was to be accomplished by adapting the simultaneously sacral and economic 
logic of the gift to modern economic conceptions of production, commodity, and 
exchange.71 
We should make use of the native institution of gift exchange and ‘exchange 
routes’ in our endeavours to interest the natives in our occupations of stock-
raising, wool growing, and farming for the market.72 
Whether Elkin’s essentialism was culturalist or biologistic, now it produced apparatuses 
enfolding either and aimed at the absolute normativization of the life of the Indigenous 
subject through a program of disciplinary power—one which apprehended the other as an 
essentially fixed form of life, slow to grasp the principles of time, contract, and  hygiene.  
Late in his article on “Native Education,” Elkin described a strict program for 
indigenous education, one which presumed the absence of these conceptions from 
Aboriginal mentality. Through discipline, these economic means were to be inculcated. 
The children are to be educated to a standard comparable to that required by the 
State for white children, particular attention being devoted to: 
(i) Equipping the child to take its place in the white community with a 
proper realization of his obligations to it, a knowledge of the 
significance of time, and the value of money, neither of which is 
realized by the aborigine at present; 
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(ii) teaching him to recognize the significance of contract (one of the 
principle difficulties in the employment of an aboriginal at present 
is the irresponsibility of native labour); 
(iii) inculcating a high appreciation of the principles of hygiene and 
personal cleanliness; and 
(iv) eradicating the nomadic background and developing the 
community sense centered upon the provision of a home for the 
individual and his family and the exploitation of the soil and 
domestic animals as a source of food supply.73 
The eradication of nomadism which was to precipitate the knowledge of time, contract, 
and hygiene, was also connected to laboring capabilities and was to be enmeshed in 
gradual substitution of the Aboriginal “old Testament” with the Christian “new 
Testament.” Elkin insisted that indigenous people were, for the time being, adapted to 
particular kinds of tasks and in need of particular forms of instruction, these he called the 
“three R’s:” 
 
(1) Crafts and occupations, especially those which are somewhat related to the 
aborigine’s own former economic life, such as boat-work, timber-work, 
carpentry and fencing, mechanical occupations, stock and sheep work and also 
gardening 
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(2) Instruction in the meaning, method and purpose of the new pursuits in which 
we require his service or which we desire him to follow for himself; especially 
is this necessary in the case of gardening and stock-raising 
(3) Instruction in religion; this cannot be omitted, and in this the Government 
must necessarily seek the co-operation of religious missions.74 
Elkin’s stadial approach to Aboriginal education was particularly focused on so-called 
“full blood” and “tribalized” Aborigines. However, while this plan shifted the policy 
toward “full bloods” from segregation to cultural assimilation, many of the absorptionist 
discourses and disciplinary techniques remained in play after the seeming turn to 
assimilation and particularly as regarded people of mixed descent. This double enclosure 
of the Aboriginal mind, when taken as a dispositif, emerges not as a transformation or 
development in the thinking of a single anthropologist—from racial determinism to 
cultural determinism—but rather as a key to the way both absorption and assimilation 
were grounded in an enfolding of bios in an evolutionist logic.75 Where Elkin did indeed 
envisage Aboriginal survival, he did so by reference to the stadial model desgined to 
countenance his fears of the fixity or belatedness of Aboriginal adaptation. 
Elkin retained the logic of blood and even colour in his writings as late as 1944. 
Further, he praised the commonwealth plan for dividing its measures based on social, 
economic, and supposed biological situations and predilections. Even as he moved 
toward a unified process of “uplift” for all Aboriginal people, Elkin insisted: “the 
methods must be related to the different types of regional contact (isolated, marginal and 
closely settled) as well as to the facts and degrees of detribalization, civilization and 
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miscegenation.”76 Further, the 1944 document entirely retained his commitment to 
measures of biopower such as child removal, compulsory removal of adult Aboriginal 
wards to and between government settlements, and exemption: 
It is sometimes necessary to remove Aborigines (full blood or other) or their 
children to Reserves, Settlements or other Institutions for reasons of health, 
education, or welfare . . . No one with experience in Aboriginal administration 
will doubt the necessity for such powers of removal from institution to institution, 
from free-choice residence (in undesirable conditions) to a controlled settlement, 
and even of children from paremts for the well-being of the former.77 
Elkin thus insisted upon the disciplinary powers emergent with absorption. While he de-
emphasized the selection of removed children by colour, he did not proscribe it. As Elkin 
framed it, the problems arising from Aboriginal removal could be assuaged by ensuring 
that discretionary power to approve removals was referred beyond Officers and 
administrators but by a magistrate who would review the circumstances of each case. 
With little reflection, Elkin declared that this would bring juster outcomes, even as he 
assured his reader that “in those State administrations where complete discretionary 
power resides in the Administrative head or his Minister, the actual implementation is 
benevolent in intention.”78 Further, as Haebich has detailed at length, at the 
perlocutionary level—the level of implementation and interpretation of state policy by its 
agents—this practice continued to disproportionately target children of mixed-descent 
and fair complexion.79 As I remarked in the last chapter, as late as the 1953 conference, 
the language of blood was retained as Missionaries and Protectors insisted that 
assimilation entailed the removal of children of mixed descent at an increasingly younger 
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age. Regarding “the problem of removing half-castes from their native environment,” at 
the 1953 Conference, “[i]t was considered that if possible they should be removed at an 
earlier age than five years.”80 
Elkin also praised the process of exemption by which half-castes were exhorted to 
enter “white” society. Employing the language of “colour” and blood, Elkin approved of 
the Commonwealth approach to Aboriginal Affairs of providing mainstream services to: 
“all half- and lighter-caste Aborigines who are not being provided for by Government 
institutions, and also those persons with a preponderance of Aboriginal blood, who have 
been granted Certificates of Exemption from Aboriginal Acts.”81 While Elkin believed 
that those granted exemptions should be encouraged to enter the wider community, his 
approached aimed to curb the extreme compulsion which those powers had previously 
entailed. 
The influence of the stadial model of normativization, with its economic and 
religious correlates, is easy to detect in subsequent assimilationist governmental writings 
and enunciations. At the 1953 Conference, questions of economy and spiritual life were 
at the forefront of discussion. The organization of Aboriginal family life, for instance, 
was to be transformed “to fit natives into a new spiritual and economic life.”82 In order to 
“bridge the gulf between aboriginal heritage and white economy . . . Gardening and other 
practical work must be a living part of the school curriculum.”83 “The basis of our 
civilization was the acquisition and conservation of property and the modification of 
nature to our service,” the conference summary noted.84 Whether Elkin ever came to 
personally doubt his essentialist and biologizing suspicions, this idea of a primitive 
mentality fixed by adaptation often returned to justify a slow, step-by-step approach to 
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the project of economic and religious “uplift.” Advising Missionaries on how to train and 
compel Aboriginal subjects in agriculture, the Government Agricultural officer W. F. 
Nixon-Smith noted that:  
there is some evidence to suggest that environmental effects of many thousands of 
years have created in the aboriginal a number of such impulses which, by the 
standards of the society into which it is desired to incorporate him, constitute 
instability and complete lack of a perception of the economic responsibilities of 
modern society.85 
As socio-cultural normativization became the primary government policy, biological 
considerations around normativization did not disappear. 
 As such, the three immunitary dispositifs of biopower elaborated by Esposito are 
present within both the intensively eugenic policy of absorption and, at the level of the 
absolute normativization of life, continue into the period of cultural normativization 
represented by assimilation The anticipatory suppression of birth, as I noted, does not 
always take the same form within settler colonial biopolitics. Under absorption, of 
course, indigenous people were to be disappeared from visibility by their absorption into 
the dominant settler population. This natal-thanatoppolitics produced a field of absolute 
control over indigenous marriage and indigenous children. Additionally, as I noted, 
absorption favored children produced through the unions of European and Aboriginal 
descended individuals and manifested concern over unions incorporating any more 
anomalous “coloured Alien” descent. What one finds, then, in place of the anticipatory 
suppression of birth is an attempt at absolute control over miscegenation and an effort to 
engineer it’s outcomes. 
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 In this sense, one finds with assimilation not so much a diminution of the power 
to decide on miscegenation, but an avowed policy attempt at the illocutionary level to 
soften this power. People of mixed descent were still subject to a more extensive removal 
of children into the assimilation period (even, as we saw, to some degree, in Elkin’s own 
policy writing). However, where absorption aggressively aimed at natal-thanatopolitical 
outcomes, both through technologies of power and their policy framing, assimilation 
retained the powers while referring their framing more to cultural normativization and the 
“civilizing” mission. In this sense, what one finds under assimilation is the implication of 
culture in the essential phenotypic framing of the body and the mind. Mentality, in 
particular, is used to frame the degree of plasticity to which the individual “savage mind” 
may be subjected and, insofar as this is expressed in, through, and by culture, the degree 
to which the correlative cultural form may itself be subjected to a stadial process of 
assimilation. The indigenous mind is fixed as an essential feature of indigenous 
difference and embedded in the body as the bearer of stock and descent. The Aboriginal 
body and particularly the essentialized mind seated within it are enclosed by their fixity 
and coadaptation along with an environment (itself containing culture). Yet, as bearer of 
the inheritance of culture, coadapted alongside this structurally fixed form, the Aboriginal 
mind also encloses it. As enclosed by a body whose normativized form will enter the 
“wider community,” intermarry and bear its features into the future, Aboriginal mentality 
is subject to discipline, training, and “uplift.” As such, the Aboriginal essentialized 
subject is in body and mind as well as in its position as simultaneous bearer and product 
of a fixed and yet plastic cultural form, a potential part of the spirit of the future of the 
settler colonial population. The Aboriginal body and mind are multiply enclosed as the 
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turn to culture in anthropology and native administration nonetheless bear along with 
them traces of the thought of biologized racism (physical anthropology, absorption). Both 
the natal-thanatopolitics of absorption and the multiple enclosure of the Aboriginal bios, 
emerging acutely with assimilation, are annexed to a regime whose project is the absolute 
normativization of life.  
As anthropologist W. E. H. Stanner would ironically quip in 1964, “[o]ur 
intentions are now so benevolent that we find it difficult to see that they are still 
fundamentally dictatorial.”86 I am concerned here not only with the identification of a set 
of technologies and powers whose dictatorial application could suggest instances of dolus 
eventualis in the acts of “removal” and “protection” in twentieth century Australia 
(though this is no doubt likely in many cases). Nor am I only concerned with the form of 
biopolitical power that characterizes the apparatus of absorption-assimilation. I am also 
concerned with the repetition of such logics in the present in the form of artifactual 
remainders and actuvirtual representational economies.  This artifactual elision of the 
defining disciplinary strategies of that regime are covered over  by the insistence 
(Nelson’s for instance) in the public sphere on the pervasive category of good intentions. 
The state signature of “good intention” obscures past wrong and whitewashes the 
biopolitical paternalism of the present. The traces and marks of illocutionary force (“the 
problem of the native race, including half-castes, should be dealt with on a long-range 
plan”) whose aim was to produce a natal-thanatopolitical discourse, was and continues to 
be referred to acts whose perlocutionary enforcement (the removal and discipline which 
to varying degrees referred themselves to such framing policy illocutions). I am 
concerned that the archive of these traces and marks, insofar as it is iterated and recalled 
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in the present deploys the category of “good intentions” and operates as a means to elide 
the complex relation between acts and their framing. It is to this concern that I now turn. 
  
 Reconciliation and the Signature of the State 
In Palyku playwright David Milroy’s 2011 comic musical Waltzing the Wilara, 
reconciliation is identified as the latest in a sequence of government policies. The 
vaudevillian figure of indigenous humour Old Toss sings: 
You 
Start with colonisa-tion to soften up the meat, 
Then miscegena-tion to whiten up the cheeks, 
Then assimila-tion to make you fit right in 
ALL: Then reconcilia-tion to forgive us of our sins.87 
A wry joke, and one which was no doubt more of a comic shock to the predominantly 
settler audience of the play’s first run in February of that year, than to indigenous 
audience members.  Indigenous public figures have already emphasized the limits as well 
as the virtues attendant on the idea of reconciliation. As one such public figure, Noel 
Pearson, has observed, there are pressing material questions that have been excluded 
from the purview of the implementation of reparation for the wrongs done to the Stolen 
Generations survivors. As Pearson puts it: 
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The majority of white Australians will be able to move on (particularly 
with the warm inner glow that will come with having said sorry), but I 
doubt that indigenous Australians will. Those people stolen from their 
families who feel entitled to compensation will never be able to move on. 
Indeed too many of them will be condemned to harbour a sense of 
injustice for the rest of their lives. Far from moving on, these people – 
whose lives have been much consumed by this issue – will die with a 
sense of unresolved justice.88 
Pearson’s criticism emphasizes the charge that the Apology risks emptiness and tokenism 
unless complemented by measures of material redress. The harder question to address is 
what the materiality of reconciliation might look like, a question I cannot attempt to 
answer in the context of this conclusion, this chapter, or, indeed, this dissertation as a 
whole. Nonetheless, it may be meaningful to dwell on the relation between symbolic and 
material models for commemorating and recomensing past state crimes committed 
against indigenous people. 
  Reconciliation is a significant and weighty task in the settler colonial archipelago 
of the modern globe. Settler colonies in the twenty-first century aim to reconcile 
colonizer with colonized, or colonizers with themselves and the guilt which besets them. 
Reconciliation is not only for the benefit of the colonizers of course, the amount of 
healing that events such as the apology have afforded the Stolen Generations and their 
families must be recognized and can hardly be emphasized enough. The degree to which 
reconciliation is also a practice of “forgiv[ing]” the colonizers “of our sins,” is a caveat 
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that must nonetheless be born in mind. Reconciliation is rarely mentioned, whether in 
South Africa, Canada, or Australia, without reference to “the nation,” its future, its 
totality, and its transcendence into the future. 
(Post)settler colonies like Australia have also modeled (and disavowed) certain 
approaches to the practical reconciliation which might accompany its symbolic 
apologetics. The Australian state has foregone any compensation scheme, 
“mainstreamed” much health and service provision—eliding in the process cultural 
sensitivity much needed at the level of such provision—and pursued through the broad 
policy ethos of “practical reconciliation” the admirable aim of attaining norms of life 
expectancy, health, and education, wherein Aboriginal citizens might expect 
opportunities commensurate with their settler-descended compatriots. Normativization is 
not inherently a vice. Yet, as Foucault long ago showed and Agamben has more recently 
elaborated, the subjection of subaltern populations to special conditions often involves 
the sovereign suspension of norms of law and ideas of justice, which accompanies the 
biopolitical processing of demographic norms.  
As Rudd offered his sincere apology in 2008, he also called for practical 
outcomes. These were implicitly those to be attained through the continuation of the 
Northern Territory Emergency Response Act, which Rudd (and his successor Julia 
Gillard) maintained from the Howard Government.89 Nelson even more forcefully 
attributed to the project of practical reconciliation the need for the exceptional measures 
given in the NTERA, defending the policy of intervention that had been established by 
his government and emphasizing many of the features of its justification: notably the 
accusations of child sexual abuse in indigenous communities. In part, the Intervention 
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was justified by its supporters by reference to a 2007 report which highlighted child 
sexual abuse in remote some remote indigenous communities.90 Indigenous people were 
suffering as a result of a legacy of dispossession. This, no-one denied. Nonetheless, the 
image of the suffering indigenous child functioned to justify immediate unreflective 
action, no matter how complex the issues, no matter how paternalistic, effective, or 
ineffective the mode of response. Ironically, this image of the suffering indigenous child, 
along with the overemphasis on the “good intentions” of the agents of assimilation came 
to disproportionately fix the cause of indigenous dispossession in the alterity of 
indigenous life, obscuring the concrete legacy of (post)colonial governmentality. Of most 
import here, where both Rudd and Nelson drew a correlation between the need for 
material reconciliation along with symbolic commemoration, Nelson’s response also 
dubiously covered over the connections between past and present, an effect which has 
spread into academia—most worryingly in Peter Sutton’s connection of social problems 
in Aboriginal communities to a cultural “pathology” stemming from indigenous 
tradition.91 Not only conservative politicians, but even, we have seen, liberal academics 
such as McGregor, find their discourse affected by the historiography of intentionality. 
The past treatment of indigenous people, given to a logic of bioculturalism, recedes under 
the veil of intentionality leaving indigenous culture itself as the essential source of 
endemic social problems in the present. 
How is it that sovereign assertions of benevolent intention come to delegitimize 
forms of speech in the present and the forms of cultural memory referred to the past? 
Discussing reconciliation in South Africa, Derrida came to theorize the relation between 
memorialization and its retention of the signature of the very state which perpetrated an 
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injustice and threatens to repeat the spectral and artifactual remainders in the policies of 
the present: 
The proliferation of scenes of repentance, or of asking ‘forgiveness’, signifies, no 
doubt, a universal urgency of memory: it is necessary to turn toward the past; and 
it is necessary to take this act of memory, of self-accusation, of ‘repentance’, of 
appearance [comparution] at the same time beyond the juridical instance, or that 
of the Nation-State.92 
Derrida further notes the way the performative aspect of reconciliation on the national 
scene, while arising in a positive desire for justice also finds itself parasite on by 
exoneration, justification, and amnesia: 
the grand scene of repentance which we are concerned with, is played, sincerely 
or not. Often it has, in its very theatricality, the traits of a grand convulsion – dare 
we say a frenetic compulsion? No. It also responds, fortunately, to a ‘good’ 
movement. However, the simulacra, the automatic ritual, hypocrisy, calculation, 
or mimicry are often a part, and invite parasites to this ceremony of culpability.93 
Nelson’s covert deployment of such calculation and his imposition on “the grand scene of 
repentance” of an insistence on the “good intentions” of many agents of assimilation is 
likely sincere, yet it nonetheless “invite[s] parasites to this ceremony of culpability.” As I 
have examined here, the presence of such a parasitic play of memory and exoneration is 
not present only in politics but even in rigorous, well intentioned practices of 
historiography. 
For Derrida, justice and law remain mutually constitutive, even as each 
deconstructs the other. Let me cite his most concrete explication of this concatenation, 
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even as it will only become gradually intelligible as the terms which he deploys are 
delineated and remarked. Justice, for Derrida,  
is always a question of differential force, of différence as différence of force, of 
force as différance (différance as a force différée-différante), of the relation 
between force and form, between force and signification, performative force, 
illocutionary or perlocutionary force, of persuasive and rhetorical force, of 
affirmation by signature, but also and especially of all the paradoxical situations 
in which the greatest force and the greatest weakness strangely enough exchange 
places.94 
In this way such “affirmation by signature” bears with it the force of affective reckoning, 
affective avowal of past injustice and its legitimate claim on the present, even as it retains 
the parasitic potential of the elision of justice through the amnesiac trace brought to 
historiography by intentionality. The signature of the state inscribes potential recompense 
as well as potential revision, as it refracts through the play of memory. Derrida, in 
elaborating the logic of genocide through the thought of signature, trace, and iterability, 
remarks the way this problem of the archive and the recollection of crimes contains the 
mechanism for historical amnesias around regimes of discipline and governmentality. 
Derrida asserts that the demand for justice after massive state regimes of power is a 
demand which entails memory as well as recompense: 
One must try to think [state crime] starting from the point of singularity, the 
singularity of the signature and of the name, because what the order of 
representation tried to exterminate was not only human lives by the millions, 
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natural lives, but also a demand for justice; and also names: and first of all the 
possibility of fixing, inscribing, calling and recalling the name.  
This, he continues, is especially important in light of the fact that the signature of the 
state is marked not only as the apparatus of power in the past, but the force by which 
official memory is undertaken in the present. 
Not only because there was a destruction or project of destruction of the name and 
the very memory of the name, of the name as memory, but also because the 
system of mythical violence (objectivist, representational, communicational, etc.) 
went all the way to its limit, in a demonic fashion, on the two sides of the limit: at 
the same time, it kept the archive of its destruction, produce simulacra of 
justificatory arguments, with a terrifying legal, bureaucratic, statist objectivity and 
paradoxically produced a system in which its logic, the logic of objectivity made 
possible the invalidation and therefore the effacement of testimony and of 
responsibilities, the neutraliation of the singularity of the final solution; in short, it 
produced the possibilitiy of the historiographic perversion that has been able to 
give rise both to the logic of revisionism . . . as well as a positivist, comparativist, 
or relativist objectivism.95 
For Derrida, then, the signature of the state is not only inscribed in the acts committed by 
state agents, but also in the very act of commemoration and memorialization by which 
such acts are remembered or effaced. This situation is no doubt rendered more difficult 
since it is the state which itself manages the archive of this memorialization.96 Practices 
of symbolic commemoration and public memory are, then, far from extraneous to 
concrete questions of justice by which the crimes of the past are reckoned today.  	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It is necessary to add a further factor to the consideration of speech acts and their 
reference to the state which still bears the trace of the illocutionary force marked in the 
signature of earlier regimes of thanatopolitics and, indeed, genocide. The logic of “good 
intentions” absented of their embedding in the illocutionary force of discursive 
formations (for instance the embedding of biological thinking in cultural assimilation) 
produces a language game which serves to silence the culpable nature of acts framed as 
such. This factor attends upon the tracing of time, archivization, and memorialization. 
Whereas, Nelson and other apologists for assimilation want to frame the actions of its 
agents within the terms of their intentions—their auto-affective, self-present beliefs about 
what was right or best for Aboriginal children (for instance)—one should instead insist 
that the actions of individuals be referred to the circulation of illocutionary devices by 
which such acts were framed within the apparatus in which they were embedded. This 
framing is not given when an illocutionary force is grounded in intention or when a 
perlocutionary force is refracted through the justificatory affects through which the 
illocution to remove, fragment, and disappear indigeneity were interpreted by agents who 
carried out the acts (of removal, of surveillance, of discipline). Rather, the relation 
between the performative actions referred to the illocutionary force of policy statements 
should be understood as a broad apparatus whose consequences could to a lesser or 
greater degree be anticipated.  
The difficulty in commemorating, mourning, and recalling the destructive and 
harmful effects of past policy arises when the transcendental guarantee of mistakenly 
good intentions is ascribed to the past as an overdetermined force, when it is allowed to 
overturn and obscure the various ways in which indigenous subjects were exposed to 
182	  
	  
intervention, removal, and discipline. The notions of good ascribed to the agents of 
discipline were nonetheless refracted through framing ideas about the disappearance of 
the Aboriginal race and the assimilability of people of mixed descent (itself, we noted in 
the last chapter, frequently implicated in disappearance).   Where the concern is the 
reference of the state signature to a culpability which implicates its agents as well as its 
framers, and carries this culpability in the signature of the present, the pithy remark of 
one legal scholar suffices to draw out the force still nascent in the perlocutionary action 
of  indigenous child removal: “forcible separation per se can be seen as effecting a wrong 
even if that separation was pursuant to a misguided belief that it was in the interest of the 
child to be integrated into white society.”97 This statement not only shows that intention 
to harm is not the issue, but reveals the way an imaginary of good must be referred to the 
frame produced by the apparatus in which “good” or “kind” intentions was framed and to 
which it was referred. 
The iterable marks of these ideas framed a state practice whose signature has 
identifiable effects (the consequences of which will, in some cases, find their apotheosis 
in acts of negligence referable to the principle of dolus eventualis). The iterable chain of 
discursive strategies by which absorption and assimilation were framed, embedded the 
illocutionary force of orders of discipline and biopower over Aboriginal lives not in any 
rationale of the good, but in a rationale of care, protection and goodness that was itself 
refracted through (at turns) the necropolitical palliative care of a race  presumed  to be 
“passing away,” the natal-thanatopolitical apparatus of absorbing and assimilating people 
of mixed indigenous and European descent, and the biopolitical imperative (nascent in 
culturalism) that all indigenous people be normativized according to the regulatory 
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outcomes of the national polity. Perlocutionary implementation of acts were emplaced 
within this field and the intentional structure of justification which one might find in such 
state agents remains heterogeneous to it. Finally, it is necessary to insist on a wariness 
around the structural forces (rather than intentions) that framed regimes of power and the 
destructive actions they precipitate (removal, dispossession) and to further insist that this 
wariness is not only pertinent to memory and historiography. As state signatures return to 
cover over the potential artifactual resonances of past policy in present, it is important to 
recognize that thanatopolitics, normativization, and cultural destruction are “in abeyance 
(as mercifully, it seems to be in contemporary Australia) rather than being [] thing[s] of 
the past.”98 If we fail to recognize the resonances between the past and the present, then 
we fail to see that late liberal biopolitics, while thankfully avoiding the intensive eugenics 
and bioculturalist normativization of the past nonetheless retains ways of making forms 
of life things of the past. As Povinelli reminds us, late liberalism may no longer literally 
kill subaltern and minority subjects bearing alternative modes of life—alien to the 
mechanism of the market. Nonetheless “it has resuscitated faire mourir into the typology 
of faire vivre and laisser mourir, even as the more dominant powers of making live and 
letting die have changed the techniques of state killing.” 
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Chapter 4 
Biopolitical Correspondences:  
Anthropology, Native Administration, and Cultural Nationalism 
 
 “[P]hysiographic factors work slowly . . . Ultimately the Australian race will be quite 
different from the ‘English’ race and hence Australian literature will be quite different 
from the merely English literature, of England.”1 
P. R. Stephensen 
 
How does (post)colonial literary culture, so often annexed to nationalist concerns, 
interface with the biopolitical regulation of race and sexuality? Colonial biopolitics can 
be defined as the regularisation of a population according to the perceived insistence on 
norms. Unlike the diffuse, microscopic, governmental mechanisms of surveillance that 
identify the need for disciplinary interventions, biopolitics concerns itself with the 
regularisation of societies on a large scale, notably through demography. As Ann Laura 
Stoler has put it, Foucault’s identification of these two forms of power, “the disciplining 
of individual bodies . . . and the regularization of the life processes of aggregate human 
populations” has led to much productive work in the postcolonialist critique of “the 
discursive management of the sexual practices of the colonized,” and the resultant 
“colonial order of things.”2 Indeed, biopolitics is crucially concerned with what is 
perceptible at the macroscopic level of an entire population – often rendering its 
operations blind to more singular, small, identitarian, or even communitarian 
185	  
	  
representations and imaginaries. Certainly one can find representations of disciplinary 
power across the canon of oft-taught postcolonial texts, from Ngugi Wa Thiong’o’s 
critique of colonial policing in Petals of Blood, to Tsitsi Dangarembga’s meditation on 
the affective violence of mimicry in Nervous Conditions, to Salman Rushdie’s magical 
realist parody of Indira Gandhi’s state of emergency in Midnight’s Children.3 Such texts 
are cognizant of policing, colonial education, and the retention of exceptional measures 
threatening the democratic form emergent from the subcontinent. 
But what does one begin to write of the lettered settler colony, particularly since 
so much of the national imaginary, including its positioning of indigenous peoples, has 
been conjured as an intertext, a canon, an inheritance by the simultaneously antipodean 
and (nonetheless) colonizing imaginaries of settler colonists? As Wolfe suggested, settler 
colonies are not merely premised on the subjection of indigenous peoples, but very often 
also on their total disappearance. As we have seen, the natal-thanatopolitical, biopolitical, 
and other mechanisms by which this is attempted are variegated. It is incumbent to 
similarly survey the cultural correlates of such ideas. In the Australian context, the 
processes of absorption and assimilation directed toward Aboriginal people in the 
twentieth century clearly involve disciplinary practices driven by biopolitical projections 
of future normativity and homogeneity. But literary texts, while making truth claims 
about such contexts, rarely prescribe policy.  
Those singular settler imaginaries that traverse the backdrop of the governance 
and policing of indigenous people—constrained by the inheritance of genre, form, 
convention, and voice—nonetheless hardly reproduce the fantasies and anxieties of 
colonial governance as facsimiles of Aborigines Department memoranda. How do we 
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read the narration of subaltern death, survival, or indeed assimilation when such an 
imaginary of doom in literary and cinematic texts has found itself displaced within the 
discursive formations of colonial governance: why do Aboriginal characters in novels 
keep dying after the turn to cultural assimilation? Why do settler poets consistently return 
to a melancholic lamentation of Aboriginal loss (as though it were their own) after this 
turn? Is it too much to say (as Foucault did not, at least not in so many words) that 
postcolonial texts—these small and particular representations—can be read alongside 
texts from the archive of settler colonial biopolitics? Taking seriously the degree to which 
such literary frames are not mere carbon copies, this chapter nonetheless insists on a 
tactical attempt to map the occasional correspondence of such archival and literary 
expressions. Doing so, I contend, brings into greater relief the moments of non-
correspondence: when imaginaries of death subsist after the supposed turn to 
assimilation, when policies about subaltern peoples are debated by white settler 
characters and not resolved. This notion off correspondence also allows us to tell the 
story of the way anthropological conceits and practices of colonial administration 
produced concrete concurrent effects in the cultural sphere, particularly, the emergent 
literary nationalist public sphere. 
The projected outcome of both absorption and assimilation was the 
homogenization of the Australian national polity. Where absorption imagined the 
disappearance of Aboriginal people via natal-thanatopolitical methods, assimilation—
while retaining its disciplinary measures—turned on a more subtle articulation of its 
outcome vis a vis ideas of race, culture, and national homogeneity. Assimilation’s vision 
of national homogeneity was paralleled by regularizing functions that correspondingly 
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operated in anthropological discourse as well as literary nationalist discourse; it is these 
correspondences which I examine here. In the post-war period anthropologists, literary 
nationalists, and agents of assimilation variously contributed to a networked discursive 
formation that anxiously concerned itself with the place that Aboriginal culture and social 
life was to have in the new nation. Mid twentieth century Australian cultural nationalism 
drew heavily on the physiognomic, racial, and eugenic data that was also significantly in 
play in the discourse of Aboriginal policy. 
A key methodological investment of this chapter arises from the assertion that the 
biopolitical outcome of regularization and homogenization parallels the concerns of 
cultural nationalism, drawing out imaginaries, forces and desires that exceed and outlast 
their concrete governmental implementation. Many of these imaginaries insist on the 
symbolic value of settler nativity over against the voice of the too often expendible 
indigene. As Chadwick Allen suggests, “Aboriginal inhabitants of what are now First 
World nations have been forced to compete for indigenous status with European settlers 
and their descendants eager to construct new identities that separate them from European 
antecedents.”4 This is often the way indigenous characters operate in settler texts heavily 
concerned with indigeneity. While Aboriginality is avowed to the point of fetishization, it 
is also often made so at the expense of the indigenous body and mind as living presence.  
One organizing question, which precipitates this observation asks: how, as the physical 
anthropological and absorptionist elements retained by assimilationist doctrine called for 
the biological incorporation of the “Australoid race” into the settler nation’s normative 
population, were the correlative cultural appropriations disseminated as a party to the 
settler nation’s cultural uniqueness and homogeneity? How does the settler nation 
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imagine its coherence and independence through the sublation of an indigenous identity 
which it simultaneously destroys, constrains, and normativizes?  
Here I explore the way a certain artifactual Aboriginal constellation would have to 
be regularized and presented as acceptable to the dominant white population of the 
nation. Assimilation required that Aboriginal tradition be regularized as a “primitive” 
social form adaptable to the settler cultural model of nuclear familialism. If orientation to 
an environment hostile to whiteness was a problem for what Warwick Anderson has 
called Australia’s “reproductive frontier,” and if adaptation to this environment could (for 
many assimilationists) benefit from the biological absorption of Aboriginality, would 
there emerge an analogous desire for cultural adaptation?5 Discourses of Aboriginality 
were disseminated alongside government policies of assimilation in order to negotiate a 
form of nativist primitivism that would be acceptable to the nation’s future cultural 
homogeneity.  
The late 1930s are a key period in the government of Aboriginal people in 
Australia. I want to mark three further dates from the late 1930s that index three acutely 
biopolitical instances of the settler nationalist imaginary:  
October 1937. Elkin would continue a correspondence with his lay-ethnographer 
contact, W. E. “Bill” Harney, who was gathering ethnographic data at the Missions on 
Bathurst and Melville Islands. In this particular letter, alongside notes on the subsection 
systems of neighbouring peoples, the Anula and the Mudbura, Harney would insert his 
opinion about the potential normativization of the Aboriginal family and what precisely 
could be “abolished or modified”: 
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The system of polygamy seems to me to be quite OK in a nomadic race and can 
be eradicated without going to extreme means as I have found that the natives try 
to imitate the white and this they do in marriage and it is incredible the amount of 
natives in the bush working with the white man that have only one wife, they do 
not want another and when questioned on this, they remark that two women 
would be a nuisance as they would be jealous of each other.6 
For Harney, the “imitat[ion of] the white” was a process that was already taking its 
course. Harney would elsewhere criticize the attitude (among missionaries and 
government agents) of “no compromise” in approaching the modification of native 
customs.7 His correspondence with Elkin would help produce a genre of popular narrative 
inviting settlers into the transforming Aboriginal life-world. 
January 1936. After its first two instalments had been published in The Australian 
Mercury, P.R. Stephensen’s The Foundations of Culture in Australia: An Essay Toward 
National Self Respect is published in book form by W.J. Miles. A short way into the 
essay’s third instalment, Stephensen would declare, ‘[a]ll parties agree that population is 
Australia’s paramount need’ (149). For Stephensen, a large population was one of the 
preconditions of a culturally nationalist Australia, independent of the British metropole. 
Yet, questions of race, hybridity, and the legitimacy of settler belonging would also not 
be absent from his prose. Coinciding with key transformations in Australian Aboriginal 
policy, Stephensen’s tract would influence a number of nativist and nationalist writers 
who desired both cultural independence and the incorporation of Aboriginal motifs into 
their writing; these included Rex Ingamells, Ian Mudie, and, most notably, Xavier 
Herbert. 
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June 1936. Herbert writes to his friend Arthur Dibley, a manuscript reader at P.R. 
Stephensen and Co., from the veranda of his house in the Kahlin Aboriginal Compound 
in Darwin.8 In early 1934, Herbert and Stephensen had worked closely on the revision of 
Capricornia;9 indeed, in the early 1960s Stephensen even claimed his role in editing to be 
so extensive as to warrant co-authorship.10 When Herbert wrote to Dibley, he was 
employed as acting superintendent of the compound—an agent of the surveillance and 
discipline of Aboriginal people. In his letter, Herbert clearly related his literary ambitions 
to grandiloquent dreams of nationalism and race-consciousness: 
Do you know what I’ve been dreaming of doing? Why, no less than teaching the 
Aboriginal race to accept citizenship & win a place in the Nation, & honourable 
place [sic], so that they may cross with the invaders & enrich the new Nation with 
their blood. Already I have founded a Euraustralian League, the members of 
which are Halfcastes and Quartercastes whose blood is pure Aboriginal and 
European, the aim of which is to teach pride of race to these people & to teach 
others to honour them & ultimately to found a Nation.11  
Herbert’s imagined project of a hybrid nation was not only premised on the citizenship of 
Aboriginal Australians. It was also an appeal to contemporary population and attitudes 
toward potential preservation of ‘full blood’ natives through reserve land12. Before 
turning to limn the correspondences between these events, it is incumbent upon me to say 
something further about the methodological stakes of correspondence itself.  
Biopolitical Correspondences 
The use of the notion of correspondence in the title to this chapter carries a 
tripartite meaning. First it indexes the correspondence between biopolitical regularization 
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of the colonized indigene and the regularization of its social form in policy discourse; this 
correspondence has been extensively explored in the preceding chapters. The second 
meaning of correspondence concerns the relation between the socially regularized image 
of the Aboriginal subject and the emergent worry over a culture of national homogeneity. 
Finally the literal correspondence between colonial administrative, anthropological, and 
popular primitivist literary discursive enunciators deploys at times complementary and at 
others conflicting demands of and about Aboriginality; these at turns confirm and and 
challenge the policies and imaginaries of the settler colonial biopolitical apparatus. In this 
chapter, correspondence in the sense of letter writing, unpublished and concealed 
discursive spaces that draw in the epistolary encounter, suggests the discursive networks 
that link actors in the colonial administration and those in cultural and literary nationalist 
circles.13 But the idea of correspondence is also a means of evoking the relationship 
between mechanisms of control over population and the cultural imaginary of an 
emerging literary nationalism that is a good deal more nuanced than a simple notion of 
causality might suggest. Ideas of demography animate fantasies of culture, but they do so 
only in a subterranean manner, connecting the symbolic grammar of raw demographic 
data with imaginary projections of cultural futurity. Here I emphasise the paradoxically 
privately networked public sphere of letter writing as one such underground 
correspondence. While experts on the ‘Aboriginal question’ were imagining the ‘long-
range plan’ by which Aboriginal presence would be evacuated from the national scene, 
literary nationalists were attempting to position their visions of future homogeneity in 
relation to the ‘Aborigines question’. On either side of the correspondence, a rhetoric of 
the future of the nation as a whole lay at the centre of debate. 
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Yet, on either side of this correspondence—be it that of the settler writers or the 
administrators or somewhere imperceptibly in the interstice—there must remain a 
recognized fluidity in views which might at once posit contradictory desires: Aboriginal 
disappearance alongside imaginary national hybridity, whiteness alongside the absorption 
of the native. These ideas were simultaneously bound together and traversed by 
contradiction. Discourses of normativization are often ghosted by such contradiction, 
even as the goal of discursive analysis is to extrapolate fields of generality. Foucault 
refers to such consistent fields, traversed by contradiction, as the “epistemic web;” he 
notes that the fact “that it is so tightly woven certainly does not mean that everyone is 
thinking along the same lines.”14 Stoler translates the term as a “tight epistemic weave” 
and relates it to Theodor Adorno’s notion of “force field” in the analysis of ideology.15 
Such a tightly woven web, Foucault asserts,  
is in fact a precondition for not thinking along the same lines or for 
thinking along different lines; and it is that which makes the differences 
politically pertinent. If different subjects are able to speak, to occupy 
tactically different positions, and if they are able to find themselves in 
mutually adversarial positions, there has to be a tight field, there has to be 
a very tightly woven network to regularize historical knowledge.16 
 If, on either side of this correspondence, one finds an internally consistent field that 
nonetheless entertains contradictions, one is certain to find both correspondences and 
divergences. Further, where there is much contradiction at the level of the ideas of 
administrators, or between the bureaucrats of racial governance themselves and the 
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anthropologists on whose knowledge they rely, then the knowledge of lettered subjects 
and their fictive enunciation will doubtless be given to multiple, intersecting layers of 
contradiction.  
Nonetheless, despite their operation in differing discursive registers, the fact of 
frequent correspondence (literal and figurative) between literary, anthropological, and 
administrative agents regarding the “Aborigines question” means that they might be 
viewed not only as three separate sets of experts, but also, in some sense, as a cohesive 
cadre. Further, the allegories of nation and race narrated by literary figures from within 
this cadre can be read as attempts to articulate cohesive imaginaries of racial and cultural 
nationalist futurity by reference to the field of governmental enunciations on which they 
draw for their imaginary. One way to view the cadre of “experts” on Aboriginality that 
emerged at this time is through a Gramscian lens. As Antonio Gramsci argued, hegemony 
is the domination of subaltern others through the production of a semblance of consensus. 
But hegemony functions not by the consistent decisions of a central, autonomous power, 
but rather, through the contradictory enunciations of its infrastructure. Colonial 
hegemony asserts itself as a functional application of power when the technologies and 
attitudes of the bureaucratic order of society coincide with the interests of the ruling 
class. In the case of settler society, the latter would correspond to the elite among the 
settlers. The hegemonic form of this coupling can be explained via Gramsci’s incisive 
assertion that, “[t]he members of [the bureaucratic, administrative, policing] stratum are 
accustomed to direct command over nuclei of men, however tiny, and to commanding 
‘politically,’ not ‘economically.’ In other words, their art of command implies no aptitude 
for ordering ‘men and things’ into an organic whole.”17 As we have implicitly seen in 
194	  
	  
preceding chapters, the structural coupling of anthropological discourse and native 
administration discourse was the key discursive intersection that produced the absorption-
assimilation regime. This is true even before its apparatus functioned to the degree 
intended by its framers (which it, of course, never fully did). Such a distinction as 
Gramsci’s between those with apparent “aptitude” for ordering and those who carry out 
the concrete practice of governmental ordering may be a useful one in unraveling the 
order of settler colonization. As we saw in the previous chapters, the stratum of Native 
Administrators who met in 1937 drew the legitimacy for their decision on the future of 
the Aboriginal population from the assertions of anthropologists such as Cleland and 
Tindale. Neville was able to state that the Aboriginal population are absorbable 
Caucasians on the basis of Cleland’s knowledge. In other words, the physical 
anthropologists were understood to possess an “aptitude for ordering” native peoples, 
thereby becoming the source for the legitimacy of the eugenic program of the settler 
state.  
Similarly, post-war reframing of assimilation in terms of culture were formulated 
by McEwan under the advice of Elkin. If physical anthropologists lent their legitimacy to 
such eugenic projects, might it be reasonable to investigate the way functionalist social 
anthropologists engaged in producing the legitimate model for cultural assimilation? 
Further, what role might settler literary and cultural knowledge-makers have played in 
constructing the place of indigeneity as it related to the production of nationalism? We 
will no doubt also find multiple contradictions in this tight field of settler literary 
nationalism. There will remain divergent imaginaries among those who translated their 
assertions into popular and literary fictive enunciations, but there may also remain 
195	  
	  
consistent threads that move between the realms of policy, anthropology, and the literary 
imaginary.  
Normativization played a key role in conditioning the idea of Aboriginality in the 
literary texts of the mid twentieth century, particularly from the 1930s to the 1950s, but 
with certain residual conceptions continuing to the 1970s. While cultural nationalists 
called upon Aboriginal subjects to act as the seat of their primitivist cathexis and the 
source for their fetish of national independence, assimilation demanded that these same 
Aboriginal subjects transform their social life in forms commensurable to “civilized” 
settler norms. Elizabeth Povinelli suggests that the continued subjectification of 
colonized people under the cover of multiculturalism bears a complex relation with the 
interplay of nation and authenticityI here identify. The relation of policy, anthropology, 
and literary nationalism forms a background to the kind of multiculturalism she has 
identified in her work. As she puts it: 
[M]ulticultural domination seems to work . . . by inspiring subaltern and 
minority subjects to identify with the impossible object of an authentic 
self-identity; in the case of indigenous Australians, a domesticated 
nonconflictual “traditional” form of society and (inter)subjectivity. As the 
nation stretches out its hands to ancient Aboriginal laws (as long as they 
are not “repugnant”), indigenous subjects are called on to perform an 
authentic difference in exchange for the good feelings of the nation and 
the reparative legislation of the state.18 
The project of nation formation—in so far as it reached out to indigenous society as a 
fragment of its self conception—relied consistently on a selection process to identify 
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what was and was not “repugnant” in indigenous tradition.  While the mass media has 
often emphasized the most “repugnant” of alterities—from the idea of the cannibal 
native, to ritualized patriarchal practice, to the more recent identification of child sex 
abuse in remote communities—and identified them with the essentialized root of 
indigenous cultural difference, framers of nation and of Aboriginal policy did not need to 
look deep into the ethnographic record to find sources of tradition whose alterity was 
sufficiently different to come under the gaze of normativization. Polygamy, complex 
modes of kin organization, practices of initiation: these were all subject to a compulsion 
to modify and transform indigenous practices in order that indigenous subjects might 
either find themselves assimilated or, if permitted to perform tradition, to do so according 
to an acceptable, unobjectionable “authentic difference.”  
Policy-makers insisted not only that indigenous Australians identify with a 
“domesticated nonconflictual ‘traditional’ form of society and (inter)subjectivity” but 
also that settler subjects accept this model as an index attached to national belonging. The 
solicitation of desire for identification with the normativized tradition in question was 
also often accompanied by a desire to become native (on the part of literary nationalists 
particularly) that was both appropriative and thanatopolitical at an imaginary level. This 
selection and assimilation process was also parallel and consonant with a process of 
settler nation-formation. At the precise moment when these artifactual “domesticated 
nonconflictual ‘traditional’” Aboriginal subjects were in the process of being constructed, 
this tradition was also being made available to settler subjects as misrecognized objects 
of appropriable nativist belonging. This process of appropriation recalls Renato 
Rosaldo’s notion of “Imperialist nostalgia.” For Rosaldo, many imperialisms display a 
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melancholic desire for the culture of the colonized that they are nonetheless in the process 
of destroying. Similarly, the mode by which Imperialist nostalgia operates often relies on 
the “salvage” and appropriation of native motifs and recalls what Robert Dixon calls the 
appropriative process of “plagiarism.” For Dixon: “[c]olonial texts . . . are built up by 
plagiarism, whose Latin root, plagiarius or kidnapper, resonates with the history of 
indentured labour . . . The plagiarism performed by colonial texts is a theft of cultural 
materials, another form of blackbirding, a kind of captivity.”19   
As Aboriginal tradition was being domesticated, the resultant “safe” form of 
indigeneity that eventuated was also being melancholically fetishized. It is within this 
intersection that nationalism with its foreclosed multicultural potential came into being in 
relation to assimilation. Either vector in this process, be it the regularization of 
indigenous social life or the correlative plagiaristic capture of indigeneity within the 
settler mainstream imaginary, were equally involved in a biopolitical process. 
Regularization of the colonized is, in the settler colony, frequently oriented, at the 
cultural level, to an apparatus of capture and appropriation whereby the normed and 
deterritorialized aspects of indigenous life can be made available to the imaginary codes 
of settler social life. Chief amongst the outcomes of such capture is the virtual 
indigenization of the settler by which every semblance of correlation renders the settler 
public sphere more capable of subjectivizing its constituents as, in their self-conception, 
“indigenous.” Just as anthropologists such as A. P. Elkin were involved in discourses of 
assimilation and practices of normativization, they were also participating in the making 
of popular narratives for the settler populace. Such nationalist movements as the 
Jindyworobak literary cadre that emerged in the late 1930s drew much inspiration from 
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the new representations of indigeneity which had begun to be disseminated. Amongst 
these were the vision of Aboriginal social life emergent from structural-functionalist 
anthropology. 
 
The Elementary Family and Assimilation 
Oedipus is always colonization pursued by other means.20 
Deleuze and Guattari 
If the microphysical application of biopower takes individual bodies as its target 
and, at the biopolitical level, population is taken as the object of aggregation by which its 
interventions are calculated, then the institution of the nuclear family can be seen as the 
hinge space between the two. Partha Chatterjee praises Foucault for showing the way 
modernity consolidated state power by emphasizing population as the new object of 
power. But Chatterjee adds a further insight. . Even as population emerged as a new 
object for aggregation and intervention, the role of civil society in norming the family 
took precedence after this turn, particularly in colonized regions. As Chatterjee notes: 
In the classical theory, the family is the elementary unit of social organization: by 
the nineteenth century the contractually formed family became the normative 
model of most social theorizing in the West as well as of reformed laws of 
marriage, property, inheritance, and personal taxation.21 
In colonial contexts, civil society formed the means to normativize the familial form of 
colonized peoples whose religious and economic practices drove a wedge, which reduced 
the capacity of the colonizer to maximize economic utility, even as this practice was 
justified through the greater inclusion of non-Western communities in civil society. 
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Within this framework, “the function of civil-social institutions [such as the family and 
the church] in relation to the public at large will be one of pedagogy rather than of free 
association.”22 In colonial societies such as India, hegemonic regulation of civil society 
was employed to pedagogically normativize elites on the model of English standards. In 
settler colonial society, matters differed slightly. Rather than a civil society extant among 
the colonized, remote institutions loosely affiliated with the settler civil society such as 
missions, as well as governmental organelles such as native settlements were employed 
to normativize indigenous family life. These instruments of governmentality were the 
product of a discursive formation which drew from sectors of the anthropological 
community, native administrators, and administratively-minded missionaries. 
The pursuit of norms was inscribed deep within the structural-functionalist 
attempt to describe a universal model of family life. While the contractually formed 
family developed in the nineteenth century in Europe as a normative, the postulate of 
primitive social organization as essentially other required a theoretical form which could 
mediate between the native and the modern and form the justificatory basis for 
assimilation. In 1930 when A. R. Radcliffe-Brown’s writings on the “Social Organization 
of Australian Tribes” were serialized in the opening issues of Oceania  he defined the 
family as a subsistence unit “formed by a man and his wife or wives and their dependent 
children.”23 Ten years later, at the Presidential Address to the Royal Anthropological 
Institute in 1941, Radcliffe-Brown defined “[t]he unit of structure from which a kinship 
system is built up [as] the group which I call an ‘elementary family,’ consisting of a man 
and his wife and their child or children, whether they are living together or not.”24 For 
Radcliffe-Brown, in spite of the complexity of kinship structures emergent from a given 
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society, the elementary family remained a unit which crossed European and native lines 
as a comparative absolute. Where the discourse of ethnography proceeded to account for 
the complexity of indigenous kinship beyond the postulate of the elementary family, this 
conception of a transcendent organizational form became central to attempts to 
governmentally norm these complex structures of kinship. If Radcliffe-Brown was right 
that, despite complex affinal and consanguinal economic and sacral modes, the 
elementary family could be found even in the most “primitive” of societies, then such 
societies could also be normativized in a manner commensurate with the civilized 
European standards maintained by settler colonizers.  
From the 1950s, Australian Governments provided increased funding to Missions 
as a means to accomplish assimilation in remote areas. Since Missions were already in 
contact with 4000 of the estimated 14000 resident in the Northern Territory, for instance: 
[t]he Government looked to the Missions as its agents for carrying out native policy” and 
funded them accordingly.25 Faith was vested in the missions as sites of assimilation, 
while it was insisted that missions defer to Government authority and that the governance 
and normativization of indigenous people be as uniform as possible. Taking the 1953 
Conference on Missions as an exemplum, we can see how this postulate informed the 
socio-cultural normativization of indigenous life. There, R. K. McCaffrey noted that 
“aboriginal social organization and relationship systems are very different from our idea 
of a family” and that, as a result, “there is some instability in aboriginal family groups.”26 
Later in the conference, the Reverend J. B. Montgomery argued that while traditional 
Aboriginal kinship structures served the needs of indigenous people in the past, such a 
“system may have been suitable to the Aborigine living in his raw state, but with the 
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advent of civilization and the breaking up of tribal life, it is surely not the type of family 
life which should be preserved for the betterment of the Aborigines.”27 Montgomery’s 
prescription emphasized a logic reminiscent of the “elementary family” postulate and, in 
doing so, correlated Christian indoctrination and economic efficiency in facilitating uplift 
to civilization. “This native system,” he wrote, “belongs to an economy peculiarly their 
own, and definitely not suitable to the civilised way of life.”28 As a result, he argued, “it 
would appear that in the best interests of all concerned, both economic and spiritual, the 
family unit must be re-arranged, so that it consists only of father, mother and offspring.”29 
Montgomery also insisted upon the institution of monogamy and advised that the 
architectural model of individual family housing in order to habituate individuals to the 
social standards of citizenship. The desire for the nuclear family as a mode of economic, 
religious, and social normativization found its scientific justification in the elementary 
family postulate as its moral force was countenanced by Government reliance on the 
missionary as the agent and his institution as the site for the implementation of 
assimilation. 
The diversity and alterity of indigenous naming practices made normativization of 
the family a challenge while also making the biopolitical imperative that the inhabitants 
of a territory be enumerated more difficult. For McCaffrey, “a reliable and sufficiently 
complete system of statistical data” on the Aboriginal population of the Northern 
Territory implied the need for a uniform practice of naming Aboriginal people according 
to European norms: “As aboriginal families are assimilated into the life of the Northern 
Territory, it will be necessary that a system of names be developed for them in line with 
our European system of one or more Christian names and a family or surname.”3031 This 
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practice of normative naming would also assist in the regularization of indigenous social 
and familial life: “the acceptance and use of a family surname,” he argued, could 
“counter the normal social organization of tribal society.”32 Naming itself became a 
technique of normativization and a mechanism for enumeration.  
Even as assimilation was fomented at conferences and cabinet meetings, 
administrators and “experts” were painfully aware of the necessity of promoting its 
postulates. It was imperative that as Aboriginal family life was normativized, those 
traditions and practices that were allowed to continue would be accepted by the white 
community. Similarly, as people of mixed descent were subject to the economic and 
religious discipline that would “train them for citizenship” (as the phrase often went), 
acceptance was also solicited from the wider community—even as so-called fringe 
dwellers were often blamed by administrators for the stigma they encountered from 
whites. Archdeacon P. McD Smith stated this most forcefully at the 1953 Conference. 
Drawing from the Archdeacon’s remarks, the 1953 Conference framers took up his 
imperative to simultaneous normativization and acceptance:  
Assimilation implied full acceptance by the white community and this had a 
reciprocal demand that the natives must be acceptable. If he was to be accorded 
the rights and privileges of full citizenship, he must be able to live at a standard 
which offered no hygienic, moral, or social affront to the rest of the community. 
Assimilation, then, traversed and employed multiple forms of normativization. 
Simultaneously, a plethora of texts and enunciations entered the public sphere as a means 
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to promote the government’s revised policy. As in so many areas, Elkin had long stepped 
into this fray. 
Promoting Assimilation 
Elkin saw his role not only as a key framer of assimilation, but as its promoter. 
Several decades earlier, 1938 had seen the publication of the first edition of his The 
Australian Aborigines: How To Understand Them. Designed to be accessible to a wide 
audience, this mainstream ethnography was to translate the cultural institutions of 
Aboriginal life as they pertained to the average white Australian, whose assent was 
essential if assimilation was to attain mainstream acceptability. The Australian 
Aborigines became an international bestseller, accessible to a general readership.33 In 
identifying his audience, Elkin specified those under whose administration Aboriginal 
lives fell: “cabinet ministers, officials, missionaries [and] settlers.”34 In the book, Elkin 
defines the family in Western society such that it “consists of father, mother, and 
children, and in some cases step-children and adopted children.”35 In rapport with 
Radcliffe-Brown’s postulate of the elementary family, traversing civilizations, Elkin 
contrasts Aboriginal families, noting that “[t]he Aborigines . . . reckon their relationships 
through the whole community,” before proceeding to translate the strange terms of 
Aboriginal kinship to his reader.36 Elkin was less concerned with the possession of the 
elementary family by the traditional Aboriginal social scheme than with the potential 
adaptability of complex Aboriginal kinship systems to the most elementary of family 
structures: the nuclear family. This outcome went along with the stadial mode of uplift he 
advocated, which I described at length in the previous chapter. Elkin’s unstated question 
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became: can indigenous families be rendered at once commensurate with settler-
European economic and social standards and nonetheless remain exemplary emblems of 
a (modified) indigenous tradition. The structure and function of the family mattered to 
ethnographers because of the way ‘primitive’ social formations served to explain the 
unconscious of civilized man. Inversely, the apparent fact that man’s innate tendency was 
subject to inherent structural predilections seemed to imply that the native could be 
regularized according to the reproductive and social norms of the settler nation whether 
or not the variation within “primitive” social forms outwardly displayed nuclear familial 
characteristics. The postulate of the elementary family saw that, however complex or 
abnormal a kinship structure might appear on the surface, Aboriginal society had the 
potential to be normed according to “civilized” standards.  
Elkin was a different kind of anthropologist to Radcliffe-Brown, taking a much 
more sustained interest in the relation between anthropology and native administration. 
After a cabinet reshuffle of 1937, Elkin’s influence was taken on board by the new 
Commonwealth Interior Minister Jack McEwan. The result, as we have seen, was a 
policy that emphasized the role of Aboriginal administration in the civilization of all 
Aboriginal people—not merely those of mixed descent.37 Elkin’s resultant reframing of 
the policy of absorption as cultural assimilation would be the template for the mode of 
national policy up to the mid-1960s. He similarly oriented his anthropological writings to 
complement the aim of “uplift” and “civilization.” If Elkin had more “progressive” ideas 
about race than Neville, the anthropologist apparently agreed with many of the Native 
Administrator’s ideas about the implementation of assimilation—its technologies, 
mechanisms, and categories. The settler colonial analytics of blood upon which 
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assimilation relied is one example. While Elkin is credited with disavowing the 1937 
conference’s notion that “tribalized” “full-bloods” were incapable of assimilation, he 
nonetheless  advocated the classification of Aboriginal people into types based on blood 
and behavior: “[t]he use of the term caste (half or other),” he wrote, 
is effective if it reminds us that we divide our population into Australians 
proper (that is, our white selves); full-bloods, who, incidentally are not 
included in the general census figures; and, in thought and behaviour, the 
Aboriginal castes of mixed bloods. These last are in our midst, and partly 
of our blood, but they are not yet ‘of us.’38 
 The question of whether Aborigines and of which “caste” were capable of assimilation, 
of education to the “white” level, had been in play for some time prior to its discussion at 
the 1937 conference. As we saw in the previous Chapter, racial psychologist Stanley 
Porteus had argued that Aborigines were not unintelligent but perfectly adapted to their 
environment. Elkin certainly agreed that half-castes were capable of uplift and had been 
communicating with Neville about his experience with “half-caste” education for some 
time, receiving a letter on the issue during the years of drafting the first edition of the 
Australian Aborigines.39 As we have seen, while Elkin’s “progressive” policy advocated 
citizenship for all Aborigines, it also did so through a taxonomy that relied on the old 
racial eugenic classificatory system of blood quanta and assimilated behavior 
(employment, “non-‘nomadic’ conditions”). Elkin maintained this line about the question 
of Aboriginal adaptability as late as the 1954 edition of his popular ethnography, even as 
he was more optimistic by this stage, with all Aborigines now coming under the control 
of Commonwealth and State regulation in health, welfare, education, and social life. 
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In tracts like Australia’s Coloured Minority and The Australian Aborigines, 
Neville and Elkin promoted their overlapping but divergent visions of assimilation to the 
Australian public, as well as to the officials who could implement real change. Neville 
saw cultural assimilation as an extension of absorption; it “merely placed the people in 
evolutionary order looking at it from the point of view of assimilation—the future of all 
native people being under consideration.”40 In other words, Aboriginal social life was to 
be framed in evolutionary stages on its road to sociocultural assimilability. But for Elkin, 
a further vexing problem lay in the question of which indigenous cultural practices were 
to be eradicated and which were to be subject to a process of substitution. “We may,” 
Elkin wrote in The Australian Aborigines, 
even feel that these [strange and puzzling] customs are not so good as 
ours, that they are degrading and should be abolished, but before we pass 
such opinions or act upon them, we must first understand what those 
customs are . . . But while such an understanding undoubtedly makes 
another people’s customs less puzzling to us, it does not necessarily 
commend them all, and we may still feel constrained to use our influence 
or authority to have them abolished or modified.41 
Elkin would implore his settler reader to attempt to understand Aboriginal culture even as 
he retained the assimilationist imperative that aspects of Aboriginal social organization 
be “abolished or modified.”  
In a curious analogy, while emphasizing the importance of “initiation” to “every 
male member of the tribe,” he further asserted that “[y]ou and I, too, whether students at 
home or fieldworkers, must, in spirit, do the same, for then and only then shall we gain 
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some conception of what life means to the Aborigines.”42 What precisely Elkin meant by 
a certain “spirit[ual]” “initiation” of settler Australians remains a matter of speculation as 
this fleeting reference is vague and inchoate. However it joins to a wider notion shared by 
literary nationalists such as Xavier Herbert or the Jindyworobak Group that aspects of 
Aboriginal cultural knowledge needed to be taken on by white Australians; this would be 
an influential cornerstone of the cultural and literary nationalism forming at the time.  
Elkin himself would come to participate in the making of popular and literary 
texts designed to make “modified” tropes of Aboriginal culture available for popular 
consumption. Much of this was due to his association with the Territorian W. E. Harney. 
Harney was neither an anthropologist, an acclaimed writer, or a high level official, 
though he dabbled in all these pursuits. As well as being a popular troubadour, bush 
character, and lay-ethnographer, Harney was also a “combo,” as the derogative 
colloquialism went: a white man who pursued Aboriginal women sexually. Harney would 
operate as Elkin’s source for points of ethnographic data, “checking points of kinship 
detail for Elkin, clarifying the meaning of the word, giving him the gossip.”43 “In return,” 
recounts Elkin’s biographer Tigger Wise, “Elkin became [Harney’s] informal literary 
agent in the south.”44  
The letter marking the first of the three “events” with which I opened is an 
instance of a long correspondence that continued between Elkin and Harney from the mid 
1930s through to Harney’s death in 1962. Their letters provide a constellation of 
overlapping assertions about the salvage of ethnological truth, the reality of Aboriginal 
adaptation to colonialism, and the amenability of either the “tribalized” or “detribalized” 
native to civilization. Elkin’s faith in Harney’s ethnographic authenticity was great and 
208	  
	  
the University of Sydney anthropologist promoted his friend as such. Elkin would later 
write that Harney was “one of those extremely rare persons---a man who had lived in 
close contact with the aborigines and really did have some knowledge of their life.”45 As 
such, Elkin, the assimilationist reformer, solicited not only ethnographic data from 
Harney but also, his opinions on the reform of native welfare and precipitants to 
assimilation. Both men shared the notion articulated by Elkin that anthropological 
knowledge was essential to assimilation: “before we pass such opinions or act upon them, 
we must first understand what those customs are.” As we have seen, some cultural 
practices, they argued, would nonetheless need to be “abolished or modified,” if 
assimilation was to proceed among the most “tribalized” natives.  
In 1939, Harney offered another extended policy opinion: “[o]nly one thing will 
save the abo: centres under strict medical and anthropological care; complete segregation 
of natives from towns especially Darwin.”46 He railed against the way the native 
administration was put at the service of native indentured servitude, rather than along the 
lines of his southern colleague’s “positive policy” of assimilation and “uplift” toward 
citizenship. Protectors, he wrote, often saw their “job [as] not the welfare of the native, 
but a labor bureau for cheap servants.”47 Harney’s diagnosis of this problem viewed it 
arising from the fact that, “contact seems to spoil the native.”48 He extolled what he saw 
as the virtues of a combination of segregation from this cheap labor market and the 
corruption of towns: 
In regards halfcastes I would suggest that as all the halfcast [sic] boys 
have been sent to Alice Springs why not send the half cast [sic] girls there 
also . . . These half caste boys in Alice Springs become a menace to 
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society with their repressed sexual desires and in time come to Darwin to 
find a mate & instead of being useful bushmen and pioneers of our back 
blocks will become steeped in the vices of our northern city.  .  . half cast 
[sic] women . . . are out of hand. I would suggest to send the incorrigible 
ones to the missions, or try and get them to marry and absorb them into the 
stations, they would only be too glad to return to their old homes & once 
there would marry. The whites would snap them up as a companion. What 
is more important let no more halfcaste children be brought to the towns.49 
It was clear that Harney disapproved of the effect of “towns” with their corrupting 
influence on “half-caste children.” These were rather to be controlled in their upbringing 
and marriagability. Like Elkin, Harney accepted child removal as a policy for the “uplift” 
of Aboriginal people to citizenship. In other words, Elkin and Harney were supportive of 
the tactics of assimilation: child removal, the regulation of marriage and of cohabitation, 
and the exemption and continued surveillance of Aboriginal subjects—particularly “half-
castes.” Their subjective visions of the outcome of these policies differed slightly. 
Nonetheless, they accepted the mandate of such powers. 
Elkin would come to solicit Harney’s opinions in framing his own advice to such 
influential members of the administration as Hasluck. In 1943, he sought Harney’s 
opinion on the effects of war and the “future development of Aborigines”: 
I wonder what the future will be for them. Do you think there will be an extensive 
white development of the country after the war? And what will this mean to the 
Aborigines? In any case, what will these Aborigines, who are working for the 
military, do when the war is over, and will those who have drifted from their 
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reserves return to them again? I am particularly concerned with the problem of the 
effect of the war situation and also of possible future development of the 
Aborigines.50  
Promising to gather data on “war and Aborigines,” Harney set about the task of acting as 
Elkin’s man on the ground. The question of an “extensive white development after the 
war,” perhaps referred to the degree to which the country would be populated by its 
settler subjects. For Elkin and Harney what this “will mean to the Aborigines” was a 
question to be answered through a two-fold strategy. On the one hand, the 
“modif[ication]” of Aboriginal society was to be pursued according to the biopolitical 
norms of the nuclear family, the possibility of which the postulate of the elementary 
family guaranteed. On the other hand, white Australians were to be prepared to accept the 
assimilation of Aboriginal people into their midst; “spinning” assimilation, as Anna 
Haebich has called it.51 For Elkin, the use of popular, literary accounts would be essential 
to this latter process. 
Harney would later become the Northern Territory’s most famed citizen for his 
popular accounts of Aboriginal life, Territory life, and cultural clash. The ideas the men 
cultivated about assimilation would become part of the appeal of their works. Not only 
were Harney’s popular accounts romanticizations of traditional Aboriginal culture and its 
loss through “cultural clash,” they were also attempts to foment and influence debate 
about Aboriginal policy in the public sphere. Elkin wrote, in his introduction to Harney’s 
1943 Taboo that: “almost every story in this book is a concrete illustration of the change 
wrought in the natives’ manner of life by contact with the white man and his ways, and of 
the disastrous consequences.”52 In introducing Taboo, he wrote that “we are formulating 
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new policies and methods designed to assist the . . . [aborigines] in adjusting themselves 
to the great changes we have wrought in their environment and manner of life.”53 
Harney’s and Elkin’s forays into popular accounts were essential to the latter’s vision for 
policy change. Where Elkin saw all his works as contributing to the education of 
administrators, missionaries, and the white population at large, popular accounts held a 
special role: 
The publication of books like my The Australian Aborigines: How to Understand 
Them and Citizenship for the Aborigines are of value to those whose interest has 
been aroused and who desire to know more, and perhaps would like to influence 
political, administrative or military action. Only comparatively few people, 
however, read books of this type; moreover, such books cannot present human 
beings as living personalities in a changing social situation. It is here that the short 
story and the novel come to our help.54 
Where the ethnographic texts were to “influence political, administrative or military 
action,” popular accounts could bring to life Aboriginal sociality, soliciting the sympathy 
of the wider community for the goals of assimilation. 
 In this way, Taboo narrated what was referred to by anthropologists and 
administrators as “cultural clash.” Harney’s narratives drew out the way contact between 
white settlers and Aboriginal people led to the dissolution of the latter’s culture; in the 
midst of this loss, Aboriginal people were seen to come adrift from this rich tradition and 
become the victims of white exploitation. While there is no doubt much truth in this 
representation, like many (post)colonial liberals of the time, Harney turned to 
assimilation as an answer to the problem of cultural clash. This viewpoint, while 
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skeptical of the veracity of the idea of a “doomed race” nonetheless also romanticized 
Aboriginal tradition and, in doing so, represented it as fixed and incapable of change and 
adaptation. For Harney, the only authentic Aboriginality was traditional Aboriginal 
custom, which was nonetheless to be modified: 
We protect our native only because they are a dying race. At first we 
despised them. Then, after a time, owing to this same weakness, we first 
exploited and then pitied them. Should they become strong and in their 
increase menace the white man’s prestige, ah! what a different tale we 
might tell. I may be wrong, but when I see them at their dances of increase 
and initiation, singing their old-time corroborees, and when I behold the 
ragged wretches hanging around the towns and station homesteads, their 
social structure crumbling round their heads, it is then I think to myself, 
‘Better this race to pass away leaving its tradition behind than for them to 
be sold into a life of slavery.’ Perhaps my narrow view of life cannot 
visualise the future, as do they who continually strive to assist these 
people to a better way of living.55 
While Harney ironizes the notion of the “dying race” by noting the potential fact of the 
“increase” of Aboriginal population, he nonetheless reinscribes the idea of a doomed race 
as a means to romanticize and fix traditional Aboriginality as a melancholic remnant, 
always already absented: “[b]etter this race to pass away” with its tradition intact than to 
be left a remnant of its former glory. However, Harney also hints that there are those who 
are attempting the modification of Aboriginal social life in order to “assist these people to 
a better way of living.” Harney’s assertion no doubt served to underscore Elkin’s 
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introductory promise of “new policies and methods.” He asserted that the modification 
and abolition of Aboriginal culture was a regrettable necessity, writing in Taboo: “[t]he 
Government authority bases its right on the belief that their natives’ only hope of survival 
lies in dropping their old customs and embracing the white man’s standard of living—a 
commendable scheme.”56 In this way, Harney indulged in the ideal of assimilation, even 
as he traded on (and no doubt genuinely held) nostalgic fixation on “natives” and “their 
old customs.” Assimilation, as it was presented to the public sphere, was not 
incompatible with a fetishization of a culture depicted as passing away. Cultural 
normativization was clearly capable of the fetish for an imagistic multiculturalism that 
nonetheless obscured the concrete normativization of extant institutions of Aboriginal 
cultural organization. 
 Elkin and Harney’s 1949 collaboration Songs of the Songmen: Aboriginal Myths 
Retold was so successful that many of their Anglophone renderings of Aboriginal song in 
verse were set to melodies and pressed to vinyl by Alfred Hill Music. Songs of the 
Songmen was a collaboration  which attempted to “present in verse the beliefs, myths, 
and customs of the Aborigines . . . [just] as the Aborigines have song specialists.”57 
Writing in request of a grant from the Commonwealth Literary Fund in 1948, Harney 
described his and Elkin’s Songs as “a complete outline of Aboriginal mentality based on 
their legends.”58 According to Elkin, the book was largely Harney’s making: “his was the 
conception and the first draft.” Elkin saw himself as adding to the craft and expert 
authenticity of the text. In his own terms, he “put the text through the finest of Aboriginal 
cultural sieves to ensure that it truly reflects native life and thought . . . for I do know the 
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Aboriginal culture and environment, and what we want to express.”59 Elkin and Harney 
were no exception to either Imperialist melancholia or colonialist plagiarism. 
They even fantasized themselves as becoming “elders” through their engagement 
with those they saw as remnants of an authentic cultural tradition. In 1952, Elkin 
remarked to Harney by mail that “the time may come when you and I will have to go 
bush and take our rightful place as elders and so give the tribes the privilege of feeding 
us.”60 The anthropologist-assimilationists, in the process of “modify[ing]” and 
“abolish[ing]” “native customs” according to the familial, social and cultural norms of 
the settler colonial nation, were also promoting the modified form of Aboriginality that 
was as much a product of this biopolitical process as it was of either the culture of the 
colonizer or colonized. This destructive alteration of native custom—made to suit the 
palette of the national public sphere—was also a process of melancholic nostalgia on the 
part of its agents. The tradition in which Elkin and Harney viewed themselves as “Elders” 
was their new assimilable form of Aboriginality. Though this perception is somewhat 
concealed in the published versions of their texts, the archive of their correspondence 
reveals the way their settler colonial literary productions were not only normativizations 
for the sake of their Aboriginal informants or their public but also for the benefit of their 
own egos. The sublation of settler identity into a newly constructed sense of nationalist 
belonging is a paradigm one finds in numerous settler writers of the period. As 
practitioners of colonialist plagiarism, settler writers frequently arrive at a self 
understanding of privileged belonging. As Elkin put it in the book’s introduction, “Mr 
Harney and I are fortunate in sharing with the Australian Aborigines what might be 
termed fellowship—a fellowship based on understanding, not on fictional and self-
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deluded ‘blood-brotherhood.’”61 Songs was to have been a well crafted translation, whose 
authorial hand would be undetectable, the authorial voice was to be a “secret” that 
“belongs to Mr Harney and myself: it is part of our ‘Dreaming.’ . . . [The] expression of 
Aboriginal philosophy and doctrine, are indeed our joint efforts.”62 The poet translators 
were to have a privileged place in the making of a settler public sphere steeped in the 
simultaneous plagiarism, modification, and promotion of indigenous culture. Divested of 
their organic relation to its owners, plagiarized versions of indigenous culture like the 
Songs sought to function as a basis for settler cultural rootedness. 
  This authorial privilege arrogated by the pair is evinced to a large in degree in the 
opening dedicatory poem to Songs. Titled “Our Dreaming,” the published version of the 
poem begins with an invocation, in its first stanza, of the relation of the author-translators 
to their text. As though the “our” of “our dreaming” refers to Elkin and Harney 
themselves, the first stanza positions them “Together,” in the present, hearkening back to 
Aboriginal tradition as its privileged translators: 
Together now we chant the ‘old time’ lays, 
Calling to mind camp-fires of bygone days. 
We hear the ritual shouts, the stamping feet, 
The droning didgeridoos, the waddies’ beat.63 
An unpublished 1943 revision, altered by Elkin, even more noticeably emphasizes the 
two authors’ claim on these texts---of which they primarily purport to be merely the 
translators. The poem is titled “To You My Friend” and the first line reads, “To you my 
friend I dedicate these lays,” as though Harney is addressing Elkin directly.64 The 
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dedication poem draws a distinct line between Aboriginal people as they lived at the time 
of writing and traditional Aboriginal society. Harney and Elkin would write  
Not of their huts, the bones, the dirt  
Of the mangy curs they will not hurt, 
 Nor the strange far look in a native’s eyes,  
As he looks to his country ‘ere he dies.65 
Rather than this vision of the apparently doomed “native,” which, we saw, Harney had 
also bemoaned in Taboo, Songs of the Songmen, would purport to extol the romantic 
figure of the pristine noble savage. The poem continued: 
Tis not of these we muse today:  
For the ‘Dreaming” comes, and we drift away 
Into myth and legend where we’ve caught 
The simple grandeur of their thought. 
In both versions, the closing lines claim that “we,” the author-translators with the secret 
“dreaming” of authorial voice have “caught / the simple grandeur of their thought,” 
where “their thought” designates that of the Aborigines.66 It is as though the pair’s poetry 
claimed to be able to salvage and recapture the “dreaming,” represented as no longer 
accessible to Aboriginal people themselves. Elkin and Harney were not merely cultural 
brokers, their correspondence reveals the degree to which the project of promoting 
Aboriginal culture through popular literature was bound up with the biopolitical project 
of assimilation and, in this way, premised on the modification of Aboriginal culture to 
meet the values and expectations of the mid-twentieth century Australian public. 
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“Physiographic Factors”: Biopolitics and Literary Nationalism 
Elkin and Harney had taken a bold foray into the literary, one which corresponds 
to Elkin’s vision of a modified assimilable Aboriginal tradition. While they were using 
“their influence or authority to have [Aboriginal customs] abolished or modified,” they 
were also using this influence to educate the public on this “modified” form of 
Aboriginality.  Simultaneously, a less anthropologically educated but equally (if not 
more) influential cadre of Australian literary and cultural nationalists were in the process 
of interfacing with the place of Aboriginality in the nation. While these figures had less 
of an impact on policy than such anthropologist reformers as Elkin, they nonetheless 
professed an “aptitude for ordering men and things” which attempted to provide a vision 
of the place of Aboriginality in the nativist poetics of a settler Australian aesthetic logic. 
In disseminating the meaning of Aboriginality to the settler nation, the literary project of 
cultural nationalism operated as the correlative to cultural assimilation. While cultural 
assimilation operated to modify Aboriginality, literary appropriation of Aboriginality 
attempted to modify settler social life in relation to a more or less spurious idea of “the 
native.” 
Xavier Herbert and P. R. Stephensen were two key participants in the literary 
nationalism of the day. As I opened by noting, after its first two installments had been 
published in The Australian Mercury, P. R. Stephensen’s The Foundations of Culture in 
Australia: An Essay Toward National Self Respect was circulated in book form by W. J. 
Miles. Population was a central question in Stephensen’s treatise, alongside ideas of race 
and physiographic adaptation. Herbert would echo the question of population in his 
masterpiece Capricornia. Opening its second chapter, Herbert remarked on the racial 
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makeup of the imaginary northern population of his novel: “So slow was the settling of 
Port Zodiac district that in the year 1904 the non-native population numbered no more 
than three thousand, a good half of which was Asiatic, and the settled area measured but 
three or four square miles.”67 With its concern over the intersection of population and 
race, Herbert’s novel and Stephensen’s essay functioned as the medium for 
assimilationist promotion sought by Elkin. 
While assimilation was emerging as federal policy in Canberra, Herbert was 
emerging as a famed literary figure with Capricornia’s 1938 publication and subsequent 
success in the Sesquicentenary Literary Prize. Capricornia’s paternalistic take on the 
Imperialist social problem novel was recongized by H. G. Wells, who, on reading the 
tome, promptly sent Herbert a congratulatory note. Wells’s also public promoted 
Capricornia by taking out an announcement of his esteem for it in a 1939 issue of the 
Daily Telegraph.68  More locally, Herbert’s novel was recommended to Elkin by Harney, 
who declared that: “Capricornia . . . is indeed a grand book and embodies the spirit of the 
cultural clash.”69   
Like many of their lettered contemporaries, Herbert and Stephensen were 
developing ideas about the connection between Aboriginality, racial “science,” and the 
making of an independent Australian literature and culture. Stephensen and Miles were 
advocates of the idea of an analogy between the physical body and the body politic put 
forward by Morley Roberts in his 1938 essay Bio-Politics.70 An Englishman, Roberts had 
spent some time in Australia as a young man in the 1870s. His essay argued that the 
analogy of the corporeal, of fitness, and of pathology was the most effective means to 
think the nation. Statesmen, he argued, should be educated in biology and he offered a 
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long meditation on the aptness of the metaphor. In the early 1940s, Stephensen had 
whimsically written in his journal of an ideal plan for the education of Australian 
statesmen. They should have to read Plato, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Roberts. 
For Stephensen, the idea of the nation as a social body was essential to the formation of 
truly nationalist independence in a settler colony like Australia. Not only was Stephensen 
eager to promote Australian cultural independence, but to do so through as sustained 
engagement with what he saw as biological and “physiographic” human characteristics. 
According to Stephensen’s biographer, Craig Munro, the publisher and man of 
letters not only indulged in eugenic theory, but also possessed a lay familiarity with 
developments in physical anthropology and a particular investment in theories about the 
diffusion of the human species. While it is unclear whether Stephensen was aware of 
Tindale’s or Cleland’s ideas about the “Aboriginal caucasian,” he was certainly aware of 
the work of Carl Tüber who had published findings in 1932 claiming that human life 
originated in Australia. In his novel, Bushwackers, Stephensen’s character Dr Morpeth 
would become the mouthpiece for some of his resultant views on the place of race in 
Australia: “On the Australian plains Man learned to walk upright! Then he crossed to 
India, the home of the Aryan race . . . The Aryan race began in Australia. Australia is the 
original home of the white man.”71 As Munro puts it, this view of human evolution 
“allowed Stephensen a vision of Australia that saw it depicted as both the oldest and the 
newest frontier of human civilization, linking the original Aborigines and white Anglo-
Saxon settlers across time.”72 For Stephensen, not only was colonization of Australia the 
white man’s destiny but this destiny also tied the culturally independent settler nation to 
the parallel fate of Aboriginal Australians. This understanding of racial destiny led 
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Stephensen’s journal the Publicist to support the policy of absorption despite widespread 
public outcry against its methodology of miscegenation.73 Ironically, Stephensen also 
worked with the Aborigines Progressive Association on organizing the protest against the 
Sesquicentenary Celebrations.74 Needless to say, Stephensen’s attitude toward the 
“Aboriginal question” was complex, particularly when nativism, Australian 
independence, and the concerns of Aboriginal people coalesced. He repeatedly insisted 
on the place of Aboriginal people in his and the Publicist’s vision for nation, even as it 
was cultural nationalism with its bulwarks of homogeneity and independence that were 
the emphases to which he most repeatedly returned. In his earlier rhetorical statements 
about Aboriginal people, Stephensen had embraced a stance less oriented toward the 
citizen rights of living Aboriginal people in favor of a more paternalistic stance; he 
included in a 1934 Press Release on the manifesto of a proposed new magazine designed 
to promote the “Preservation and study of Aborigines.”75 As his influential Essay shows, 
however, it was the contribution that Aboriginality could—through assimilation—make 
to national independence that most occupied Stephensen. 
Stephensen was interested in the long term effects of racial admixture and 
Lamarckian transformation on the future settler population of Australia. In The 
Foundations of Culture, he wrote “[c]ulture in Australia, if it ever develops indigenously, 
begins not from the Aborigines, who have been suppressed and exterminated, but from 
British culture, brought hither by Englishmen, Irishmen, and Scotsmen through the 
Nineteenth Century.”76 The capacity for settler Australians to identify their own 
independence would rely on a biological transformation of European stock; as the book’s 
opening credo went: “[a] new nation, a new human type, is being formed in Australia.”77 
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For Stephensen as for the absorptionists, the presence of “Aboriginal blood”—in 
Herbert’s words—was not, or should not have been, a source of anxiety. Where 
Stephensen saw “America” as a “racial hotch-potch” of “Negro, Asiatic, and Red 
Aboriginal elements,” his assent to the idea of the Aboriginal as Aryan, led him to the 
notion that Australia could support a new “human type” adapted to the antipodean 
environment.78 While “concrete” political action and “control of the political system of 
the Commonwealth,” would be needed to attain literary and cultural nationalism’s 
immediate goals, for Stephensen, there was also a Nationalist “argument from physical 
Geography.”79 While “physiographic factors work slowly . . . Ultimately the Australian 
race will be quite different from the ‘English’ race and hence Australian literature will be 
quite different from the merely English literature, of England.”80 The attitude toward 
racial descent that Stephensen acquired from his reading of Tüber meant taking seriously 
Aboriginal blood as well as settler “physiographic” change in envisioning the hybridity 
that could undergird a future homogeneous and independent national culture. For 
Stephensen, it was the milieu of the Australian environment combined with an argument 
for the racial “Aryanism” of both Aboriginals and Anglo-Saxons that ensured the national 
futurity of Australian independence from Britain. For Stephensen, the embrace of the 
Aborigines question did not necessarily refuse the possibility that hope was lost for the 
native “suppressed and exterminated.” The cultural contribution of living Aboriginal 
people seems, for Stephensen, to have been valuable primarily as a means to a nationalist 
end. 
Elkin was an almost iconic figure to many cultural nationalists. He was the living 
inheritor of the anthropological tradition that many of the settler nativist writers perused: 
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a tradition consisting of such eminent predecessors as Walter Baldwin Spencer and T. G. 
H. Strehlow. The poet and literary editor Rex Ingamells visited Elkin in the late 1940s.81 
Shortly after the publication of Songs of the Songmen, Harney also recommended Rex 
Ingamells’s Selected Poems to Elkin noting that the poet “has some fine thoughts about 
our old people.”82 “Us Poets,” Harney writes, “should keep abreast of the moderns.”83 As 
sympathetic as he was, the Aboriginal people who made up Harney’s subjects were 
primarily of value as “our old people” —his and Elkin’s. What were Ingamells “ideas 
about the ‘old people?’” It is worth positioning Ingamells not only as a poet revered by 
the duo of anthropological assimilationists (themselves popular writers) but also in 
relation to other cultural nationalists.  In 1937, while Elkin and Harney were musing on 
the modifiability and assimilability of Aboriginal social life, Ingamells was following 
Stephensen in considering the influence of the Australian environment and its native 
people on a possible future literary and cultural nationalism. This moment saw the birth 
of the movement Ingamells termed “Jindyworobak”—in many ways, the apotheosis of 
settler (post)colonial plagiarism. 
Stephensen’s ideas about environmental influence and the production of a new 
Australian “human type” were highly influential, particularly among the Jindyworobak 
literary movement of which Ingmells was the leader. Ingamells was “vividly impressed” 
by Stephensen’s essay, but also complained that it was “not Australian enough.”84 
Ingamells was more directly impressed by Aboriginal tradition than Stephensen had 
been; the former named his burgeoning movement for an Aboriginal word meaning “to 
join.”85 Ingamells appears to have taken and accentuated Stephensen’s notion of 
“physiographic factors” in producing a “new human type” in Australia; Ingamell’s term 
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for this transformation of settler biology was “environmental values.” While Neville and 
his colleagues were deciding upon the mode by which Aboriginal people were to be 
“absorbed” into the white population of the Commonwealth, Ingamells was publishing 
his first ideas about the relationship between Aboriginal influence, environmental factors, 
and the making of an independent Australian literature. This was the source of the 
metaphor of joining. For Ingamells, 
The Jindyworobaks, I say, are those individuals who are endeavouring to 
free Australian art from whatever alien influences trammel it, that is, to 
bring it into proper contact with its material. They are the few who 
seriously realize that an Australian culture depends on the fulfilment and 
sublimation of certain definite conditions, namely:  
1. A clear recognition of environmental values.  
2. The debunking of much nonsense.  
3. An understanding of Australia's history and traditions, primaeval, 
colonial, and modern.86  
Ingamell’s notion of “environmental values,” was more explicit than Stephensen’s earlier 
ideas in asserting the necessity of the white settler adoption of Aboriginal tradition as a 
precondition of national consciousness. He declared that 
[w]hen I see wommeras, spears, bullroarers, boomerangs, dillybags, 
message sticks, tjurungas and wax figures in the Aboriginal sections of our 
museums, and when I read scientific treatises and pioneer reminiscences 
dealing with Aboriginal occultism, funeral rites, initiation ceremonies and 
so on; I am strongly conscious, often unhappily so, of much in our 
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colonial tradition. As a people it is our duty to be familiar with these 
things. In them must spread the roots of our culture. Our culture must 
make artistic realizations of these things and the spirit permeating and 
engendered by them acceptable to the world.87 
Yet the fact that Ingamells has only encountered these things in “museums” indicates the 
degree to which Aboriginal influence was to be an inheritance of “spirit” that did not 
challenge the thanatopolitical idea that Australia’s indigenous people made up a “doomed 
race.” Ingamells confirms this as he writes that “[a]lthough such a culture has itself, for 
the most part, died with the tribes, something of its spirit has been preserved.”88  
This notion of environmental influence, with its veiled relation to racial 
transformation, was not merely a passing fancy of individual writers like Stephensen and 
Ingamells. Strehlow, in a 1948 Jindyworobak retrospective publication wrote that: 
Science has pointed out to us that man has managed to reach every part of 
the globe and to live in every type of environment mainly by adapting 
himself to his environment and by making the fullest use of its natural 
resources. I believe that Australian writers, using the same principle will 
in the future come more and more to love their country, its trees, its 
flowers, its animals, and its physical features.89 
Novelist Dymphna Cusack, in her contribution to the same retrospective appreciation, 
made the explicit connection to the influence that contemporary anthropology had on 
such literary movements. Jindyworobak, she wrote, was “an aesthetic application of the 
discoveries of modern anthropology and psychology.”90 Nationalist men of letters like 
Stephensen and Ingamells not only crafted the relation between Australian nationalism 
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and indigenous culture through incidental means but in rapport with their—often 
partial—understanding of the contemporary “discoveries” of “anthropology,” 
“psychology,” and native administration. 
 
Euraustralian Story  
If Stephensen underemphasized the role of Aboriginality, and Ingamells 
unquestioningly retained the idea of the “passing of the Aborigines,” Herbert, as we have 
seen, avowed a notion of “Euraustralian” hybridity.  Similarly, if both Stephensen and 
Ingamells were less explicit about assimilation, Herbert came closer to avowing its 
techniques of protection and intervention—if not its vision of Aboriginal disappearance. 
Unlike his literary nationalist colleagues, Herbert had actually served as a functionary of 
the Native Administration in Darwin, if only briefly. For Harney, Herbert’s book 
reflected the fact that “apathy in regards to native affairs is noticeable here in the NT. 
They use the Abo problem here not to study the native but to make a job for themselves 
& the more sympathy one has for the native, or if one tries to understand them, he is 
regarded in these parts with suspicion.”91 Herbert’s imagined project of a hybrid nation 
was not only premised on the equal citizenship of Aboriginal Australians which he 
proclaimed in the letter I earlier cited. It was also an appeal to contemporary racial 
science as to the degree to which hybridity might transform the settler population by 
“enrich[ing] the new Nation with [Aboriginal] blood.”  Herbert’s vision of founding a 
“Euraustralian” league responded to the so-called “Aborigines problem,” by embracing 
Aboriginal “blood” as a necessary physiognomic dimension of the “found[ing of] a 
Nation.” 
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For his part, Herbert also believed himself an expert on the anthropological views 
of the time. On 27 April 1936, he wrote to his friend Arthur Dibley with a scheme to 
auto-didactically study the texts of the University of Sydney’s course in Anthropology, 
complete a paper and “request . . . an honorary diploma or some such recognition.”92 In a 
subsequent letter, Herbert represented himself as possessing some “ordinary 
anthropological knowledge,” as gained from the normal course of acting as 
Superintendent of Kahlin Compound; Herbert, it seems, accepted the contemporary 
premise that anthropology and administration went together. Herbert also convinced 
Elkin to recommend him as a Patrol Officer in the Administration, though he later turned 
the position down.93 He was also privy to some of the ethnographic documents, which 
Harney was supplying to Elkin. Harney asked permission to show this information to his 
novelist acquaintance: “X Herbert has expressed a desire to see all the abo data that I 
have left with you and I would deem it a favour if you would let him read them.”94 Elkin 
evidently consented, as these documents appear to have remained in Herbert’s possession 
until he eventually donated them to the University of Queensland along with his other 
papers.95 Herbert no doubt employed Harney’s ethnographic papers as source materials; 
Aboriginal character names occurring as late as Herbert’s final Poor Fellow My Country 
were evidently suggested by charts of Anula and Mudbura kinship systems which Harney 
had gathered for Elkin from inmates of the Bathurst and Melville Island Mission. 
Herbert’s idea of assimilation was eugenic, but differed from the eugenics of the 
native administration he abhorred. Herbert saw, in assimilation, an opportunity not for the 
disappearance of the Aboriginal people as a “race”—the way the earlier natal-
thanatopolitical “Protectors” had—but rather, as a form of transformative hybridity that 
227	  
	  
would strengthen the settler individual and produce a national culture. In the 1930s, we 
saw, Herbert explicitly viewed the goal of nationalism as reliant on “the enrichment of 
the new Nation with [Aboriginal] blood” —a line of thinking that corresponded to the 
racial taxonomy of the absorptionists. Similarly, he did not see the administration and 
surveillance of Aboriginal people on governmental lines as inimical to his nativist desire 
to belong to the country as authentically as its indigenous population. In a letter of mid-
1936 to Stephensen praising The Foundations of Culture, Herbert confessed that he 
“dream[ed] of being made a patrol officer, so that I may go right home to the old people 
and become one of them.”96 For Herbert, a place in the Aboriginal administration is 
obscurely connected to the idea of nativist identification.  
Where histories of biopolitical intervention operate through the regulation of 
colonized populations through miscegenation—whether the goal is thanatopolitical or 
not—it may not be possible to decouple their ends from those of an ostensibly 
benevolent, apparently unrelated, but in fact correspondent cultural politics of hybridity. 
As Graham Huggan has recently argued,  
The problem is not, as some might see it, how to turn the prohibitionary 
rhetoric of ‘miscegenation’ into the permissive possibilities of ‘hybridity.’ 
It is rather that hybridity itself is an inadequate mechanism for 
counteracting a white-colonial racial imaginary; indeed hybridity might 
well be seen as part of the very white-colonial racial imaginary it is often 
called upon to dissolve.97 
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Herbert’s idea of a hybrid nation was rooted in blood. Herbert’s literary logic bears a 
remarkable correspondence to certain tendencies in cultural assimilationist policy, and 
like cultural assimilation itself, Herbert’s logic does not eschew the idea of blood, race, 
and inherited characteristics.  
It is difficult to ascertain the degree to which Herbert was aware of the taxonomic 
claims about racial descent proffered by such physical anthropologists as Cleland. 
Herbert’s vision of national enrichment through miscegenation clearly embraces the 
value of Aboriginality in a way that absorptionist rhetoricians like Neville did not. In a 
1937 letter from the Kahlin Compound to A.P. Elkin, Herbert had remarked that “the 
Euraustralian is a very fine type of young man.”98 The year before, he had proposed to 
Stephensen what would eventually become Poor Fellow My Country in the postscript to a 
long letter praising The Foundations of Culture: “Someday I shall write ‘True 
Commonwealth’, a vast tale of the Euraustralians and the birth of the happiest nation on 
Earth and some day I shall father a Euraustralian so as to truly root myself in this dear 
earth and so as to legitimize my bastard whitefella genius.”99 For Herbert, this imaginary 
fathering of a “Euraustralian” was apparently fundamental to the project of settler literary 
independence and legitimacy. His vision of a future nation is as tied to miscegenation, as 
was that of the assimilationists he often opposed and criticised.100 It would do to track the 
trajectory of this project from Herbert’s Capricornia to Poor Fellow My Country. I will 
not endeavour to provide exhaustive readings of either text, but rather to emphasise the 
correspondence of Herbert’s literary project to a positive paternalistic racism of hybridity 
that recalls certain elements of assimilation’s biopolitics. Both Capricornia and Poor 
Fellow My Country can be read as tragedies of colonial contact and cultural clash. While 
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the former recounts the “Euraustralian’s” lack of acceptance by the white community, the 
latter bemoans the tragic loss of the “Euraustralian” ideal. 
In part a family epic, Capricornia moves from a mythic description of the 
founding of northern Australian settlement to tell the story of the arrival of brothers Mark 
and Oscar Shillingsworth in the imagined region of Capricornia. Oscar earns respect in 
the civil service and establishes the family as successful cattle-farmers, while Mark is 
drawn into the alcohol-fuelled exploitation of Aboriginal women by the working class 
men he befriends. As a result of his transgressions, a part-Aboriginal son is born. Initially 
named “Nawnim”—an (imagined) Aboriginal word for “no name”—the child is first 
embraced and just as quickly abandoned by his father. Left in the care of his uncle, 
Nawnim, re-named the more normative homophone Norman passes through the novel 
believing himself not to be of Aboriginal descent but South East Asian, a “Javanese 
prince.” Enabled by his and the government’s lack of knowledge of his Aboriginality, 
Norman is able to attain an education as an engineer and to partially pass in white 
Capricornian society. Yet his dark complexion leaves him nonetheless an outsider within 
his father’s polite social circles. On learning of his Aboriginality, Norman wanders 
Capricornia in search of the truth of his identity, taking a lover in “half-caste” Tock Lace 
and becoming implicated in a murder he did not commit. Ultimately, the novel turns from 
comic satire to the tragic death of Tocky as a generic emplotment of Norman’s 
abandonment between two cultures.  
 In Capricornia, Herbert would emplot discussions of Aboriginal policy which 
framed both his views on and his frustrations with the Aboriginal administration of the 
time. The first of these dialogical moments occurs as Oscar worries over how he is to 
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raise Nawnim/Norman. The second concerns Norman’s own acceptance of himself as 
Aboriginal. The novel’s Peter Differ, father of several children by Aboriginal women, 
advises Oscar to take an assimilationist view on Norman’s upbringing, even as this 
viewpoint is framed as an unproblematic avowal of his self conception. He insists that the 
“Binghis are really highly intelligent  . . . Trouble is the white man won’t teach ’em 
anything that might raise ’em a bit.”101 Shillingsworth objects with thanatopolitical 
rhetoric—“it’s not much use worrying about them now. They’re dying out” —to which 
Differ rejoins by reference to a rhetoric of the transformation of the rising population ( 
“thousands and thousands of them”) through education.102 “Send ’em [to school],” Differ 
insists, “[k]eep at it generation after generation. Don’t look for immediate results.”103 The 
rhetoric of “generations”—of the future of the colonised as a eugenic speculation—
reveals that the focus on cultural transformation that defined assimilation is also 
imbricated in a biopolitical logic of intervention into population.  
One key thread of Capricornia’s narrative concerns Norman’s gradual acceptance 
of and pride in his Aboriginality. This narrative thread comes to fruition in the second 
key discussion of the book between Andy McRandy and Norman, with Mark 
Shillingsworth, in his persona as Jack Ramble, looking on. Like Differ (and, indeed, 
Harney, whom Herbert knew) McRandy is a “combo,” through whom Herbert articulates 
his vision for Euraustralian “genius,” with its form of “bastard” hybridity. Indeed, one 
might consider the degree to which Herbert’s characters of wisdom and insight are 
frequently those who marry Aboriginal women. Herbert does not cover over the degree to 
which such men were, in reality, often ignoble and sexually exploitative. For instance, 
Mark Shillingsworth himself is a white absentee father. However, I would suggest that 
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Differ and McRandy, embody Herbert’s idealisation of ‘bastard whitefella genius’ 
through fathering Euraustralian children. As such, the dialogues hardly take place 
between the voice of Aboriginal culture and a settler who might learn from it. Rather, it 
becomes bastard white-fellow genius that acts as the proper pedagogue of indigeneity. 
During the dialogue, Norman is questioned by McRandy as to the source of his 
sensitivity about his pedigree: “What have you got to be ashamed of ’em about?”104 
McRandy then launches into what appears a long defence of Aboriginal tradition: “If you 
know anything about the Binghis in their native state, you can’t help but honour ’em, 
unless you’re a fool.”105 This defence culminates in an avowal of the future of the “new 
Nation” and of Aboriginality’s place in it. McRandy’s argument is reminiscent of 
Cleland’s ethos. Where Cleland could predict a hybrid future through “a scientific 
breeding and education program,” McRandy insists that  
the day’ll come in your own time when your Old People’ll be recognized as our 
Old People too, as the Fathers of the Nation, and’ll be raised to a place of honour. 
No exaggeration. There’s signs of it now. Twenty years ago they was killing off 
the Binghis around here like Dingoes. The Government didn’t mind at all … The 
people of Australia are waking up to the fact that they’ve got a responsibility in 
Brother Binghi.106 
Not only does Herbert position Aboriginal tradition as the basis for a future national 
culture, he also reflects on and avows the transition from frontier violence to the 
discourse of protection and assimilation: the future of “Brother Binghi” is a 
“responsibility” that registers with the making of a future nation. The telos of assimilation 
and the vindication of the “Old People” is to provide a foundation for the new nation. Yet 
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Norman—both an educated engineer, raised by a white family, and “racially” of 
Aboriginal descent—comes to this Aboriginality through the very frame of the novel 
itself: bastard whitefella genius, indexed by Herbert’s pretensions as author, and the 
correlative sphere of the Jindyworobaks. Aboriginality emerges as a tradition that is to be 
known and redeployed among indigenous peoples through a frame given by its settler 
appropriation. Made safe for cultural nationalism from all that was “repugnant,” 
“savage,” and unassimilable, Aboriginality can be returned to people of Aboriginal 
descent on the pedagogical scene enacted by Differ (and Herbert). 
Herbert scholar Sean Monahan observes, “for all McRandy’s praise for 
Aboriginal tradition, there is no suggestion that it has anything to teach white Australia. It 
is not Norman’s Aboriginality that provides hope for the future but his genius for white 
technology.”107 Herbert’s contemporary statements outside the text challenge the reading 
that his use of McRandy’s voice reveals no role for Aboriginality in white Australia; still, 
Monahan’s point remains salient in light of Herbert’s emphasis on the effect that 
Aboriginal “blood” will have on the settler subject and the new nation. For Herbert, we 
saw, fathering a child by an Aboriginal mother is a legitimisation of his self-described 
“bastard whitefella genius” This act would transform the cultural cringe of illegitimate 
bastardry into a new hybrid identity independent of Britain. In this way, “Aboriginal 
blood” enriches Norman’s “whitefella genius.” Where Cleland envisaged a hybrid 
utopianism for which living Aboriginality would be merely a memory, Norman learns 
pride in his Aboriginal ancestry, bolstering the future “bastard” genius that, as Herbert’s 
letters reveal, is nonetheless the eugenic undergirding of a future nation-state. Norman’s 
apprehension of pride from McRandy is thus vested in a vision of futurity reminiscent of 
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that held by such assimilationists as Cleland. While that future day may involve 
“Aboriginal ancestry,” and appropriation of the ways of the “Old People,” it also involves 
the inscription of whiteness. For McRandy (as for Neville and Cleland) “colour” has no 
place in the future. Only a page after his praise for “Brother Binghi,” he turns to make 
explicit the eugenic and racializing rhetoric already implicit his praise for socio-cultural 
assimilation: “The black feller ain’t a Negroid type. His colour’s only skin-deep. Three 
cross-breedin’s and you’ll get the colour right out, with never the risk of a throw-back.”108 
Differ has become the pedagogue of bastard genius, capable of properly instructing a 
normativized Aboriginality. This normed form of indigenous knowledge and self-
conception can then be retaught to a future “race” whose hybridity secures national 
independence. The avowal of Aboriginality then becomes a desire for independence that 
is happy to dissolve indigeneity into itself. What is perhaps more unsettling than the loss 
of an ideal past indigenous object (an ideology with its own troubling limits) is that the 
only custodian and pedagogue of Aboriginal knowledge is presented as gardiya, white. 
Like the vision of absorption’s natal-thanatopolitics, both of Herbert’s major 
“Aboriginal” novels end with the death of an Aboriginal character and, by extension, the 
figural tragedy of the death of a certain element of Aboriginality. After Norman is 
acquitted of Frank McLash’s murder, he returns to Red Ochre Station to rebuild his life. 
There, in the novel’s closing lines, he discovers, in the stocktanks, “[a] human skull – no 
– two – a small one and a tiny one . . .  Tocky and her baby!” (448). Where Norman 
survives to build the new nation on the combination of his sublation of Aboriginality and 
white “bastard” genius, his “half-caste” lover Tocky and their infant die as a tragic result 
of the inability of the law to police such combos as McLash and such part-Aboriginal and 
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part-“Asiatics” as Charles Ket. This tragic ending can be read as a specific indictment of 
the administration of the time; an administration of which Herbert was a vehement critic. 
However, reading through the lens of biopolitical correspondence, one can also see the 
death of Tocky as the condition of Norman’s sublation. While Tocky is depicted as a 
failed subject of assimilation and a victim of the Aboriginal compound, Norman’s 
successful assimilation and his reconciliation with his father can be read as the parallel 
conditions for his survival. In their dialogue, Differ corrects Oscar for his assertion that 
Norman’s whitened racial inheritance is “submerged” (70). Norman emerges as a white 
part-Aboriginal with a future in the “new Nation,” whereas Tocky is sacrificed to the 
thanatopolitics of race. As Monahan argued, it is Norman’s whiteness that is emphasised. 
The tragedy of “Capricornian” society is that it will not recognise the future potential of 
the “Euraustralian.” Norman’s Aboriginality is de-emphasised, it is able to “enrich” with 
its “blood” but, as McRandy underlines: “you’ll get the colour right out, with never the 
risk of a throw-back.” Herbert’s sacrifice of Tocky and his further redemption of Norman 
imply that, in this vision, Aboriginal survival is less significant than the degree to which 
Aboriginality can “enrich the new Nation with [its] blood.”  
This fetishization of a hybridity put to the service of whiteness is confirmed as, 
later in his career, Herbert would depict the loss of a possible hybrid, or creole, Australia 
as a tragedy. This tragic mode operates in his late work as a past conditional. In 1976’s 
Poor Fellow My Country, Jeremy Delacy, the white patriarch and grandfather of the part-
Aboriginal protagonist Prindy, tells a visiting cattle inspector, 
‘In my opinion a beautiful breed of people could have been created if only our 
forefathers’d had the courage to breed with the Aborigines like men, instead of 
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dirty little boys … and one that would have loved the land because they truly 
belonged to it . . .’ Jeremy launched into his subject of what Australia might have 
been as a Creole nation.109  
The hybrid potential of a new “breed of people” is the source of this tragic conditional 
past nation that might have been, but has failed to achieve fruition. Herbert’s late work 
draws inspiration from the tragic failure of racial hybridity that he, in the 1930s, had seen 
as the potential font of nationhood.  
Monahan has emphasized the development of Herbert’s politics from the 
assimilationist Capricornia to Prindy’s agency or his “rown road” in Poor Fellow My 
Country. There remain, however, a number of assimilationist strategies and 
thanatopolitical imaginaries occluded in this reading. The closing deaths of the latter 
novel reinscribe and even accentuate a view of hybridity undergirded by the death of 
Aboriginality—a loss given the tone of a tragedy, but a death nonetheless. At Poor 
Fellow My Country’s close, the two protagonists, Delacy and Prindy, are killed when 
Delacy interrupts Prindy’s initiation ceremony. Whereas Prindy’s death signals the 
failure of the part Aboriginal to produce an effective hybrid identity for the new nation, 
the close of the novel brings about Herbert’s desired legitimisation of ‘bastard whitefella 
genius’ in Delacy’s death. In Prindy’s death, Delacy’s alienation from true hybrid 
Australianness is sublated and overcome as he finds himself rooted in the soil, as he has 
so desired through the novel. He declares with his dying breath, “to die . . . like this . . . 
but . . . how better? The debt . . . the . . . the ancient debt . . . paid . . . Old Yalmaru . . . 
come . . . get me . . .”110  It is as if, as Huggan suggested, the appropriation of Aboriginal 
culture through assimilation aims to produce an authentic nativism for the white 
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inhabitants of the settler colony. In the face of this nativist appropriation, Aborigines of 
mixed descent are destined to death, alienation, and to act as the conduit for this 
“bastard” desire for rootedness. Prindy’s and Jeremy’s deaths symbolically guarantee a 
future hybridity of spirit for the Australian nation, one supplied by the maintenance of 
traditional Aboriginal custom. Yet, this vision of hybridity sacrifices the young 
Aboriginal protagonist Prindy in order to transmute his death into the spiritually 
meaningful death of the white settler. Prindy’s death marks the meeting of Delacy with 
his whitefella Yalmaru (spirit double); in Herbert’s imagining, it is Delacy whose spirit 
transcends these deaths and he finally finds himself at home on the soil of which he is an 
invader. It is Delacy who benefits from hybridity; Prindy merely dies. Poor Fellow My 
Country reiterates a spectral trace of the logic of the doomed race by marking the death of 
the part-Aboriginal child as a means to the end of the cultural appropriation of 
Aboriginality qua settler rootedness. Monahan stresses the relative agency displayed by 
Herbert’s Aboriginal characters and sees this as an index of the transformation of 
Herbert’s awareness of race between Capricornia and Poor Fellow My Country. His 
discussion also risks uncritically reifying Herbert’s hybrid vision while failing to observe 
adequately the degree to which it ghosts and repeats an assimilationist vision of 
miscegenation. Monahan comes closest to this uncritical avowal of Herbert’s nationalism 
when he, for instance, writes “the half-caste hero Prindy … offers symbolic hope for an 
Australia in which new and old can join in productive harmony.”111 According to this 
reading, Herbert’s success as a settler writer depicting Aboriginal people is evaluated by 
the very logic that reproduces the biopolitical norms discussed in the first part of this 
essay. Precisely because Aboriginality is appreciated as something to be transvalued for 
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the benefit of settler Australian subjects, Herbert’s novels refuse to establish a legitimate 
place for Aboriginality on its own terms.  
The generic device of tragedy must be connected to the persistent spectre not only 
of the doomed race theory but also of the thanatopolitical conception that Aboriginality 
could be bred out of the life of the nation. While, as we have seen, Herbert did not 
necessarily share Neville’s vision of an Australian future wherein Aboriginality would be 
forgotten, he did subscribe to an assimilationist hybridity reminiscent of Cleland’s ideas. 
By closing with the transvalued spiritual death of Jeremy Delacy, Poor Fellow My 
Country, even more fully than Capricornia, embeds its exploration of Aboriginal custom 
in a crypto-assimilationist logic, wherein the primary goal of writing Aboriginality is to 
emphasise settler hybridity as the basis for cultural independence. The pervasiveness of 
the doomed race theory, its transformation into a natal-thanatopolitics, and the 
disciplinary function of miscegenation and stolen children cast a heavy shadow on 
otherwise “well-intentioned” (so to speak) texts by settler writers of the time. The limits 
of Herbert’s empathy lie in the form of hybridity immanent to his project and this reflects 
the assimilationist programs of his time. It is significant also that Herbert did not 
successfully emplot this idea of ‘bastard whitefella genius’ through the appropriation of 
Aboriginality until his later novel, even though, as we see, he had been developing the 
notion since the late 1930s. Where Monahan sees Poor Fellow My Country as more 
successful in its depiction of Aboriginality, I would suggest that its return to tragedy with 
the death of the ‘half-caste hero’ confirms how insistent the thanatopolitical influence 
was on even Herbert’s later writing. As a cultural imaginary, the thanatopolitical trope of 
the doomed race outlasts assimilation itself, passing into the public sphere via texts like 
238	  
	  
Poor Fellow My Country and Nicholas Roeg’s 1971 film Walkabout, which closes with 
the suicide of David Gulpillil’s character (credited only as “black boy”). 
Stephensen’s vision of a “new human type” for a future white Australia indicates 
that his idea of national futurity may well have shared its telos with aspects of the 
absorptionist worldview: if not that of Aboriginal disappearance, certainly that of the 
value of hybridity that privileges the cultural identity of the settler. Herbert’s view of the 
Aboriginal place in the nation is more assured: his emphasis on ‘combo-ism’ and 
miscegenation orients towards a positive vision of hybridity, while he also stressed, like 
the Jindyworobaks, the cultural legitimacy of the settler appropriating Aboriginal motifs. 
Yet, as I have tried to show, these aspects of Herbert’s project also risked reiterating the 
assimilationist and absorptionist logics that we find in the policy frameworks of the time. 
This correspondence establishes the uncomfortable relationship between Australian 
literary nationalism and a peculiarly settler biopolitics that continues to inform visions of 
a (post)colonial Australia. 
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Chapter 5 
Panoptic Recurrence: 
Evaluation, Artifactuality, and Indigenous Endurance. 
 
 
The perception of many Australians of an Aboriginal person will no doubt be influenced by 
stereotypical images of dark skinned Aboriginal persons in outback Australia 
Bromberg J, Eatock v Bolt [2011] FCA 1103. Summary. [190]. 
 
These moments are especially troublesome for indigenous subjects. Indigenous persons face the 
demand that they desire and identify in a way that just so happens, in an uncanny convergence of 
interests, to fit the national imaginary of the traditional Aboriginal person.1 
Elizabeth Povinelli 
 
Moments of adjudication on identity are troublesome for indigenous subjects. Such 
moments mark discourses of identity across the fourth world, particularly where evaluations of 
identity and belonging circulate in the public sphere of settler (post)colonies. These events are 
often enmeshed in tense adjudications wherein settler subjects claim the authority to recognize or 
disavow social worlds that subsist in the late liberal era—an era in which economic individualism 
and nuclear familial social worlding has surged up as the normative more than ever before.2 This 
essay explores the way modes of governmentality emergent within colonial liberalism return as 
240	  
	  
artifacts in the mass media of the late liberal multicultural moment.3  In doing so, the essay 
delineates the relation between the endurance of alternative collectivities and their evaluation by 
settler colonial subjects. Strategies of gazing and surveillance persist to inform these evaluations 
in settler colonial public spheres. In Australia one finds the return of such a gaze, smuggled back 
from the most intense era of governmentality: the white Australia policy period from roughly 
1901 to 1966. Thinking through these recent moments of governmentality’s subterranean 
recurrence in the mass media allows us to unpack the shifting terrain within which settler social 
imaginaries recognize, misrecognize, or fail entirely to recognize representations of social forms 
and the identifications that emerge from them. 
Between March and August of 2009, a series of articles were syndicated across the 
Herald and Weekly Times banner—newspapers owned by Rupert Murdoch’s News Limited 
Corporation. Penned by conservative columnist Andrew Bolt, the articles employed a wide range 
of false or misleading  imputations about indigenous artists, intellectuals, writers, activists, and 
other public figures.4 These indigenous people were of mixed descent and did not readily conjure 
“stereotypical images of dark skinned Aboriginal persons in outback Australia.” As such, their 
identifications implicitly challenged the “national imaginary of the traditional Aboriginal person.” 
Ironically, many of the indigenous artists named in Bolt’s articles have complicated and critiqued 
the stereotypes and imaginaries searched for by this gaze. Blind to these complex deconstructions 
of identity, Bolt’s articles accomplished their rhetorical imputations in no small part by recourse 
to a logic of racial gazing that has long subsisted in the settler Australian imaginary. The articles 
employed cunning rhetorical tactics to imply that the mode of self-formation by which these 
indigenous public figures had come to their subjectivities was a choice rather than an 
identification emergent from within an organic and living indigenous collectivity. This late liberal 
rhetoric of choice acted in no small way to cover over the endurance of models of communal 
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recognition in which these, like many, indigenous subjects encounter and position diverse 
practices of identification.  
Bolt’s articles registered unease at “a nation that now institutionalizes even racial 
differences you cannot detect with the naked eye,” a rhetoric that was tactically varied across the 
syndicated Herald and Weekly Times’ networks; this rhetoric ultimately culminated in Bolt’s 
comparable assertion that those he was criticizing chose to “sign up” as “white Aborigines,” 
insisting on “differences invisible to the eye.”5 “[F]ull blood aborigines,” he loudly rhetoricized, 
“may wonder how such fair people can claim to be one of them.”6 The print version provided 
selected pictures of the derided fair-skinned people of Aboriginal descent. This rhetoric of 
“blood” and its supposed quantum, was connected also with antiquated European notions of 
externality. It posited a physiognomic gaze that imagines a capacity to see the essence of others 
through the external features of the body. Bolt’s column was also published on the Herald Sun’s 
blog section; there readers could link from the names of each indigenous subject and scrutinize 
their facial features. Of two artists, he evaluated their Aboriginality as a stretch of definition, 
evidence for which was to come from “studying the faces of these two ‘Aboriginal’ men.”7 Bolt’s 
insistence on the unmediated correlation between racial exteriority recalls and reproduces a white 
gaze neutralized as “the naked eye.”8 Criticizing one of his targets, Bolt drew on such a 
genealogical mode of surveillance: in the case of novelist Tara June Winch, he noted that “her 
father has both Afghan and Aboriginal heritage.”9 This gaze was imbued with an imaginary 
capacity to evaluate not only Aboriginal identity but also invited an invasive genealogy of the 
background of an individual’s “racial” inheritance.  
By September of 2010, the indigenous activists publically attacked by Bolt had rallied, 
lodging a complaint under the Racial Discrimination Act of 1975.10 The Act, a watershed of self-
determination alongside the Native Title Act of 1976 was passed only three years after the 
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formation of the Aboriginal Tent Embassy—an event which saw indigenous people come 
together before the steps of Parliament House in Canberra to demand political recognition, rights, 
perhaps even an emergent sense of sovereignty grounded in the then palpable prospect of a treaty. 
Pat Eatock was among those indigenous people who protested the discriminatory policies of the 
state and negotiated among other indigenous subjects to articulate political potentialities across 
the public sphere and its counterpublics.11 She has since found herself adjudicated one of those 
“fair-skinned Aboriginal people” —as the legal apparatus has named them—who came under 
public attack from  the mode of late liberal panopticism which the Bolt columns represent.12  
Eatock and her fellow plaintiffs were successful in their claim. Justice Mordecai 
Bromberg found in September of 2011 that “fair-skinned Aboriginal people (or some of them) 
were reasonably likely in all circumstances, to have been offended, insulted, humiliated, or 
intimidated by the imputations conveyed by the newspaper articles”—the central factor of Section 
18C of the Act.13 But response to Bromberg’s finding in the public sphere has been divided 
across a number of registers in the short time since the decision. Many commentators in the mass-
media have invoked the doctrine of freedom of speech—protected by a provision in Section 18D 
of the Act that hinges on “good faith” and accuracy. Others have pointed to Bromberg’s emphasis 
on the doctrine that freedom of speech should be subject to constraint.14 This notion was 
publically asserted most prominently in the Fairfax media by indigenous intellectual Marcia 
Langton and indeed has subsisted—rather silently—in transnational liberal political theory.15 One 
could cite, for instance George Kateb’s seminal essay on the possibility of limiting harmful 
speech.16 Kateb’s caveat to free specch posited that harmful public speech could and should be 
subject to restriction where it impinges on other more fundamental rights such as freedom of 
association and freedom from persecution. Yet, Kateb’s formulation remains within the purview 
of classical liberal discourse, neither concealing nor bearing witness to the governmental aspects 
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of liberal models of speech act and classification.17 Bromberg’s decision was clearly vested in a 
dialectical tension between freedom of speech (emphasized in section 18D of the Racial 
Discrimination Act) and harmfulness (in 18C). But this was not the only consideration in the 
case, questions of rhetorical strategy and evaluation were also significantly in play. Why, one is 
prompted to ask, does the eventfulness of the decision emphasized by many respondents in the 
public sphere—across a number of Op Ed pieces and throughout the blogosphere—hinge only on 
the question of free speech, without a more adequate thinking of harmfulness, suffering, and 
endurance? Here, I mark these debates within the liberal modeling of the public sphere because I 
want to underscore what is excluded even within the dialectic between freedom of speech and its 
constraint. I want to push, instead, toward the historical and temporal conditions of harm to which 
Bolt and his supporters are blind, as well as to meditate on the shifting way in which indigenous 
identity is evaluated, scrutinized, and policed by settler subjects. 
Both the defenders of unconstrained free speech and those who proceed from the position 
articulated by Kateb remain within the language game of liberalism. Yet, in this late liberal 
moment, these logics are no longer only ethical or economic principles; indeed, they are only 
occasionally concerned with such classical liberal concerns. Under late liberalism, such ethical 
and economic principles have become discursive strategies employed to evaluate social worlds; 
particularly those that refuse a simple economically individualist and culturally (or, indeed, 
“racially”) unmarked subjectivity. Evaluations now tend to be carried out through the economic 
and ethical scripts of liberalism—even when, as in the case of Bolt, self-identified conservatives 
inhabit this space on the late liberal discursive spectrum. In referencing this spectrum, I have in 
mind Elizabeth Povinelli’s savvy description of late liberalism. For Povinelli, liberalism subsists 
beyond the architecture of a neutralized rights discourse or the market fictions of neoliberal 
economic axioms: “[l]iberalism, late liberalism, and neoliberalism do not exist as things in the 
ordinary sense of the term but rather as actions like a sighting or a citing.”18 Liberalism, then, 
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only exists as such a citing of axioms and an evaluative sighting of alternative social worlds. 
These late liberal sightings and citings function “insofar as they are evolved to conjure, shape, 
aggregate, and evaluate a variety of social worlds, and each of these conjurings, shapings, 
aggregations, and evaluations disperse liberalism as a global terrain.”19 One consequence of this 
reading of late liberalism, as it regards the enduring social worlds of indigenous peoples, is that it 
allows one to make key observations about the representational and, indeed, exclusionary form 
given to these social worlds in the public spheres of settler colonies. Within these hypermediated 
spaces, relics and artifacts of (post)colonial liberalism shape how settler subjects perceive, order, 
and evaluate those indigenous people who do not adhere to its projects, imaginaries, expectations, 
and stereotypes. 
Where public utterances about identity and difference (such as Bolt’s) claim the capacity 
to evaluate alterity, decisions such as Justice Bromberg’s in Eatock vs Bolt, adjudicate between 
the complexity of the legal system and indigenous forms of collectivity, identification, and 
affectation. Settler subjects continue to arrogate the evaluation of indigenous identity and Bolt’s 
articles act as a hypermediated solicitation of this abiding tendency. While the liberal turn to, for 
instance, civil rights and self-determination in many settler (post)colonies has progressed state 
models of adjudication and recognition beyond the assimilationist paradigms of colonial liberal 
governmentality, here I describe the covert remainder of such surveillance.  
Much of Bolt’s mode of rhetoric can be traced to the subsistence of a gaze of the white 
subject identified most clearly in the contemporary Australian context by sociologist Ghassan 
Hage.  As Hage contends in his 2000 study White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a 
Multicultural Society, this gaze is claimed by many white subjects of multicultural societies. It 
forms part of a broad fantasy of exclusionary belonging—one that is particularly prevalent 
despite the multicultural pretence of the liberal present in settler (post)colonial societies.20 For 
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Hage, part of the reflexive self-formation of white Australians is their arrogation of the capacity 
to decide who belongs in and to the nation. Justice Bromberg’s awareness of this pathological 
gaze links Bolt’s rhetoric to the correlative fields of social power associated with what Hage 
correlatively names “governmental belonging.”21 In White Nation drawing on Michel Foucault’s 
notion of “governmentality”—tempered with a strong Lacanian register founded in the notion of 
subjective fantasy—Hage coins this term to describe a way of thinking identity and difference 
that emerges from “the field of Whiteness,” as well as from “those who aspire to occupy it and 
assume a governmental position within it, and consequently within the nation.”22 For Hage, this 
strategy of looking, knowing, and evaluating, “is pathological. It reflects the neurotic character of 
the gaze that is collecting the empirical data.”23 Subjects emerge from this field who claim “the 
feeling that one is legitimately entitled in the course of everyday life to make a governmental / 
managerial statement about the nation.”24  
Deploying this physiognomic gaze in the most pathological of imagined empirical 
projects, we have seen, Bolt worried about the cache afforded  identities “you cannot detect with 
the naked eye.”  Bolt’s seeming unawareness of the twentieth century Assimilation regime’s 
surveillance and biopolitical management of Aboriginal hybridity with those of migrant descent 
was glaring here. As Bromberg noted, in Bolt’s articles: “[c]olour is . . . used as a point of 
contrast between people in the group and those intimated to be ‘real’ Aboriginal people.”25 
Through this use of “colour” and of a rhetoric of scrutiny and knowing, Bolt produced himself as 
a such a pathological subject standing in for the presumed white privilege of evaluating 
governmental belonging. I detail key artifacts of this practice as this essay unfolds, and before 
returning to theorize more fully the form of their return in the twentieth century and circulation in 
the sphere of actuvirtuality. 
246	  
	  
As artifacts of past apparatus recur in the present, they inscribe themselves not only in the 
imaginaries of privileged subjects but through the virtuality that traverses the mass media and 
frames the capacity (or pretension) of these subjects to evaluate the identity and belonging of 
those whose social worlds subsist tenuously outside late liberal normativity. Within Bolt’s 
articulation of governmental belonging, we find that at least two technologies of biopower—in 
Michel Foucault’s sense—returning from the assimilation period. Yet now the fantasized 
dimension of this governmentality—its mentality per se—is not only vested in the state but in the 
circulation of mass-mediated evaluations of alterity across the public sphere. Before theorizing 
this return further, let me turn back to the particular apparatuses which the Bolt articles can be 
seen to unconsciously reference.	  
	  
Three Biopolitical Technologies of Absorption-Assimilation 
The manner in which Aboriginal people have identified, and have been identified, by others since 
the British settlement of Australia is a background matter of some significance to a number of 
issues in the case, including whether the Articles were reasonably likely to offend and the extent 
to which Mr Bolt should have realised that to be so. 
Bromberg J, Eatock v Bolt. Summary [167] 
 
I now turn to a nonlinear discussion of crucial discursive instances of the technologies of 
power—of state gaze and genealogy—which formed the settler colonial apparatus of 
governmentality around policies of absorption and assimilation and which—at moments such as 
the span of Bolt’s 2009 articles—return in spectral form in the late liberal mass media. Here I 
trace key aspects of the emergence of these technologies of gaze and genealogy as they arose in 
the biopolitical operations of the Australian state. The purposes to which white subjects of 
governmental belonging  might put this pathological gaze (purposes such as the imputation of 
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Aboriginality as a choice outside communal belonging) are not identical to the genocidal aims of 
absorption.26 Nonetheless, the notion that white subjects of governmental belonging are those to 
adjudicate on Aboriginal identity is retained at either end of this spectrum. Before returning to the 
present, it is necessary to track the multiple and inconsistent uses to which logics of surveillance 
around race were put during the period of absorption and assimilation during which the 
Australian state became most biopolitical. 
The most notorious eugenicist “Chief Protector” A. O. Neville retired in 1940 from his 
post as Commissioner of Native Affairs for Western Australia. In 1947, he published a book on 
Native affairs, feeding into the public sphere his own reflections on the administration of what he 
called “Australia’s Coloured Minority.” Neville’s “long range plan” divided Aboriginal people 
via both categories of blood quanta and economic and behavioural modes. His 1948 book was 
manifestly concerned with the racial and social absorption of people of mixed descent, 
particularly in Australia’s earlier colonized southern regions.27 Neville insisted on the externality 
of racial physiognomy: 
Time and again I have been asked by some white man: ‘if I marry so-and-so (a 
coloured person) will our children be black?’ As the law imposed upon me the 
responsibility of approving or objecting to the proposed marriage, I felt I had to 
give an answer to that vital question. The answer of course depended upon 
whether the woman was of purely European-Aboriginal descent.28 
While Neville here implicitly claims that his administration held sway over a scientific system of 
taxonomizing race and miscegenation across the colour line, Neville’s articulation also 
dialogically calls out to a certain public: “some white man.” Neville’s public was to be populated 
by the white paternalist inhabitants who arrogated the right to decide on the governmental 
belonging of a future “white Australia.” 
248	  
	  
Some provisional schematics are necessary in tracing an archeology of this regime.29 One 
can identify at least three technologies of absorption and these technologies that would subsist 
through the era of assimilation and return as artifacts in the mass mediated present. As a 
generality, one can specify that these three discursive fields of knowledge each possessed their 
own technological forms. The census of Aboriginal subjects, particularly as it proceeded 
sporadically prior to 1967 relies on technologies of surveillance but also on statistical aggregates 
at a national level focusing on health, geographic distribution, and miscegenation. Second, one 
finds the use of networks of communication by which surveillance was channeled, passing 
between the Chief Protector and his agents—the telegram, the letter, the native affairs department 
circular, the police circular. These acted in relation to perceptions of demographic crisis identified 
by the census. Finally, between these two technologies emerges a metaphorics of pantopticism 
retained throughout the West Australian regime. The photograph, as we shall see, appeared in 
Neville’s published materials as an expression of this biopolitical conjugation of physiognomic 
gazing and of adjudicating indigenous identity.30  
The census emerged in varying states sporadically prior to the 1967 Referendum, but an 
attempt at the aggregation of such data from across the States and Territories had not been 
attempted until 1924. As is now well known, one of the principle settler colonial anxieties of this 
period was the decline in the population of “full blood” Aboriginal people and the rise in 
miscegenation, leading to many more recorded “half-caste” Aboriginal people.31 Here I focus on 
the shifts in categorization themselves as an index of the kinds of technology by which difference 
was processed by the state apparatus.  From 1928, the Western Australian Aborigines Protection 
Department, drawing information from surveys done across 78 regions around the state (the 
jurisdictions of local “Protectors”), divided between those perceived to be “half-caste” and those 
perceived as “full blood” natives under the 1905 Act and its amending legislation. Sporadically, 
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counts and surveys were undertaken of the spatial distribution of “natives” identified under the 
initial distinction based on blood quantum. This second strategy divided between modes of 
economic habitation and surveillance between the categories of “nomadic” people, those “in 
regular employment,” and those “in supervised camps.”32 In 1933, information from a 
Commonwealth Census was made available to the states, permitting larger aggregates to be 
produced within the biopolitical logic of absorption. Nonetheless, annual surveys after 1933 
continued to retain the bipartite division between tables articulating blood quanta and the three 
part system divided economic modes of life (nomadic, supervision through regular employment, 
supervision within camps) across the 78 jurisdictions of the various protectors. By 1936, the 
Commonwealth Statistics Bureau had cross-referenced the two systems, identifying economic 
modes of life (nomadic, employed, in supervised camps) and dividing the trends across this three 
part taxonomy between blood quanta and economic mode. The census remains the most 
biopolitical of technologies, aggregating data on populations at large scales.33  
At the biopolitical level, the administration tracked assimilation through surveillance of 
“natives.” As such, any increase or decrease in the number of people of mixed descent 
represented through axiomatic means in the census was understood by its agents in one of two 
ways. An increase marked a threat, the persistence of resistant identification as Aboriginal and the 
retention of indigenous religious, economic, and community modes of belonging which 
assimilation targeted and aimed to render absent, dead, or extinct. The administration ascribed 
any numerical decrease in the number of half-castes to a success of assimilation. While I regard 
the settler colonial census as a system subject to selection criteria which reveal the imagined gaze 
of its agents, the persistence of rises in the “half-caste population” (for instance, from 2437 in 
1928 to 4602 in 1938)34 to indicate the endurance of indigenous identification and communal 
belonging in the face of attempts to assimilate Aboriginal bodies and destroy their mode of life.35 
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A decrease, on the other hand, in the number of “half-castes” appearing in the census implied a 
decrease in the number of exemptions granted by the states to indigenous peoples of fairer skin. 
Neville, for instance, interpreted a decrease in the Western Australian half-caste population from 
1940 to 1941 as an indication that “a number were no longer classified as natives at all.”36 My 
analysis here is focused on the kind of biopolitical aggregates asserted by the administration, not 
on any correlation they might have with the “truth” of indigenous identification, communal 
recognition, and belonging. As such, I refuse to make generalizations, here, of the kind which 
would be made by a historical demographer. I will offer instead a few provisional conjectures on 
the complexities of thinking through biopolitical systems of accounting on demography and 
population in relation to the modes of surveillance which produced them.  
With the move from assimilation to absorption in the period after the “New Deal For 
Aborigines” was implemented nationally in 1939 by Interior Minister Jack McEwan and based on 
the advice of A. P. Elkin, beginning a reorientation away from “colour” in assimilation discourse. 
Nonetheless, this project was consistently biopolitical. The state continued to evaluate and decide 
which modes of indigenous life it would permit to live and which it would allow, precipitate, or 
imagine to pass away.37 Nomadism was a form of life which all cadres in the administration saw 
as subject to such a passing away, whether desired or melancholically bemoaned—from 
thanatopolitical absorptionists such as Neville to liberal assimilationists such as Elkin and 
McEwan, or through to Neville’s liberal assimilationist successor Stanley Middleton. The 
assimilationist logic saw “supervised camps” as a pathway to “regular employment,” and, 
therefore an assimilation of indigenous people into the economic mode of life of the nation. For 
Neville, this process accompanied the logic of colour, race, and physiognomy, whereas, for Elkin 
and others, this assimilationist ethos eschewed colour for a broader liberal idea of forced 
civilization. In order to develop the aggregates at which pre-1967 Aboriginal censuses aimed, the 
Western Australian Aborigines department kept indigenous subjects under constant surveillance. 
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The networks of surveillance which emerged from such practices took genealogies of Aboriginal 
individuals as their objects and at key moments, rendered this genealogical imaginary in visual 
form—through the printed photograph, such as that inscribed in the plates of Australia’s Colored 
Minority and return in an uncannily reminiscent form in Bolt’s use of photographs.  
The 1869 Aboriginal Protection Act of Victoria is perhaps the earliest instance wherein 
an officer of the state was given such a capacity to judge race through external appearance as it 
manifest to the gaze of the functionary in question. A justice could decide the status of an 
individual under the terms of Section 8 of the Act  “in the absence of other sufficient evidence . . . 
on his own view and judgement” whether an individual was legally an Aboriginal or not.38 C. D. 
Rowley, who became one of assimilation’s first prominent critics in the 1970s, noted that under 
the 1869 Act “a justice could decide whether a person was an Aboriginal by sighting him.”39 
Neville’s utterances then comes at the twilight of a long standing practice of sighting and 
classifying. 
As Warwick Anderson’s work has shown the logic of absorption—assimilation in its 
most biopolitical form—was undergirded by the construction of the Aboriginal “racial type” as a 
fixed early descendent of Caucasian man.40 Children of “purely European-Aboriginal descent” 
were therefore seen as assimilable within the Aborigines administrations—particularly in Western 
Australia and the Northern Territory. Invoking a genealogical and heritable imaginary, Neville 
asserted that where children were the offspring of “European-Aboriginal” unions, “the children 
would be lighter than the mother, and if later they married whites and had children these would be 
lighter still, and that in the third or fourth generation no sign of native origin whatever would be 
apparent.”41 In most instances, this eugenic outcome could be verified by the gaze itself: “a half-
blood mother is unmistakable as to origin, her quarter-caste or quadroon offspring almost like a 
white, and an octoroon entirely indistinguishable from one (see illustrations).”42 The goals of the 
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administration were to produce visibly indistinguishable white Australians. Neville’s use of plates 
(“illustrations”) to exemplify his typology of anthropometric forms derived from an 
administration which had used photography relatively little over the course of his tenure. Before 
turning to read the gaze solicited by these images, it is necessary to delineate the genealogical 
tactics assumed in Neville’s widely circulated tract. 
In the Western Australian Native Affairs Department as it formed itself in the twentieth 
century, the regulation of marriage was the most significant organelle of discipline by which 
these structures of surveillance were applied. Neville asserted this most explicitly in 1947, 
unabashedly insisting on the regulation of miscegenation as the means to the “white Australia” 
project: “the success of our plan of assimilation is so allied with the question of who shall marry 
whom, and because colour plays so great a part in the scheme of things, that we must encourage 
approach towards the white rather than black, through marriage.”43 On the other hand, with the 
introduction of what the Western Australian Aborigines Department under Neville had for some 
time referred to as “alien” bloodlines, Neville asserted: “the indications are that if a white man 
marries a coloured woman of Aboriginal descent also possessing some Negro, Asiatic, Indian or 
other coloured ancestry, then he must take a greater risk of atavism in any children of the union 
there may be.”44 Where absorptionist and assimilationist discourses accepted the offspring of 
carnal encounters across the colour line readily when they concerned Aboriginal and European 
parents, marriages were more frequently forbidden by the state when they were proposed between 
Aboriginal people and non-Aboriginal migrants of non-European descent.45 This policy trend, 
reveals a distinct fear of supposedly aberrant racial types—“negroid,” “Asiatic,” “Afghan,” to cite 
a number of confused biopolitical indices. Racial surveillance focused on managing physical 
uniformity at the external level, though this was also correlated with habits and capacities. As 
such, the administrative regulation of marriages and unions apprehended by the state as “illicit” 
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was greatly concerned with managing miscegenation between indigenous subjects and diasporic 
subjects perceived as “non-white.”  
As has been well established, between as early as 1915 and as late as 1975 in Australia, 
children of mixed descent were subject to surveillance and potential removal.46 Carnal and 
intimate encounters transpired at times with the consent of (predominantly) aboriginal women 
and at others through rape by (predominantly) white men. Where unions between people of 
mixed descent were seen to cross or worry “racial” lines, a approach to race panic arose in the 
administration: on the one hand, this gave rise to the surveillance, removal of children (followed 
by their discipline within state and church institutions). On the other hand, a concomitant 
mechanism of power developed which bore on questions of the economic and moral propriety of 
the parents as well as their perceived racial descent and blood quantum. “Had our forebears 
insisted upon a clean-cut embargo upon illicit sexual intercourse between black and white 
beginning a hundred years ago,” Neville asserted, “the process of assimilation would have been 
further advanced because such action might have resulted in many more legal unions bringing 
about naturally the same result.”47 This mechanism of categorization reveals the way, as Ann 
Laura Stoler has put it: “[c]olonial control was predicated on identifying who was ‘white,’ who 
was ‘native,’ and which children could become citizens rather than subjects.”48   Not only were 
legal unions perceived to be defensible through the morality of whiteness pervasive within wider 
public discourse, they also generated written records which were used by Protectors and police 
(often a coincident office) to track the economic and collective mode of life of mixed-descent 
members of indigenous families. Absorption’s technologies of surveillance were retained through 
the assimilation period, even as they came to focus less on “colour” and more on evaluating the 
economic and sacral practices by which individuals identified with and through their indigenous 
collectivity.49 
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Writing in South Australia in 1941, anthropologist Norman Tindale had serious 
misgivings about the accuracy of categories of racial taxonomy; he wanted to revise the system. 
Remarking upon the way such racist colloquialisms as “half-caste,” “mixblood,” and “yellow 
fellow,” had made their way into the administration, he further noted that one problem with the 
categorization was that it failed to account for the distinction between favored European-
Aboriginal “crossing” and Aboriginal “crosses” with migrant others. Such colloquial terms, he 
bemoaned, “are applied generally to anyone bearing an admixture of alien blood with that of 
Australian aborigines.”50 Tindale did not object to managing and regulating unions across the 
color line, rather he insisted that the current nomenclature lacked rigor. He would remark at 
length: 
[i]n the case of crosses between aborigines and whites there is a tendency to 
qualify the term with the addition of the adjectives white (or light) and dark 
respectively, to indicate the predominating strain, but other adjectives such as 
‘real’ and ‘proper’ half-castes are also ignorantly employed. However, use is by 
no means uniform and even Government officials have been found to regard the 
first cross as a ‘true half-caste,’ the second cross as ‘quadroon,’ and the third as 
‘octaroon,’ this false terminology in some measure reflecting an undoubted 
tendency for further white dilution to occur even in areas where the first half-
castes have been under official surveillance.51 
Tindale therefore, set out to provide what he saw as a total system for classifying and surveilling 
the offspring of interracial “crosses.” This apparent rigor operated entirely within the eugenic 
logic of taxonomy. 
 Tindale’s taxonomy operated to identify the typical characteristics and capacities of 
“crosses” over at least four generations. The goal of this taxonomic apparatus was to survey the 
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“general trends of admixture in the population” in order to make generalizations about the risk of 
atavism in each cross and the relative intelligence of individuals of mixed descent.52 The “first 
cross or ‘first half-caste’” he designated F1, which was understood to be “brought about by the 
cross-mating of members of two separate ethnic groups.”53 In the second generation of crossing, 
Tindale identified three types of intermixture. F2, he designated as “the mating of two F1 
individuals.” The sign ¼ came to stand for “the progeny of the mating of an F1 and the alien 
race.”54 Tindale participated in the sophisticated pseudo-scientific construction of justification for 
the fear of Aboriginal “crosses” with migrant peoples such as those designated in the discourse as 
“Afghans,” “Asiatics,” and the few “Negro,” individuals identified in Australia. However, in 
regard to his use of “alien” in ¼ stock, he specifically meant to include not only these “coloured” 
aliens but also European immigrants. Nonetheless, such European others and their unions were 
normalized, while fear and eugenic regulation surrounded unions perceived to breach the 
threshold of whiteness. While in Aborigines Department language, alien meant immigrant, in 
Tindale’s nomenclature it broadly designated non-Aboriginal. The final category in the “second 
generation of crossing,” was the ¾: the progeny of the “cross” of an F1 and the full blooded 
Aboriginal. This final category was designed to show that simply moving down crosses over 
generations did not precipitate absorption; absorption instead required a consistent effort to 
regulate unions and marry the first and second generations with fairer skinned individuals. 
Tindale’s “third generation of crossing” took in many and multiple categories (attach image 
[Tindale pp. 84-5]) and he proceeded to expound at length on the various possibilities of 
crossing. 
 Tindale argued that “[i]n some ways the first cross with ‘white’ seems to deviate slightly 
from the mean towards the characters of the white parent and to present a remarkably uniform 
appearance.”55 But he warily alerted his readership among physical anthropologists and 
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Aborigines Department administrators to the possibility that further crossing did not imply 
reduced atavism. In fact, he cautioned, “F2 folk may be somewhat more variable” than F1 folk. 
Indeed: 
Personal observations lead to the suggestion that in the case of F2 individuals 
there is a greater range of variability and that in some individuals there is a 
somewhat closer approach to the aboriginal type of physical form and mental 
outlook and reaction than there is to be found in F1.56 
Drawing on the physiognomic gaze implied by “personal observations,” Tindale developed his 
taxonomy. There is, he submitted, certainly “some evidence, not yet properly considered, which 
suggests that in the third generation of crossing this variability may be still further increased.”57 
This variability was a point of anxiety for Tindale and his contemporaries. If this third generation 
continued to intermarry within a discrete “native” population, such “variability” would subsist 
and the desired outcome of a “white Australia” could not be achieved. As we saw in the last 
chapter, Tindale, along with Cook and Neville, rejected segregation of Aboriginal people of 
mixed descent; if left to intermarry among themselves, this course entailed “the ultimate 
development of one or more ethnic pockets or variously diluted and altered aboriginal peoples. 
These may remain apart, sometimes as dependent or partly dependent peoples, living in 
isolation.”58   
Tindale introduced a complex notation system to be used in accounting for the origin of 
“alien” blood. Employing troubling language drawn from species discourse, Tindale described 
the the categories of the third generation, saying: “[m]atings of all the above types regularly occur 
and indicate the type of admixture to be found in any old half-caste community even when the 
alien blood is all one ethnic type.”59 Partly because they were the majority and partly because 
they were increasingly considered desirable, Tindale’s notation system assumed that the majority 
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of “crosses” took place between European and Aboriginal subjects except where otherwise noted. 
Whereas “[i]n those hybrids in which alien blood is of non-white origin the ethnic type or 
nationality of the alien parent is indicated as follows:---F1 negro, ¼ Afghan, etc.”60 As Tindale 
further noted,  
[i]n the course of specialist genealogical studies it has been necessary to record 
persons with such complex trihybrid genetic combinations as 
((F2)x(F1xCinghalese)), i.e. with ¼ Cinghalese, 3/8 white and 3/8 aborigine, and 
quadrihybrids such as ((F1))x(F1 Melanesian x F1 Malay)) in which there 
appears 1/8 Melanesian, 1/8 Malay, ¼ white and ½ aboriginal.61 
Tindale’s Survey was, in large part, an attempt to fix and totalize racial categorization once and 
for all. This assertion of racial-scientific knowledge-power relied on correlation between blood 
and behavior at the level of surveillance. Certainly the basic assumptions about phenotype, blood 
type, and other methods of genealogical intervention employed by Tindale were pseudoscientific. 
Nonetheless, Tindale’s writings on intermarriage were an attempt to render this fiction of race 
cogent. Tindale produced a notation system for those who deviated from the norms of blood 
quantum, and to potentially correlate these  deviances from the norm with generalizations about 
behavior. The norm, then, was not only an ideal to be achieved: fair-skinned homo economicus at 
the tip of the bell curve. The normativizing process was also a means to regulate, surveil, and 
taxonomize those who deviated from it. As Michel Foucault observes, in the context of 
disciplinary biopower, “the norm is not simply . . . a principle of intelligibility; it is an element on 
the basis of which a certain exercise of power is founded and legitimized.”62 Yet children who 
formed the offspring of mixed descent couples were not social outcastes. The opposite was true, 
at least in theory. Children of approved crosses could be removed from parents and, if they were 
adequately “whitened,” from “quadroon” onward for some time, they could even be allowed to 
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enter the white community. The whole system of deciding who could be thus assimilated---
potentially or actually---relied on this system of deciding on the desirability of crosses. In this 
way, “the norm’s function is not to exclude or reject. Rather, it is always linked to a positive 
technique of intervention and transformation, to a sort of normative project.”63 
 One thing was certain. For Tindale, his mentor at Adelaide University, J. B. Cleland, and 
such administrators as Neville and Cook, who read, accepted, and aimed to implement their 
assertions: if the racial admixture remained Northern European and Aboriginal only, the horizon 
of racial futurity in Australia was safe. This was the apex of the longed for white Australian 
normative subject. Yet the existence of “aberrant” types was a reality and needed to be managed. 
Tindale’s articulation of this pseudoscientific orthodoxy read: 
[o]n general grounds and from a study of their mental and social responses the 
present writer concludes that there are not likely to be any marked aberrant 
characteristics introduced by the low percentage of Australian aboriginal blood 
that is being added to that of the predominantly North European ethnic strain of 
white Australians.64 
In rapport with such contemporary figures as Elkin and Stanley Porteus, Tindale also purported to 
identify mentality with his genealogical imaginary.65 
For Tindale, dissonance between the nomadic mentality and the assimilation to a modern 
economic, sacral, and social outlook could be minimized by managing the kinds of crosses that 
were permitted; it was a question of the proximity of descent. Giving broad examples of 
“crossing” between stocks, Tindale noted that although “[s]ome American authorities have come 
to the conclusion that in the United States the negro-white ethnic admixture is a bad one, 
producing many physical and mental disharmonies,” on the other hand, contemporary studies of 
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“negro-white mixture both in Jamaica and the United States” implied that “physical and 
psychological disharmonies of a serious nature may be expected to occur when partners to a cross 
come from stocks which are too widely diverse.”66 For Tindale, the question of intermixture was 
rooted in the perceived proximity of peoples within the racial phylogenetic ordering of the human 
species. Intelligence and temperament could be controlled by only “breeding” peoples of similar  
“stocks.” Physical characteristics were to be disappeared on a longer eugenic temporality. Noting 
a number of influential mixed-race populations such as not only “Negro-white,” but also 
“Tahitian-white” crosses on Pitcairn Island as well as Hawaiian, Chinese, and Phillipino 
intermarriage with whites in Hawaii, Tindale set out to survey the potential for physical 
characteristic formation and its relation to the future of Aboriginal people of mixed descent. “The 
negro cross” he remarked, “is held as least desirable” according to the physical characteristics 
entailed; mentality was out of the picture.67 These physical characteristics included: “body 
proportions, gait, sebaceous glands, skin colour and hair form, and the fear of the recurrence of 
these factors in relatively undiluted form.”68 For “the Australian aborigines hair and eye-form are 
within white limits; skin colour being the most obvious factor in which he is completely outside 
white range.”69 Physical characteristics were, for Tindale, a barrier that existed even if one did not 
believe the claims of racial mental deficiency. In this way, some tracts were able to tactically 
assert the humanitarian aspect of assimilation. In so far as the discourse was willing to accept that 
the intelligence of racial others was not aberrant, arguments were still proffered from physical 
difference. In an ideal world, the argument went, white Australians would be all accepting of 
Aboriginal alterity, but the existence of color prejudice acted as a precipitant for physical 
homogeneity. Anthropologist A. P. Elkin, for instance, wrote that color should not be a factor 
where civilizing discourses could take their place. Yet voices from the absorptionist camp 
questioned the idea that those who “seem to think that by taking a coloured man, just able to read 
and write, out of his environment, dressing him in a nice suit and granting him full civil rights so 
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to speak . . . all will be well with him.”70 Racial homogeneity, it seemed, was necessary to such 
social homogeneity in the minds of these individuals: “[t]here is still the colour prejudice and 
inherent traits which few adults now living will ever surmount.”71 The slippage between “colour 
prejudice” and “inherent traits” however, also reveals the assumption that colour was not only a 
barrier to acceptance, it also implied an assumption that internal worlds of morality, 
psychological, and intellect are expressed in physical appearance.  
Further, the very mode of thinking that operated by reference to occluding Aboriginal 
cultural, economic, and physical difference could be presented as a well intentioned policy of 
uplift by reference of the degree to which these factors were barriers to social cohesion and 
integration. However, even as the framers of policy moved their intended outcomes away from 
thanatopolitical discourses such as absorption and toward biopolitical discourses of social and 
cultural assimilation, consistent residues remained that were positioned to imply that 
normativization could not be only economic and social, but required reference to colour. “Colour 
prejudice,” Neville put it,  
is the main stumbling block towards assimilation---colour combined with 
ignorance, ill-health, deleterious living conditions, and suchlike disabilities, has 
no chance of finding a place in Australian social life. Colour alone, without such 
disabilities, ought at least to have a sporting chance of finding its proper place in 
the community.72 
Further, “colour” in this discourse, is also indexical of the three technologies of 
absorption: the circular, the census, and the photograph. As he had already stated, “the success of 
our plan of assimilation is so allied with the question of who shall marry whom, and because 
colour plays so great a part in the scheme of things, that we must encourage approach towards the 
white rather than black, through marriage.” Though there is little doubt that the idea of regulating 
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assimilation on the model of absorption through colour remained in microscopic applications 
even after the socio-cultural turn, it is also true that even before this turn, many exceptions were 
made. Even marriages of supposedly aberrant “coloured” individuals to natives and half-castes 
was sometimes permitted and often by reference to moral and social factors. The break at the 
level of intentions (while it certainly took place at the discursive level) did not always reflect the 
level of discipline and biopower on the ground, in the eyes and thoughts of those applying the 
legislation. Though he ultimately could not approve them, Neville himself even wrote of his 
administrative system’s potential tolerance for children the offspring of unions between “natives” 
and “Chinese.” At this juncture in his text, Neville invited the gaze of his reader to scrutinize their 
features: “see illustrations of these first-cross Chinese-Aboriginal girls.”73 The photograph 
culminated as the technology by which the genealogically disciplined background of individuals 
were produced for and presented to the reading public. 
 While such unions were to be avoided and “the offspring of these ethnically unsuitable 
unions too often is found in institutions,” nonetheless, some such children could “turn out well, 
too, intelligent and capable.”74 Nonetheless, offspring of “crosses” between indigenous and 
migrant subjects formed the basis of a figure of abnormality and potential atavism, which the 
state kept under particular surveillance.75 One key instance of the application of surveillance as a 
response to this concern over such figures of abnormality in 1937, as Neville dispatched a circular 
to his Protectors around the state: 
I am desirous of learning as quickly as possible the names and particulars 
of all coloured persons of alien race, including Negros, who were living with 
natives in the relationship of husband and wife, legally or otherwise, prior to the 
passage of the “Native Administration Act, 1905-1936,” and still are so living. 
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 In addition to the personal particulars of the alien or Negro, I would also 
like to know the name and age of the native concerned, together with particulars 
of any children.76 
 Elaborations in the discourse of physical anthropology, then, also refracted extant 
practices of surveillance as they subsisted in the regime of absorption-assimilation. 
 Neville’s photographs in Australia’s Coloured Minority deploy a number of intersecting 
and divergent strategies. The photographs allowed readers to marvel at just how 
physiognomically indistinguishable from the white population people of mixed Aboriginal and 
European descent could be. The first plate shows “Three Quadroon Sisters,” identifying them by 
their blood quantum, but also emphasizing their appearance of whiteness; a further caption reads: 
“[t]he large freckles on the face of the centre figure are the only trace of colour apparent.” The 
uniform framing of the three images also seems to suggest a uniformity of outcome: whitened 
children of uniform admixture will uniformly conform to a relative and therefore relatively 
manageable external appearance. The placement and captioning of the pictures shows two sets of 
photographs which offer a glimpse of mixed descent Aboriginal children “As I found them” in 
the status of a young “bush waif,” and then repeats images of the same young women who, years 
later, have gone through the process of institution life. In both sets, the children chosen are 
designated as “first cross half-blood girls.” The photos of the young women, unlike those 
depicting their past as “bush waifs” show them posed in European dress. One of the many 
intersecting suggestions of the phographic pairing is to imply that even those whom Tindale 
called “F1” individuals are capable of assimilating fully enough to facilitate the next step in the 
absorptionist plan of social engineering, producing offspring who would, in turn, marry fair 
skinned individuals and progress socially toward settled bourgeois existences. This implication is 
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expanded as the next plate is captioned “half-blood mother with her quadroon child.” Again, the 
photographic genre recalls the bourgeois family photo, correlating blood with behavior.  
As Alan Sekula importantly points out, amidst a panoply of aims advanced by the 
emergence of photography in the nineteenth century were practices of archiving the human mean, 
the so-called “homme moyen”; these practices nonetheless subsisted alongside the genre of 
bourgeois honorific which suddenly allowed any and every individual, regardless of 
socioeconomic class, to potentially possess a portrait of loved ones.77 Neville’s plates bring these 
historical photographic practices uneasily together. As each generation is whitened and captioned 
by cross, so too do the photographs pass from records of the “tribalized” Aboriginal past and, 
instead, come to emphasize the bourgeois assimilability of Aboriginal people. “Crossing” and the 
adaptation to settled social life are rendered concomitant through techniques of composition and 
captioning. 
 Neville’s second set of plates emphasize this further. The first, titled “Three 
Generations,” shows a son, his mother, and the former’s grandmother from left to right. The 
photo uneasily straddles the dimensions of visual anthropometry and bourgeois family 
photography. Deploying a biopolitical narrative wherein the logics of whitening, homme moyen, 
and the bourgeois social form (homo oeconomicus), converge as consubstantial social forms. 
Mother, son, and grandmother are each equally spaced apart so, perhaps, as to allow the features 
of each to be apprehended separately, signaling the gradual progression of physiognomic 
externality which—Neville believed—would emerged with each new generation. The 
Grandmother is labeled “half-blood” and her full “racial” makeup is listed, “Irish-Australian 
father, full-blood Aboriginal mother.” The mother, in the photo, is similarly designated 
“quadroon” through captioning, while her father is noted to be “Australian born of Scottish 
parents,” recapitulating the normativization of Euro-Australian unions. The “Octaroon Grandson” 
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is noted to have a “father of Irish descent.” The “Three Generations” plate signified Neville’s 
ideal progression at the level of absorptionist demographic incorporation of Aboriginality. At 
each generation, people of mixed Aboriginal and European descent would marry “whiter,” 
moving ever closer and closer to the normativized “homme moyen,” no longer racially marked. 
The uniform portraiture allowed 1940s readers to practice amateur physiognomy in their 
scrutinization of “racial” features while the trace of bourgeois portraiture provided the implication 
of the potential or actual sociality of a concretely liberal bourgeois social form emerging in the 
subject of absorption. Amidst these plates, one could see one instance of the feared aberrant 
“Chinese-Aboriginal” “half-blood.” In this plate, a girl stands in a garden setting wearing a neat 
dress. Her facial features, however, are not framed in close up for the reader to observe. Neville’s 
inclusion of a “Chinese-Aboriginal” girl in the plates reflects his attitude of toleration for those 
existing children alongside his eugenic objection to such further unions. No narrative of 
“progress” across “generations” includes people of “coloured alien” descent. Rather as she was 
seen in the biopolitical discourse of race futurity, the “Chinese-Aborginal” girl is posed in 
isolation; well dressed according to bourgeois standards, she is nonetheless isolated from a visual 
narrative of Australian cultural and racial homogeneity. 
In 1947, Neville offered photographs as evidence of the “unmistakable” correlation 
between physiognomy and racial genealogical background. However, though his agents were 
called upon to determine the legal classification of individuals as natives and though this legal 
power required them to engage in further surveillance of the relative blood quantum of the 
individual (half-caste, quadroon, octoroon) and their racial makeup (the presence of “coloured 
alien” blood), nonetheless, many of these protectors felt less confident in their capacity to make 
such decisions than Neville himself would advertise. The scrawling which responded to Neville’s 
circular on “coloured persons of alien race” often betrayed uncertainty. One Constable Mounter, 
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for instance, registered a number of his darker skinned constituents as “believed h/c Malay.”78  
The genealogical imaginary and the pathological gaze emerged as mutually constitutive 
technologies of surveillance. Yet each remain part of a fiction: that external appearance and the 
tracking of descent might reveal secrets of identity. These technologies recur in the space of 
actuvirtuality represented by the late liberal public sphere.  
 
Acting in the Actuvirtual 
 
The return of artifacts of settler colonial biopolitics exposes the play of power not to inert 
indigenous subjects but to dynamic forces of collectivity in the face of state efforts at the 
regularization of such collectivities. In late liberal settler colonies, an assimilationist logic of 
disciplinary surveillance returns in the evaluations which pervade the public sphere, even as it 
recedes in some operations of state apparatuses.  
For Hage, it is white settler-descended Australians who imagine this entitlement to such 
an affective governmentality. Governmental belonging, Hage contends, emerges from this field of 
whiteness to give form to hateful acts against migrant subjects the apotheosis of which, for Hage, 
is the the fantasized, spoken, or enacted moment in which the subject of governmental belonging 
tears a scarf from the head of a diasporic Arab female subject. This gesture—assaulting the Arab 
subject while also aiming to absent her otherness—is often annexed to late liberal evocations of 
modernity even as these invocations eschew enduring modes of intersubjectivity, belief, and 
kinship subsisting within diasporic communities—modes of collectivity heterogeneous to 
indigenous collectivity but nonetheless rendered other within late liberal evaluation of 
assimilable, modern, subjectivity. Modernity here becomes a thing conjured within the imaginary 
of late liberalism, one which refuses to acknowledge alternate modes of collectivity and 
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belonging. However, where Hage’s study focuses on the xenophobic logic of violence against 
diasporic subjects ideated by the white subject of governmental belonging, he excuses himself (in 
the opening pages of the text) from addressing the possible implications of governmental 
belonging as it pertains to settler affective and material attitudes to indigenous subjects. Settler 
governance of affect around indigenous cognatic and affinal modes of belonging also directs 
itself toward indigenous subjects of mixed descent. 
Hage’s tactical avoidance of the evaluation of indigeneity within the field of whiteness—
and through the imaginary of governmental belonging—is perhaps one reason to reconfigure 
these concepts, particularly in light of the eventfulness of moments such as Eatock v Bolt. While 
the gaze of governmental belonging does not question whether indigenous peoples belong within 
the nation, this gaze clearly claims the desire to evaluate how such subjects belong (both together 
and within wider imaginaries). That this gaze does not see the way indigenous subjects comport 
their immanent belonging is particularly central to the way the physiognomic gaze attempts to 
render alterity subject only to an evaluation of its surface from the colonizing exterior.  Subjects 
who arrogate the capacity to determine the belonging of others often do so by drawing on a 
lexicon of assumptions about an imaginary connection between race and the gaze—a lexicon 
undergirded by the legacy of mid twentieth century state gazes linking identity with 
physiognomy, and shadowed by the concrete technologies of surveillance to which indigenous 
families of mixed descent were subjected in the twentieth century. That this disturbing visual 
aspect of governmental belonging has remained more or less absent from debate in the public 
sphere in Australia after the legal event of Eatock v Bolt is surprising, especially since Justice 
Bromberg’s decision acutely foregrounds this problematic aspect of Bolt’s rhetoric.79  
A level of complexity has developed as Native Title has formed through the tireless 
efforts of indigenous activists and their allies. As the notion of land rights won a place and the 
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discourse of Native Title arose in the Australian legal system, a complex adjudicatory function 
arose, which came to process the parallel complexity of indigenous identification and communal 
recognition, subsisting outside the purview of late liberal individualist understandings of 
identity.80 These two parallel modes of complexity can be seen as structurally coupled according 
to a second order of organization that inhabits the Australian state and gives rise to the tripartite 
legal doctrine including identification and communal recognition: one which has importantly de-
emphasized the prominence of descent in its process of definition.81 This processing of 
indigenous alterity’s complexity is far from an unproblematic apperception of indigenous social 
life. Nonetheless, when contrasted with the kind of artifactual retention of alterity’s evaluation 
which we have encountered here, it becomes clear that, after the turn to self-determination in the 
settler (post)colony, governmental belongning remains far more active in the public sphere as it 
traverses the actuvirtual circuits of the mass media. 
 As we have seen, Bolt developed the false and misleading imputations of his articles by 
recourse to a rhetoric of the gaze which insisted on the physiognomic correlation of external 
features with authenticity. Bolt’s articles recapitulate an assimilationist logic in at least two ways: 
first, by attacking “fair-skinned Aboriginal people” for continuing to identify as Aboriginal. Not 
only does this assertion imply an assumption of the superiority of the invisible subject position of 
whiteness, it also camouflages this assumption within the rhetoric of humanism and, by 
association, the liberal subject of economic individualism.82 This first recapitulation of 
assimilation also serves to misperceive the enduring presence of indigenous identification and 
belonging, which subsists despite colonialist artifacts of race and colour thinking. Second, Bolt’s 
utterances—textual and through photographs—reproduce the assumptions of assimilation through 
the technologies of the physiognomic gaze and the photograph by which settler subjects in the 
public sphere are solicited to arrogate it. 
268	  
	  
Bolt’s characterization of indigenous photographer Bindi Cole, distasteful even to quote, 
asserts that she: “could in truth join any one of several ethnic groups, but chose Aboriginal, 
insisting on a racial identity you could not guess from her features.”83 It should now be clear that 
this spurious physiognomic rhetoric—organizing the veridiction of “racial identity” around 
“features”—also continues to be annexed to a genealogical imaginary. This genealogical 
imaginary was produced in the nineteenth century, implemented (as we have seen) in twentieth 
century a biopolitical apparatuses such as that of assimilation-absorption. As I have further 
detailed, this genealogical imaginary came to undergird the logic of physiognomic gazing and 
produced such artifacts as the photograph, which disseminated this gaze across the public sphere. 
The mediation and dissemination of the physiognomic gaze returns in Bolt’s articles, through the 
use of photographs—recapitulating a spectral instance of Neville’s plates. 
Within this hypermediated gaze of governmental belonging, European descent is 
rhetorically privileged as a fetishized mode of fixed identity. In reproducing the technologies of 
surveillance and physiognomic gazing that arose under absorption and assimilation, settler 
mediations also reproduce the specter of an assimilationist privileging of whiteness qua European 
descent. Bolt’s conservative neoliberalism claimed to speak for a humanism that relied on the 
unmarked subject of humanism: “In fact, let’s go beyond racial pride. Beyond black and white. 
Let’s be proud only of being human beings set on this land together.”84 Where Bolt had 
previously emphasized a liberal egalitarianism as the alibi for his racist solicitation of the 
physiognomic desire to know others through the gaze, he had also covered over his fetishism for 
Europeanness. Perplexed by artist Anita Sax’s complex and polyvalent identificatory strategy, 
Bolt had asserted that: “Racially, if these things mattered, she is more Caucasian than anything 
else. Culturally, she’s more European.”85 Here, Bolt inscribes racial difference in the materiality 
of the signifier “racially” as the biological fact which biologists, geneticists have long shown it 
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not to be. 86 Concealing this within a clause of toleration (insisting that “these things [don’t] 
matter”), Bolt nonetheless privileges “crossing” in an assimilationist mode.87 As I noted earlier, 
Bolt named one indigenous public figure as possessing “Afghan and Aboriginal heritage.” He 
also named other individuals as having “pacific Islander heritage.” With the knowledge of 
Tindale’s constructed racial taxonomy we can see how, under the assimilationist regime, such 
individuals were subject to eugenic regulation, the refusal of licenses to marry, and the removal 
of children. Bolt’s articles foreground an eschewal, unawareness, or denial of this facet of 
Australian history.88 Yet they also reveal a fetishization of European genealogy that recalls the 
worst excesses of the white Australia policy—a central framing device in the assemblage of 
assimilation. As Bromberg noted, the conservative columnist honed in on a “multi-stranded but 
largely European genealogy.”89 In a blog post subsequent to the decision, Bolt most explicitly 
expressed this when he asserted that he believed “even many academics” and certainly his 
readership are “uneasy” that “people with clearly significant European ancestry can identify 
themselves solely as Aboriginal.”90 Here, it was clear that it was the eschewal of identification as 
European in particular that troubled the mentality undergirding such settler evaluations of 
governmental belonging. It should be clear from my discussion of the historical legacy of 
assimilation that this anxiety acts as an artifact of the genealogical gaze developed in Tindale’s 
1941 text from practices such as Neville’s 1937 circular inquiring into the: “particulars of all 
coloured persons of alien race living with natives in the relationship of husband and wife, legally 
or otherwise.”  For Bolt, there is, then, such a thing as race, but it is his liberal (albeit 
neoconservative liberal) embrace of toleration which enables his capacity to genealogically 
surveil, physiognomically scrutinize, and misperceive the collective modes of belonging and 
identification by which many indigenous people claim and position their modes of living with and 
within self and kin. Here, governmentality around race subsists even in the moment of late 
liberalism.  
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Very often, settler colonial subjects believe that the empirical data they neurotically 
purport to perceive as they scrutinize the face of the other is verifiable. Their fantasies of alterity 
are imagined to inhabit the object they sight in much the same way as physiognomy imagined a 
correlation between external features and the essence of the self. Similarly, late liberalism cites 
the precedents of its economic and ethical precepts in order to manage and constrain those aspects 
of alterity which unsettle the late liberal subject. Povinelli’s identification of the way liberalism, 
neoliberalism and late liberalism are “actions like a sighting and citing” describes—amongst 
other things—this practice of evaluation which settler colonial subjects unconsciously claim, 
particularly in relation to collectivities—across race, class, gender, and sexuality identification—
that refuse liberal regulation. It is productive to take liberalism not so much in the terms of its 
own articulations—where it cites its classical model and represents its subjects as a community of 
neutral, self-interested individuals competing economically under the protection of rights—but 
rather as subject to practices of conjuring, shaping, aggregation, and evaluation, particularly 
around such “other” differences and identifications. In light of this rearticulation of liberalism, 
different conceptions of public utterance begin to take shape, even as the cunning of such 
enunciative practices acts to conceal its evaluations of alterity within discourses of liberal, 
humanist, individualism. One such formulation would run as follows: public speech is not 
objectless, rather, when dealing with alterity in situations of plurality such speech frequently 
taxonomizes, regulates, and divides.  
What is challenged by the imposition of such an artifactuality is not presence per se, but 
the imperative that one form of presence (conjured as the “traditional indigenous person” or the 
“unspoiled” Arrernte man) displace another, more mobile, if less cathected indigenous presence. 
Limning the idea of actuvirtuality, Derrida notes the need to insist on the remainder of presence 
even within the zone of hypermediation: 
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this requisite deconstruction of artifactuality should not be used as an alibi. It should not 
give way to an inflation of the simulacrum and neutralize every threat in what might be 
called the delusion of the delusion, the denial of the event: ‘everything,’ people would 
then think, ‘even violence, suffering, war, death, everything is constructed, fictionalized, 
constituted by and for the media apparatus.’91  
Derrida insists that a trace of presence remains even if it is subject to distortion and virtualization 
in the mass media. Further, just as we emphasize the return of biopolitical logics, we must also 
acknowledge the endurance of indigenous collectivity and identity, even as its enduring form 
might not conform to actuvirtual imaginaries. Such presence is often immanent in a shared 
awareness of the legacy of colonizing force. In so far as one effect of this collective awareness is 
at risk of trauma, one finds just such a series of traumas produced by Bolt’s actuvirtual fictions in 
the indigenous subjects he attacked. As Bromberg found, the offensive and traumatic dimensions 
of Bolt’s remarks not only discursively wounded the nine named plaintiffs in the case, it also sent 
traumatic shockwaves through their extended families; an attack on living and active networks of 
kin, presence, and  belonging.92 Yet what was wounded was not any subjectivity per se, but a 
collectivity that is constantly strung between the compulsion to assert its alterity and the need for 
anonymity and camouflage. Furthermore, however wounded, the presence of the indigenous 
collectivities compelled to assert themselves in the case also remain durative, persistent, tough. 
Disentangling this actuvirtual play of presence, one might employ Povinelli’s terms from 
her 2002 genealogy of Australian multiculturalism and the function of indigenous alterity within 
its polyvalent logic. What Povinelli calls the cunning of recognition marks the pliable affinal and 
cognatic modes of kinship and affiliation through which indigenous modes of life endure and are 
either recognized or refused recognition by the apparatuses of the settler (post)colonial state. The 
cunning of recognition is of crucial import in surveying the unwarranted evaluation of these 
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modes by settler subjects in the public sphere—evaluations whose valence has shifted after the 
events I describe here.93  Since the self-determination era, juridical practices of adjudication have 
emerged from fields of knowledge the complexity of which has developed to process the equally 
complex modes of indigenous communal recognition to which settler colonial governance has 
long been blind.94 Such complex modes of communal identification and belonging nonetheless 
endured colonial governmentality in Australia and continue to endure the return of spectral 
instantiations of such governmentality under late liberalism. As Povinelli remarks, connecting 
indigenous endurance and survival from the colonial period to more recent developments in late 
liberalism, “endurance” manifests through “its ability to suffer and persist . . . endurance encloses 
itself around the durative—the temporality of continuance, a denotation of continuous action 
without any reference to its beginning or end and outside the dialectic of presence and absence.”95 
As subjects of endurance, indigenous people find themselves constantly under the scrutiny of 
settler colonial evaluations whose blindness to their agile, transformative social forms is 
compounded by parallel blindness to the suffering precipitated by such misrecognition. This is 
particularly so as such misrecognition repeats and retains the evaluative gestures by which they 
and their forbears were so long evaluated, surveilled, and disciplined by the settler state. 
In a nationalist positioning of his covertly neoconservative emphasis on individualism—
concealing the immunitary assumptions of this position—Bolt railed against the 
institutionalization “racial differences” imperceptible to “the naked eye” of evaluation.96 Those 
with even a passing awareness of the terms of applied anthropology as it has emerged alongside 
the discourse of Native Title would immediately recognize the way that Bolt’s rhetoric eschews 
the complex structures of affinal and cognatic kinship, which remain in place among indigenous 
people—including those of mixed descent. As Anne Brewster has recently argued through Kim 
Scott’s recent fiction, such collectivities maintain “multiple forms of agency and mobility which 
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cannot, by definition, be assimilated to the settler state”—forms which she sees as Scott’s 
assertion of Noongar Sovereignty.97 This complex and multiple nexus of belonging which the 
legal apparatus designates through the tripartite adjudication of descent, identification and 
communal recognition. It would do to briefly contextualize the relevant Australian legal concept 
of indigeneity.  
The active presence of a reconstituted indigenous subjectivity endures both settler 
colonialism’s governmentality and even late liberalism’s normativizing strategies. The Australian 
state has indeed moved beyond the biologism of absorption and the disciplinary power of 
assimilation—at least in its most genocidal forms. Instead, from the era of self-determination, the 
juridical logic of descent, countenanced by the recognition of the significant role of identification 
and communal recognition in Aboriginal identity, has developed a complexity that structurally 
couples with indigenous modes of collectivity and often allows a mode of recognition that 
facilitates genuine land rights within the discourse of Native Title. This remains an adjudication 
by the state, no doubt, which always indicates a retention of colonial sovereignty (whether the 
Commonwealth decides for or against the interests of indigenous people). 
Subaltern subjects have endured settler colonial modes of governmentality, they have 
suffered and persisted—in Povinelli’s terms—in identifications that exceed and challenge 
assimilation’s specters and late liberalism’s imperative to normativity. Similarly, under late 
liberalism, indigenous subjects refuse to silently endure the evaluation and regulation of their 
form of life and the identities which abide within it. They resist the pathological gaze’s capacity 
to sight social difference. Where the physiognomic gaze recurs in late liberal mass-media, 
complexities of identification and belonging remain invisible. Indeed, as Noongar writer Kim 
Scott has suggested in the life account he wrote of himself and Wilomin Noongar Elder Hazel 
Brown, at times, modes of collectivity and kinship must remain hidden from settler subjects in 
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order for such endurance to be maintained.98 Such a conception recalls the tension between 
politics and policing identified by Jacques Rancière. 
Politics, as Jacques Rancière has argued, is not the exercise of power, the organization of 
perception, or of social life; these, he usefully understands as operations of policing.99 Politics 
begins instead with the way those excluded from the everyday accounting of communitas 
intervene in the distribution of what can and cannot be perceived to count in the accounting of the 
dominant. This accounting of the dominant mode of perception correlates to the police and is 
often termed by Rancière the distribution of the sensible (partage du sensible). Povinelli usefully 
parses Rancière notion of policing for the late liberal and settler colonial context currently under 
examination, noting that: “[a]s the dominant technique of the governance of difference in late 
liberalism, cultural recognition manages the difference between policing and politics in Jacques 
Rancière’s sense.”100 Describing policing, she asserts that:  
policing [is] the management of a given distribution of social places and roles, ways of 
being and saying such that some activities are visible and sayable (are located in the order 
of logos) while other activities appear to be nothing more than noise (are located in the 
realm of phonos).”101 
One concrete assertion we might make of this constellation would be to say that where under 
colonial liberal projects of governance such as assimilation and absorption the bodies of 
indigenous people were most acutely governed, disciplined, and policed, after the apparent turn to 
late liberal multiculturalism, such a policing happens at the level of the visible and sayable, which 
is, in large part to say, in the mass media. Settler colonial biopolitics saw Chief Protectors and 
Colonial Administrators able to decide on the distribution of indigenous bodies, sexual couplings, 
and familial collectivities. as the state moves . While the state has turned to acknowledge Native 
Title and has proceeded through a period of self determination, the public sphere continues to 
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retain the artifacts of a colonial biopolitics. While the physiognomic gaze is no longer employed 
by the state to sight indigenous others and the genealogical imaginary, retained by the state in the 
juridical  logic of descent, has been countenanced by recognition of the importance of 
identification and communal recognition, nonetheless, these logics subsist into the present as 
hypermediated artifacts. As Foucault long ago observed, The Panoptic modality of power --- at 
the elementary, technical, merely physical level at which it is situated --- is not under the 
immediate dependence or a direct extension of the great juridico-political structures of a society; 
it is nonetheless not absolutely independent.”102 
As opposed to the logic of the police, Rancière’s notion of politics can be parsed as the 
redistribution of the sensible.  Politics, for Rancière, is action organized around the reason of the 
excluded. The tension at the heart of politics in his sense, emerges in so far as, in order to be 
counted or recognized, the excluded are forced to make visible their social, cultural, and 
collective condition. As Rancière puts it: “the particular feature of political dissensus is that the 
partners are no more constituted than is the object or the very scene of discussion. The ones make 
visible the fact that they belong to a shared world the other does not see.”103 As the mode of 
governing indigenous peoples develops complexity, responding to indigenous assertions of self-
determination (such as the Tent Embassy in which Pat Eatock played a key role), technologies of 
managing and fixing difference become more agile. Now the state no longer simply distributes, 
fixes, and arrests abnormal subjects or racial others. To be sure, it retains the sovereign power to 
adjudicate who is indigenous and who is not, but, as we have seen, it does so by a complex 
process of recognition, structurally coupled to indigenous modes of collectivity, however 
imperfect this structural coupling may remain. On the other hand, in the actuvirtual sphere of the 
mass media, with the arrogation of artifacts of governmental belonging and its retention of 
formerly state-based technologies of physiognomic gaze and genealogical imaginary, the 
distribution of the sensible recurs and returns, concealing the desire to decide who belongs and 
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how, who seems or can be seen to be indigenous. Governmental belonging draws its imagined 
legitimacy from the artifacts of a mode of thinking, seeing, and distributing alterity which has 
long been recognized as discriminatory within the accounting of the state. It is in this context that 
indigenous subjects who might have emphasized their desire to maintain the privacy of their 
modes of collective and communal belonging are compelled to make public and therefore, 
political, how they belong together---challenging the distribution of the sensible that traverses the 
actuvirtuality of such mass media evaluations as Bolt’s.  
Indigenous subjects often walk the line between the revelation of their identification and 
the resistance to making “visible the fact that they belong to a shared world the other does not 
see.” Where, for Rancière, such revelation is a political act, indigenous subjects often eschew 
politics in favor of endurance. But where the physiognomic gaze recurs in the mass media and the 
invocation of late liberalism’s legal apparatus remains the only recourse for public repudiation, 
such indigenous subjects also find their political revelations of collectivity subjected to yet 
another round of state adjudication. By revealing how they belong within the logos of the state 
adjudication, they are able to silence and delegitimize mass mediated misrepresentations, but this 
political act always comes with the accompanying surrender of a degree of autonomy. By 
challenging actuvirtual evaluations, subaltern subjects must often find their recourse in state 
adjudication. Nonetheless, in key moments, such adjudication perceives and upholds the networks 
of identification and communal recognition, which traverse indigenous kinship. In such moments, 
it seems, we must be more wary of the pundits than the sovereign.  
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CODA 
“Need I Repeat?”: 
Settler Colonial Biopolitics and (Post)colonial Iterability in Kim 
Scott’s Benang 
 
Sergeant Hall was remarkably progressive in his ideas, 
particularly for a policeman. He understood it was 
necessary to raise the level of debate.  
Raise it? Raise it from the level of troublesome 
indigenous fauna, of vermin control, of eradication and 
slaughter; raise it to the level of animal husbandry. 
 . . .  
And need I repeat radical, progressive thoughts of the 
time? 
 
Kim Scott, Benang 1999, 75–6. 
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Settler Australia is increasingly conscious of the need to redress the material 
consequences of its colonial history, and to symbolically commemorate related injustices. The 
dialectic between symbolic and material politics may appear to render either as incommensurate 
poles. Nonetheless, in the Australian context, this apparent incommensurability raises the 
specters of the long term derision of symbolism by former Prime Minister John Howard.1 To 
raise such questions as the materiality of redress and of its necessary relation to the symbolism of 
mourning and reconciliation implies questioning the very language of raising in the context of 
the policy of assimilation. In the above epigraph, Nyoongar novelist Kim Scott begins to do just 
that. Scott’s text suggests that the covert regulatory function underlying the “progressive 
thoughts” of Australia’s settler colonial regime is intrinsically linked to its “animal husbandry” 
enfolding of racial difference into the biopolitics of physical anthropology.2 The meaning 
ascribed to repetition raises the stakes for the settler colonial nation’s self assertion as an 
unquestionably postcolonial multicultural liberalism. This is especially so since, as Scott makes 
clear, direct medical and sexual regulation of indigenous people also underlay the “progressive” 
policy of assimilation.  
In such a biopolitical colonial setting, repetition can position the cultural reconstruction 
of the colonized so as to necessitate a dual encounter; one that aims at reconnecting to the absent 
presence of the colonized while confronting the disruptive inscription of statistics that had 
attempted its effacement. Such an encounter takes place at the moment when postcolonial 
writing engages the colonial archive. Here I want to offer an analysis of the specific form of 
biopolitics to which Indigenous Australians were subjected through much of the twentieth 
century, by close reference to a text of A. O. Neville—Western Australian Chief Protector of 
Aborigines for much of the first half of the twentieth century. In light of this, I will assemble a 
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reading of Scott’s novel Benang: From the Heart to reveal its reconfiguration of traces of this 
source text and its deconstruction of what I tactically call wadjelogocentricism.3 From within this 
fictive critique of the colonial archive, Benang offers a magical realist reconstitution of 
Aboriginal identity. 
Some historians have attempted to separate government policies toward Aborigines of 
manifest genocidal intent from those aimed at cultural destruction. Scott’s novel intertwines the 
biopolitical dimensions of native administration with the disruption of cultural modes of 
belonging, problematizing the foundational assumptions of such historiography. To do so, Scott 
foregrounds the analytics of blood, descent, and sexual relations that will become increasingly 
subject to regulation within the regime of Aboriginal administration. Scott calls Neville’s 
Australia’s Colored Minority a “perverse[ly]” revealing source for Benang.4 Neville’s text plays 
out the analytics of sex and blood through a set of terms that foreground biology and enfold 
culture.5 That Neville entangles this biopolitics within a rhetoric of cultural “uplift” may be amid 
the reasons for the aforementioned historiographical elision of biologism in favor of cultural 
destruction. 
Neville’s text consistently employs a tropology that collapses racial and cultural 
destruction within the frame of a colonial biopolitics. Tropes of raising, uplift, elevation, and 
drift, reverberate throughout Benang, entwining cultural destruction in racial science and 
population mapping. Neville’s application of these tropes situates a cultural progressionism 
undergirded by an operative biologism. Playing on such floating figures, Scott puts into play a 
deconstructive repetition of colonial biopolitics to séance the specters of Aboriginal kinship's 
past buried between the lines of such archival marks.  
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Disheartening Biopolitics: Assimilation’s Perverse Prescriptions 
 
We must be realistic—the heart should not overrule the head in such matters.6 
A. O. Neville, 1947. 
 
The settler colonial discursive field consistently approaches colonized bodies by 
reference to the futurity of the Aboriginal population, itself referred to the norms of color and 
blood type of the white Australian population. One contemporary colonial writer asserted that 
Aboriginal policy should “make use of the study of anthropometry for [the] study of what the 
[white] race may become.”7  
Within the settler colonial regime, some government actors focused on Aboriginal 
cultural logics, others on the postulates of racial biology. One can disentangle this discourse in 
the terms of Michel Foucault, who argues that such a regime’s discursive webs of semiotic 
enunciations (énoncés) and apparatuses (dispositifs) enmesh knowledge about subjects of power 
in the regimes of their regulation. “Given that such a regime is capable of containing 
contradictory énoncés,” the operation of a apparatus must be extracted from what is consistent 
despite differences of opinion, say, in policy framing and intention.8 Absorption—the manifestly 
racial and eugenic policy of “breeding out color” among Aboriginal people—and the more 
culturally focused assimilation, in this light, constitute a field of power which enfolds cultural 
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destruction within the biological modeling of the colonized population and direct intervention at 
the level of the anatamo-physical disposition of colour, blood, and intermarriage. In other words, 
either is rendered in the terms of biopolitics and its application as biopower. In that light, it may 
be necessary to further clarify the way that term will be used here.9  
In the Australian context, as we have seen, such Native Administrators as Neville 
understood their role in relation to native peoples by reference to an abstract model of the future 
white population’s homogeneity. This homogeneity was always to be determined by the 
application of pastoral power as a mode for transform the population of the postcolonial settler 
state. The gathering of information on “proposed marriages,” and the perceived colour of those 
involved, was at the heart of this process. This question of racial “destiny” resounds throughout 
Australia’s Coloured Minority. The analysis of Aboriginal birth and death rates led to the 
recognition of a rising population of aborigines of mixed parentage. The resultant concern over 
“the half-caste problem” came to occupy every proceeding settler colonial administration. 
Perceptions of white vitality were implemented through the analytics of color that protectors 
used to maintain the state of exception under which the population of people of Aboriginal 
descent found itself differentiated. 
This simultaneously gendered and raced analytics of the Aboriginal population is referred 
not only through analytics of colour, but also through an evaluation of cultural factors: degree of 
tribalization, morality of gender relations at the frontier. While this biopolitics enfolds the 
perceived “evolutionary order[ing]” of aborigines, taxonomized through the assertions of 
anthropologists, its goal is the “futurity” of the population, the “destiny of the race,” and with it, 
the correlative concern with “welfare,” and “security.10” This structure positions an evaluation of 
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cultural development such that the overall goal of the dispositif is to place “people in 
evolutionary order, looking at it from the point of view of assimilation—the future of all the 
native people being under consideration.”11 
Neville’s administrative aims are reliant on a knowledge power which comes to define 
concrete application: the relation between missions, state institutions, and government 
“Authority.” This prescription for the future regulation of generations of Aboriginal people 
through a plurality of disciplinary mechanisms—forced marriage, adoption, stolen children—
applies power by enfolding biopolitical control within this sovereign Authority. For Neville, 
Authority—which appears capitalized throughout the book—stands for “[t]he power [and] . . . 
obligation by law to educate, feed, medically attend and otherwise safeguard [Aboriginal] wards 
[of the Government],” a power which “rests upon Authority.”12 For Neville, the centralization of 
“Authority” retains mechanisms of biopower (and its correlative civilizing mission at the level of 
the Church) while subjecting the entire Aboriginal population to a reorientation consonant with 
the population’s futurity and subordination to the maintenance of the white racial type. Neither 
emerging entirely from the level of federal state government—though perhaps from the office of 
Chief Protector—and only vested in the police, Authority is something that agents of biopower 
should themselves submit to in applying power to the native bodies and minds to which they 
minister. Authority appears to be the force that is associated with the government and the 
sovereign while never wholly reducing to it. 
“Authority” is to centrally distribute the epistemology of life, death, birth, race, and sex 
which will underpin such application. Government is to “look to the practical side,” while “the 
Church [is to] take care of the spiritual.” “Science” is to enfold either by “help[ing] to train and 
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advise both of the nature of the people and its culture, towards whose enlightenment all three are 
working.13” Within this “far-sighted plan of operations,” assimilation of the target “half-caste” 
population is to be realized—as Neville and numerous other writers within the dispositif of this 
settler biopolitics insist—across “generations.”14  
Within this biopolitics of racial destiny and national normativity, two aspects of 
“Science” are identified. For Neville, “[t]he Scientist, with his trained mind and keen desire to 
exert his efforts in the field investigating native culture and in studying the life history of the 
species, supplies an aid to administration.”15 The trope of “native culture” covertly encodes 
certain development assumptions of the contemporary functionalist anthropology—as opposed to 
the physical anthropology favored at the University of Adelaide—particularly those favored by 
University of Sydney Chair in Anthropology A. P. Elkin, who writes Neville’s introduction. 
Elkin and Neville also corresponded over issues of policy. In a single letter, Neville concisely 
offers information on the form of education of half-castes in “mission and settlement schools,” 
the highest level Neville “contend[s],” up to which children should be educated, the state of 
native settlements, and other questions of native administration.  What Neville calls “the nature 
of the people,” rhetorically and syntactically precedes their “culture.” The “nature of the people” 
refers to the place of Aboriginal people within the “life history of the species.” In this way, the 
administration of aboriginal people operates as an anthropological machine which refers to the 
future of the white settler population. 
Neville situates this “science” of “the people,” as a knowledge of “the life history of the species.” 
Every biopolitical agent of “protection” within the new regime is to take on the knowledge of 
“science” necessary to position each sanction of a marriage, cohabitation, or copulation, as well 
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as each removal and placement of a child. As such, each agent of biopower was to position each 
act of discipline and care within a paradigm that aims to determine the future of the 
homogeneous normativity of white Australia.16 Relying on Cleland’s taxonomy, this mode of 
pastoral regulation relied on a rhetoric of elevation, uplift, and “raising.” For Neville, uplift is 
elevation into a population within which Aboriginal people are to be absent in every way except 
as spectral traces within the pool of blood that comprises the future Australian genus. Neville 
cites Cleland’s assertion that “the ultimate absorption of these persons into the white community 
. . . will not necessarily lead in any way to a deterioration of type.”17 On the same page Neville’s 
assertion that, “[a]s I see it, what we have to do is to elevate these people to our own plane,” 
appears for the first time (emphasis added). This phrase finds its way into Benang, the first 
citation of Neville’s text by Scott in his critique of uplift. The metaphorics of “raising,” and 
elevating run through Neville’s text and are played on in their various modes by Scott. Neville 
also refers to this upward metaphor in terms of “lift[ing] out,” amidst else (Neville 25). By 
inserting a parallel metaphor, Scott’s creative citation manifests a palimpsest which not only 
produces the magical realism of his novel, but also, when read adjacent to Neville’s text, draws 
out the metaphoricity that runs through the latter, rhetoricizing a spatial metaphor in order to 
flesh out a groundless taxonomy. There are numerous variations on the metaphor in Neville’s 
text, including the other question of “raising,” on which Scott similarly plays, and such figures as 
“lift[ing] out.”  
As a source for Scott, Neville stands to reveal how the discursive operations of such a 
regime of power manifest the conditions for their own deconstruction. In drawing out such a 
deconstruction, Scott exceeds the dismissal of racial pseudoscience to underscore the way this 
biopolitical brand of colonial knowledge, while perverse, is far from random. This perverse 
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biopolitical power posits and refines an internally consistent regime of population modeling that 
cannot be dismantled merely by its dismissal as pseudoscientific. For this reason, we should risk 
along with Scott this gesture of taking the colonial archive of biopolitical power seriously, in 
order to foment a more rigorous critique.  
 
Benang’s Strong Pulse: Kinship and Iterability 
 
I touch the earth only once in my performance—leaving a single footprint in white sand 
and ash—through me we hear the rhythm of many feet pounding the earth, and the strong 
pulse of many hearts beating  
Kim Scott, Benang, 1999, 9. 
 
The specter of biopolitics and biopower—of missions, institutions, and racialized population 
control—haunts the colonial archive as it haunts (post)colonial Australia.18 Employing this 
archive as the enabling hinge between a critique of colonial biopolitics and a reconstruction of 
the kinship lines it has disrupted, Benang is the complex tale of a Nyoongar-descended child of 
the stolen generations, whose white grandfather Ernest Solomon Scat was enmeshed in Neville’s 
“science” of breeding out skin colour. Benang repositions the genre of family history in light of 
its disruption by the regime in which Scat is enmeshed, designed to make of Benang’s 
protagonist Harley, “the first-born-successfully-white-man-in-the-family-line.”19 The traces of 
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kinship concealed within this textual space concern both Scott the writer— working in the Battye 
Library—and Harley the character, floating above Scat’s papers.20 Scott notes that he worked in 
the J. S. Battye Library of West Australian History while researching such colonial archival 
sources for the novel as the Aborigines and Native Welfare Departments; the motif of Harley 
while reading through the colonial records of his grandfather recurs throughout the novel.21 Here, 
I refer to one of the earliest instances. As Lisa Slater has argued, the body transformed by this 
textual presence, continuously risks its own monstrosity.22 Scott’s novel traverses textual and 
performative convention in order to transcend the legacy of biopolitical determination that 
assaults Harley’s body through the insistence of text.  
“Uplift” and “raising” are central among a panoply of terms drawn from Neville’s text 
and emplaced within Benang. Playing with these tropes, Scott draws out the biopolitics which, 
we have seen, undergirds colonial liberal governance. This figural uplift sees Benang’s 
protagonist Harley “floating toward the ceiling,” in response to his researches into Scat’s past. 
Harley’s body is enmeshed in text, the traces not only of a formally colonial European mode of 
expression, but also of the specific signifiers that have been drawn from the colonial archive, 
from Neville’s text. He attempts to transform his levitation into a practice that can speak through 
Nyoongar orality: “hovering in the campfire smoke and sing[ing] as best [he] can.”23 Through 
this text, Harley recovers traces of the culture that has been withheld from him through the 
dispositif of absorption-assimilation.  
By transmuting terms through repetition, Harley’s singing also allows him to make 
meaning from the family name he uncovers in Scat’s papers: Benang. He becomes Benang, a 
meaningful reappropriation of a name that cannot adequately transliterate his Nyoongar 
grandmother’s true name. Harley/Benang exhorts his reader to “consider the ignorant scribes: 
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Benang, Pinyan, Winnery, Wonyin.”24 Attending to such repetition and difference, Scott’s novel 
makes possible Harley/Benang’s rediscovery and (re)appropriation of the name and kinship 
denied him. The novel ends by returning to this name “Benang,” in order to reaffirm the renewed 
meaning of this (re)appropriation. In Noongar, “benang” is also the word for “tomorrow.” This 
indexical naming, then, also temporally projects toward a restorative model of the future. This is 
the case for Harley particularly—and, in the form of his linguistic acts of conjuring—for 
descendents of stolen Nyoongar people more generally, in so far as they have been cut off from 
those to whom their descendents had been knowing kin. The novel closes, “offer[ing] these 
words, especially, to those of you I embarrass, and who turn away from the shame of seeing me . 
. . [Y]ou hear something like a million million many-sized hearts beating, and the whispering of 
waves, leaves, grasses . . . We are still here Benang.”25 Here, through a critical and wary 
repetition, the continued presence of Nyoongar people in general and the Benang family in 
particular attains presence through Harley’s prose. This repetition is redoubled as a continuous, 
unfinalizable project. “We are still here Benang,” means that a family name and with it, a whole 
complex of kinship, has been reclaimed while also simultaneously connoting “we are still here 
tomorrow.” This unfinalizable closure of the novel’s model of restoration and endurance, Scott 
elsewhere calls “regeneration, continuity, and going back to go forward.”26  Through Harley’s 
imagined autobiography, this operation serves as a model for the futurity of such a speech act 
outside the bounds of the fictive diagesis of the novel. By repeating Harley’s attainment in 
advance, Scott’s story models a possible future Aboriginal life writing against the archive of 
colonial biopolitics—one that acts in the world by recourse to the tension between fictionalized 
and productive destabilizations of the genealogies of already “ignorant scribes.” 
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Rather than purporting to rediscover an essential Nyoongar identity, Scott describes 
Harley’s working through the tension between the act of singing while floating and physical 
presence in proximity to the earth; a dialectic facilitated through the painful engagement with the 
textual archive that has left him separated from his family’s kinship. Harley’s floating singing 
refuses a simplistic return to the precolonial essentialism offered through the colonial archive. 
Instead, this poiesis thematizes the confusion that surrounds the recovery of kinship through such 
an archive, and the sublation of text and song, body and cultural expression. The locus of 
corporeal transformation at the “heart” can be read as Scott’s subtle retooling of Neville’s 
rejection of this metaphoric body part’s “overrul[ing] the head.” The heart becomes a locus of 
rediscovery for the wounded body of the stolen Aboriginal child, evading its overdetermination 
in terms of whiteness and descent within the colonial genealogies of the absorption-assimilation 
dispositif. Benang, then, attempts to deanchor kinship and the body from their position within 
and positioning by the colonial archive. In doing so, it valorizes the “heart” beyond a biological 
stratum, or something “overrule[d]” by the “head” of this wadjelogocentrism. To do so, the novel 
must work back through the text of the dispositif that produced the colonial trauma of the stolen 
generations. 
The novel’s first mention of kinship comes in the context of the disposal of the body of a 
deceased Aboriginal boy named for Premier John Forrest—discarded because of the threat it 
apparently poses to the security of the settler population’s health. In a rhetoric that ironically 
mimes an administrative report, the reader is informed, “Kylie Bay’s Board of Health had written 
to the Aborigines Department asking for funds for the disposal of the body of said child which, 
having been deposited within the town area by blacks, posed a hazard to the town’s health.27” 
This fear will be repeated and magnified later in the voice of Mark, a son of the villainous 
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pastoralist families—the Mustles and the Dones. Mark’s “dad talked of a White Australia, about 
the dangers of contamination and infection.”28 Immediately after the Board of Health incident, 
Harley’s voice wells up, “I feel a certain kinship with the boy . . . when I began this project, I too 
breathed in the scent of something discarded, something cast away and let drift and now only 
washed up.”29 It is as if the book’s project returns to pursue its “feel[ing]” of “kinship,” through 
entering the space of the archive of “discarded” textual traces; one part and parcel of the regime 
of biopolitical control that linked the local “Board of Health,” to the “Aborigines Department” in 
the past. Just so, in the present the archives of each remain discursively connected in the traces of 
date and contemporaneity that also allow the narrator to reconstruct narrative and even kinship. 
Yet the discarded fragments of text in the colonial archive also refer to Aboriginal bodies. 
The archive fragments bodies through language, fixing and reordering them. Such bodies were 
seized as wards and placed in institutions, assaulted by the police (as is Benang’s Harry Cuddles 
soon after receiving his exemption papers),30 prevented from marrying or retaining children (as 
happens throughout Benang), or exhorted to marry as soon as they were adequately “trained for 
absorption.” If then, Harley “breath[s] in the scent” of the discarded fragments of the past, it is as 
part of a project which accounts for text while aiming to recover the meaningful subject position 
of that which has been left a-drift.  
Like the trope of uplift, “drift” is sourced from Neville’s text, in which it smooths over 
the slippage between heredity and environment—a central aporia in the wadjelogocentrism of 
Neville’s biopolitics. For Neville, “[h]eredity produces physical results, many of which are 
subject to correction by modern medical science, while the influence of environment can perform 
miracles. Take the native child in infancy and it will grow up as you choose to train it, its 
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antecedents influencing its life not at all, being completely forgotten.”31 In this way, the 
ontogeny of the native child—particularly the partially “uplifted” half-caste—is to be understood 
as capable of “performing,” the “mirac[ulous]” capacity to acquire civilization. Heredity 
completes the task of whitening the native child, rendering this child an amnesiac with regard to 
his or her “antecedents”—enacting a violent disruption of kinship by recourse to a colonial 
system of descent and genealogy. 
 
Neville’s fear is that natives might “revert” for, “should its training stop short of 
adolescence, some adverse human influence may cause a cultural reversion to type of an 
undesirable character.”32 By conditioning the “environment” of stolen native children, the 
operations of the administration at the level of biopower are to perfect the ontogeny of the 
“living stone age” Caucasian. It is at the moment in the controlled development of the child to 
adulthood that Neville’s worries figure as a metaphor of drift and reversion: “some,” he fears, 
“will drift back to native camps.”33 Without rigorous regulation to prevent “reversion,” then 
“[t]he youngster is apt to find himself as in an oarless boat adrift on a wide sea.”34 In Benang, 
this line is repeated through Scat’s voice at the moment when Harley notes he has freed himself 
“from the timetable set for [him]” by Neville’s biopolitics; effected through his Grandfather’s 
applied “training for absorption.”35  In the inscription of the regime, drift stands for the failure of 
biopower’s rigorously attempted distinction between heredity and environment. 
These drifting and floating metaphors overlap in Benang. Thinking of “Nyoongar 
language [and] Culture,” Harley muses upon “all the things I did not have. Unsettled, not 
belonging—the first white man born,” whereupon he floats toward the ceiling: “I let myself 
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drift.”36 Harley floats “as far as the joists” worried by the textuality of his floating, which risks 
rendering him “a solitary full stop.”37 Drift and uplift compound one another, threatening to 
make a self-fulfilling prophecy of Neville’s dubious prognostications for the settler nation’s 
biological future. The rhythm of repetition surges up in the novel to sublate the dimension of 
cultural loss that threatens such stolen children as Harley through the dialectic of drift and uplift. 
This sublation must move the assemblage of wadjelogocentric binaries—drift/uplift, 
earth/uplift, Nyoongar orality/archival text—through various rhythmic repetitions in order to 
finally attain the closing motif of “repeat, return, remain.” Promising restored kinship, this motif 
must banish the spectral whiteness that haunts the Nyoongar people of mixed parentage. Even as 
Harley watches the horizon while indulging in one of his flights, tethered “like a balloon,” he 
notes that while 
 
I preferred to be let drift, and it came so naturally to me . . . The sea, like the fire, formed 
and reformed out of the island—even at night—there was that blossoming; white, gone, 
white, gone white gone. Like what? Like ectoplasm, like breathing. 
Here. 
Here. 
Here.38 
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This notation of the whiteness of the sea insistently returns to haunt Harley. The ectoplasmic 
whiteness in the archive of the White Australia Policy’s eugenic regime insistently affects the 
lives of generations. The return of “white,” from its regular recession into the waves (“gone”) 
makes Nyoongar identity merely the absent dialectical other of whiteness: “white, gone, white, 
gone.” Yet Harley’s use of repetition deconstructs this rhythm, rendering it a rearticulation of the 
full stop that has hitherto threatened Harley’s textual body, “gone white gone.” The colonial 
dialectic of complexion is fragmented. In emplacing such fragmentation, Scott produces a an  
indigenous belonging that is not fixed within a colonialist reiteration of the Hegelian dialectic of 
master and slave but rather proffers a multiple and productive futurity. What follows is 
Nyoongar presence and its necessary repetition in the rhythmic tripled “Here.” As Scott’s prose 
continues to expound such repetitions throughout the novel, this textual weave leads to the 
rhythm of song, and to the “repeat, return, remain” that affirms to Nyoongar people that they too 
remain as a presence: “We are still here. Benang.” By repeating from the very archive whose 
traces foreground the absenting of Aboriginality, Scott reconstructs kinship from within such 
floating biopolitical signifiers as “drift” and “uplift.” 
 
Coda: Need I Repeat? 
 
Towards the end of 2004, I recall driving along the peninsula in Maylands, Perth’s local 
radio station RTR FM crackling on the stereo. The program was a segment on etymology in 
which a prominent local linguist—an expert in Aboriginal languages—would discuss a different 
word each week, which that week was Sorry—to coincide with the Reconciliation Council’s 
annual “Sorry Day.” The linguist sharply expressed the way that sorrow, in English, could be 
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endowed with the sense of a shared mourning that need not reduce to a calculation of blame; an 
accusatory simplification that many deriders of “Sorry Day” had leveled (Jones 171-2). Yet even 
this left leaning intellectual said he felt that, since John Howard’s refusal to apologize to the 
victims of the stolen generation, the necessity of this symbolic gesture had given way to more 
material imperatives. I raise this, anecdotally in order to return to and repeat debates over 
reconciliation from the recent past. Scott’s question of the necessity of “repeat[ing]” such 
traumas is, I think, pertinent to a general structure of  presence and absence that must inform any 
self-ascribed postcoloniality in a nation that has never ceased to be, in some sense, a settler 
colony.  
The question with which I began, “need I repeat?” is followed on a separate line by an 
immediate “no”—at once questioning and underscoring the centrality of repetition in Scott's 
literary project. Scott should not have to repeat the policies of the past. Yet Harley nonetheless 
does repeat the “radical progressive thoughts of the time.” One can read this tension between the 
presences and absences of repetition through a theoretical concern with the productive function 
of language which Jacques Derrida calls iterability. For Derrida “a performative statement 
succeed[s]” only through “a repeated ‘coded’ or iterable statement” (“Signature, Event, 
Context,” 326). In Derridean terms, the first significations to metaphorize Aboriginality in the 
colonial archive of “progressive thoughts” at once limit and delimit the conditions for their 
possible reconfiguration. Repeated iterations might remark a formal dimension of their initial 
inscription—say, of the status of Aboriginal subjects in Neville’s text. Such repetitions might 
precisely repeat the initial limits and blindnesses of that which they repeat—even as such limits 
also return in today’s government policies. The performative repetition of absences occulted by 
colonial discourse is both a crucial gesture of resistance and, ironically, the condition of 
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remembrance per se. Such an insistence on repetition—on postcolonial iterability—makes clear 
that Australia’s claim to postcolonial status is reliant upon a never ending need to memorialize 
past trauma. 
The lesson of Derridean iterability is that Howard’s refusal to mourn conjures the refusal 
of white memorialization that can only now be repeated—even in the apology of 2008 when 
opposition leader Brendan Nelson continued to insist on the “good intentions” of the agents of 
assimilation. The initial refusal of apology itself repeats colonial trauma—in the mode of a 
denial. If one follows the logic of the academic in my story, the symbolic repetition of past 
trauma is less significant than the continued need to address the care and welfare of Aboriginal 
people—a biopolitical imperative on the part of the national agenda that is being repeated in the 
Northern Territory Intervention, many of the aspects of which remain in the Gillard 
Government’s policies. This materialism, directed toward Aboriginal bodies, reproduces a 
structure of anomie (the suspension of native title by compulsory acquisition and its substitution 
by government leases) and biopower (medicalizing the body) that very much looks like a 
repetition of earlier settler colonial biopolitics. Separating out the material needs from the 
colonized from the memory of past injustice is impossible. As Mick Dodson recently stated that, 
“I can’t think of anything symbolic that’s not also concrete” (Browning). The ethos of repetition 
in Scott’s novel could, then, be seen as a critique of the refusal—until recently—to mourn the 
past of colonial biopolitics in the most frank, honest, and confronting manner possible.  
Any transcendent refusal of mourning must be utterly rethought for postcolonial spaces 
where the body of the colonized continues to be subjected as bare life. Repeating the symbolic, 
repeating the traumatic, and reestablishing such structures of recovered kinship and belonging is 
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an absolute necessity when colonial biopolitics appears poised to return as the dominant 
repetition to disrupt the lives of those who remain—at some level—irreparably colonized. 
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